


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THE
HISTORY
OF THE
CAMPAIN
OF
1796,
IN
GERMANY AND ITALY.

London:

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1797.

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PREFACE.

NO Person can be ignorant, how totally the war, which has desolated Europe for five years, has differed from all preceding ones in its nature, in the means that have been employed for the prosecution of it, and in the consequences that have resulted from it. Its history, inseparable from that of the French Revolution will, doubtless, be the most remarkable feature of the annals of this age. The campaigns of 1794 and 1796, will particularly attract the attention of posterity. In the first of these, political errors, still more than force of arms, enabled the French to become masters of the Netherlands, of Holland, and of all the
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countries on this side of the Rhine. The union of Belgium to France, and the application of the French system to Holland, left no doubt of the project formed by the French, to enlarge their territory, and to compel Europe to submit, either to their arms, or their principles. The spirit of moderation, which the successors of Roberespierre were obliged to affect for some time, as well as other political reasons, prevented the French from pursuing their ambitious designs, during the year 1795. They resumed the execution of them in 1796, employed more considerable means, and combined them with greater ability. They knew how to take advantage of the disunion and the errors of their enemies; diminished their numbers, partly by terror, partly by seduction; invaded Germany as well as Italy; and were on the point of accomplishing their plan of general disorganization in its fullest extent. One young hero saved Germany: but a young man also, on the other
other

other side, was almost constantly victorious in Italy.

The disastrous consequences which these events might have brought with them on Europe, the effects which they have already produced, and those which may result from them hereafter, attach a considerable degree of importance and of interest to the campaign of 1796. Possibly there may be some persons who would wish to have before them, in one view, all the various facts which compose it, combined, arranged, and connected. This is what I now presume to offer to the public. I have neglected no enquiries, nor pains, to give to this historical account exactness and perspicuity, the only merits of which a work of this sort will admit. It seems to me, that he who writes, not on Theories, but on Facts, is absolutely bound to be impartial, both with respect to things, and to persons, whatever may be his own interests and opinions.

—I have endeavoured to prove myself such to my readers.

The materials from which I have composed this Work, have been partly collected from the accounts officially published at London, Vienna, and Paris ; and partly procured through means of a correspondence which I have constantly kept up with some distinguished military characters on the Continent. Some of these have been and still are, actually engaged in this war ; and the others have watched its progress with the most attentive and intelligent observation. I have spared no pains to put together and to compare these various materials. This Work is, in fact an abstract and a combination of all these accounts.—I have endeavoured to draw from the whole, a result, if not absolutely correct, at least, as nearly so, as it was in my power to make it.

The

The knowledge which I myself have personally had of the greater part of the theatre of the war, of some of the armies which are engaged in it, and of several of the Generals who command them, joined to some degree of experience in the subject which I treat of, cannot have failed to be of considerable use to me.

I hope it will not be expected, that there should be found in this historical detail, a constant and minute criticism on the operations of the commanders, and on the causes of their success or their failures. On this point I have thought it right to impose on myself a good deal of reserve.—For if the art of war presents so many difficulties to those who are carrying it on; if its chances are attended with so many vicissitudes; if accident so often deceives the foresight of the most able commander, or gives him unexpected success; would it not be ridiculous in any man to presume, in his closet, to form

form a correct judgment of military operations, the object, as well as the probable advantages and inconveniencies of which, are often unknown, even to those who are employed to execute them?

Anxious as I am to avoid this reproach, I have nevertheless endeavoured to explain the motives for the different movements of the armies, and have not refrained from presuming to censure or to applaud, where there was evidently room either for the one or the other. If, notwithstanding the choice of my correspondents, and my earnest endeavour to relate the exact truth, I have (as I have too much reason to fear) fallen into some errors, I hope to derive my pardon from the reflection that will occur to candid minds, on the difficulty of stating facts quite correctly, when one is at once so distant from the countries, and so near to the period, in which the events to be recorded took place.

Note.

Note. I could have wished to add to this book, some military maps of Germany and Italy, in which the reader might be able to follow the march of the armies, and to trace the manœuvres of the Generals. But I could meet with none in London of a proper form and scale to answer this purpose. I could neither procure those of Chauchard or Jæger, which are the best for Germany; nor have I been more fortunate with respect to Italy. However, those of my readers, who do not wish to look very much into the detail of military operations, will probably have some general map where they will be able to trace the more important movements of the armies, and find the names of the principal places. With respect to those who being of the military profession, or from taste, would wish to follow step by step the marches of the smallest corps, and to form an exact knowledge of all their positions, they will hardly have waited till now to procure maps sufficiently detailed. As it may be however useful to some, I just observe, that the best maps which I have met with in London, are, for Germany, that of the banks of the Rhine by Mr. Delisle; it is in
three

three sheets, which takes in a great part of the theatre of war in 1796. It is to be had at almost all the Mapsellers, as are also two others for the campaign in Italy. The first, which consists of two sheets, is by Mr. D'Anville, and comprehends all Italy, Sicilly, Sardinia, and Corfica. The second is a map of the Duchy of Mantua; it was published at the end of last year, by J. Cary, is well executed, and on a sufficiently large scale. Mr. Faden, Geographer to the King, received, a short time ago, twenty copies of a very good map of Lombardy, by Chauchard, but they were bought up in a few days.

CAMPAIGN.

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C A M P A I G N

OF

1796,

IN

G E R M A N Y.

C H A P T E R I.

Relative situation of the Imperial and Republican Armies before the opening of the Campaign.— Estimate of their respective force.—Interest of the French to carry on an offensive war.—Interest of the Imperialists to adopt a defensive one.—Rupture of the Armistice.—Movements of the French on both banks of the Lower Rhine.—Battle of Uckerath and of Altenkirchen.—Evacuation of the Hundsruck, by the Archduke Charles.—March of that Prince to the Lahn.—Battles of Westlaer.—Second battle of Uckerath.—Retreat of the French beyond the Rhine and the Sieg.

IT is necessary, before we enter on a narrative of the events of this campaign, to explain the strength and position of the adverse armies, at the moment of its commencement, and to introduce

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some details on the interests of the belligerent powers, on the objects to which their views were apparently directed, and on the means which they respectively possessed to attain them.

At the period of opening the campaign, the Imperial and French Armies were situated in the following manner.—The Rhine separated them from the frontiers of Switzerland to the environs of the town of Spires, where it ceased to be their common barrier. Beyond that city, the cantonments which they respectively occupied at the distance of some leagues from each other, extended across the upper Palatinate, the Dutchy of Deux Ponts, and the Hundsruck. The line occupied by the Imperial Army passed through the towns of Spires, Neustadt, Kayserlautern, Kuffell ; and from thence, crossing the Nahe, terminated at the Rhine, in the neighbourhood of Baccharach. At this point, that river again became the common separation of both armies, and continued so to beyond Cologne, between the river Sieg, and the town of Duffeldorf. The Austrians and French divided between them the space between the river and the last-mentioned fortrefs, before which the army of the latter had an intrenched camp. The Imperialists possessed on
the

the Rhine the strong fortresses of Phillipbourg, Mannheim, Mayence, and Ehrebreitstein. The French on their part possessed on the upper Rhine, those of Alsace, and on the lower Rhine, that of Dusseldorf.

With respect to the strength of the opposed armies, it is obvious, that in order to be enabled to appretiate them with absolute precision and certainly, it would be necessary that the author should have been commander in chief, or at least an officer of the staff of both armies. His enquiries however on this point, have been numerous and extensive, and he has addressed himself for the purpose to those persons, whom their local position, and their military situation equally placed within reach of very good information on the subject. The communication which he has received from them, enables him to form a near estimate of the numbers of the French and Imperial armies, at the opening of this campaign. He thinks himself authorised to state, that at this time, the two French armies, commanded by Generals Jourdan and Moreau, amounted to more than 160,000 men; and that the Imperial forces commanded by his Royal Highness the Arch-

duke Charles, including the Saxons and other contingents of the empire, were nearly 150,000 men.

Every motive which determined the French Government to continue the war, made it likewise their interest, or rather indeed imposed upon them the necessity to carry it beyond the Rhine, and into the heart of Germany. They had at their command a great number of soldiers, but were in want of money to pay them, of cloaths to cover them, and means to subsist them. The Netherlands, Holland, and the countries situated between the Meuse and the Rhine, had borne, during two years, the whole burden of maintaining the French armies. These countries, but a short time before so rich and so abundant, were exhausted; their whole specie was absorbed by contributions, their manufactures were suspended, and their produce consumed. An immense quantity of paper money without any real value, had operated to paralyze their commerce and their industry. The productions and commodities of the country were scarcely equal to the consumption of the armies and of the inhabitants. Two years had been sufficient to place the countries conquered by France on a level with herself, and to reduce them to one common equality

lity of dearth and misery. It was become therefore absolutely necessary, at whatsoever price it was to be accomplished, that the French should march forward into other countries, in search of subsistence, of horses, of cloaths, and above all, of money. These views were most unequivocally expressed by the directory in the order given to their Generals, that *they should maintain their troops by victory.*

To this urgent call of necessity were added some motives of ambition, and reasonings of political interest. The directory flattered itself, that by an invasion of Germany, it would accomplish the disunion of the Germanic body; that the inferior Princes, struck with terror, would hasten, by turns, to purchase a separate peace; that the Emperor, reduced to his own forces, stripped of one part of his dominions, and fearing to lose what remained, would in the end subscribe to such conditions of peace as it should please his conquerors to impose; that at the conclusion of the war, its final result would place all the countries on their side the Rhine in the possession of the French, and the fate of Germany in their disposal; and would leave them enriched with its spoils, and dictating laws to Europe. Such was the brilliant perspective which presented itself

to

to the chiefs of the French Republic, and at once directed their views, and animated their expectations.

If from what has been here suggested, it should appear that their plan would of course be offensive, every thing on the other hand seemed to prescribe to the Court of Vienna, a line of conduct almost entirely the reverse. A concurrence of military and political considerations ought to have engaged it to persist in the defensive system, which it had adopted and pursued with advantage the preceding year. The situation of the French and Imperial armies offered to the latter but few means to ensure, and but little reason to expect success in an offensive war. Several campaigns (amongst others those of 1674 and 1793) [*Note 1.*] had sufficiently shewn them how extremely difficult it was to penetrate into Alsace, and above all to maintain themselves there. France was scarcely more vulnerable by the rout of the Sarre and the Morelle, which were defended by a great number of strong places. They could still less think of retaking the Netherlands, and of advancing between the Moselle and the Meuse, the French being masters of Dusseldorf, of all the fortified towns of the Meuse, and

and of those of Holland. At any rate, the Imperial army being of inferior force, would have been unable to penetrate to the frontiers of France, or even to the Meuse, without fighting many battles. The advantages of the French, both in number and position, would have necessarily occasioned the loss of much time and many men; and could it even have been supposed that the Austrians would have been always victorious, the most successful campaign could at best have probably ended only in putting them in possession of one or two strong places, and in effecting their arrival on the banks of the Meuse.

The strength and situation of the Republican armies did not however permit the Court of Vienna to hope for these successes. It was evident that whether in Alsace, or on the Sarre, the Morelle, or the Meuse, all the chances, and all the advantages were on the side of the French. The Austrians, therefore ought to have adopted a plan for the campaign, of which the basis should have been essentially defensive, but the operations of which might be partially offensive, according to circumstances, and the nature of the countries.

If

If in a military point of view, the interest of the Emperor prescribed to him a defensive war, it was still better adapted to his circumstances in a political aspect. The loss of the Netherlands and Holland, and the defection of Prussia and Spain, deprived the rest of the coalition of every possibility of making conquests upon France. Under the necessity of continuing the war, the combined plan of England and of Austria, was less directed against the armies of the Republic, than against her finances and military resources. To follow up this system with advantage, it became the object of the campaign to observe, to exhaust, and to gain time, rather than to win battles. The great point was, to reduce the French to their own resources alone for the payment and maintenance of their numerous armies, to confine them on their frontiers and on those of the conquered countries; in a word, to hinder them from penetrating into, and spreading in Germany.

The most natural and most easy method to accomplish this object was, without doubt, to take the course of the Rhine as the line of defence, and to give to the different corps of the imperial army, the same disposition which Marshall Clairfait had established

established in 1795, a disposition of which that General's success had proved the advantage. It appeared adviseable after his example to abandon to the French, the Hundsruck, and the Dutchy of Deux Ponts, countries of little importance in themselves, already exhausted by the war, and which belong always of course (except in the case of a great superiority of force, to the possessor of Landau, Bitche, Sarrelouis, Treves, Traerbach, and Coblenz. By abandoning these countries, and carrying the greater part of their forces to the right bank of the Rhine, the Austrians would have been in a situation to strengthen it with a sufficient number of men to defend the passage of that River from Basle to Mannheim, and to place between the latter fortress, and that of Mayence a large body of troops, which could readily advance to the succour of either of those places, and support their Garrisons. By adopting this disposition, the Imperialists would have been enabled to place on the Lahn and the Sieg, more than a third of their army; to reinforce their right wing, the point where they were weakest and most menaced; to oppose a powerful resistance to any enterprise of the French on the Lower Rhine; to confine them in their camp before Dusseldorf, and

even to profit of any favourable opportunity to attack them there with advantage.

The dispositions and first movements of the Austrian Generals seemed to indicate the adoption of a different plan. The army of the Upper Rhine, under the command of Marshall Wurmser was strongly reinforced, which gave reason to suppose that it was intended he should cross the Rhine to penetrate into upper Alsace. At the same time the greater part of the army of the lower Rhine under the immediate orders of the Archduke Charles took post in the Hundsruck, and the Dutchy of Deux Ponts, and seemed to menace at once lower Alsace, and the fortresses on the Sarre and the Moselle. The misfortunes which rapidly followed these indications soon obliged the Austrians to renounce their first dispositions, and to adopt in part those which have been already mentioned. The armistice agreed upon at the end of the year 1795 between the French and Austrian Generals was put an end to by the latter on the 21st of May. One of the conditions of this suspension of arms being, that there should be an interval of ten days between its rupture and the renewal of hostilities, the respective armies became at liberty to recommence

mence them on the 31st of May. On that very day the French army of the Sambre and the Meuse, commanded by [*Note 2.*] General Jourdan, made a movement forwards on the two banks of the lower Rhine. On the same and the following day, some trifling affairs of advanced posts took place in the Hundsruck. It was on the right bank of the Rhine that the French employed the greater part of their force, and it was precisely there that the Imperialists had the least to oppose to them. There were not more than 20000 men to defend the Sieg, to cover the fortrefs of Ehrebreitstein, and to line the right bank of the Rhine, between the Sieg and the Lahn. This corps was commanded by the Prince of Würtemberg, who had taken a position in front of the Sieg. He was attacked there on the 1st of June by the greater part of the army of the Sambre and Meuse, under the order of General Kleber. After an engagement of several hours, the Austrians being forced at all points abandoned the Sieg, and retiring behind that river, took the strong position of Uckerath. They lost in this engagement 2400 men, of whom, if we are to give credit to the reports of General Kleber, 1000 were made prisoners.

That General did not allow the Prince of Würtemberg time to establish himself in his post, and to receive reinforcements. The French being unable, without a great sacrifice of men, to attack the formidable position of Uckerath in front, availed themselves the next morning of the superiority of their number, to outflank and turn it. The Prince of Würtemberg seeing himself on the point of being surrounded, quitted the position of Uckerath, and fell back on that of Altenkirchen, which was equally advantageous. He was attacked there the 4th of June in the morning. After a pretty vigorous resistance, the superiority of numbers again carried the point, and the Austrians were completely routed. They lost, according to the French accounts, 12 pieces of cannon, part of their baggage, and 3,000 men made prisoners. The fruit of this victory to the French was the capture of some magazines, without which they would have been unable to subsist in a country exhausted by the consumption of the armies. It forced the Austrians to retire behind the Lahn, leaving uncovered by that means the Fortrefs of Ehrebreitstein, which the French invested. The success of the French on the Lower Rhine, and the
 appre-

apprehensions that after forcing the passage of the Lahn, they would direct their march towards the Mein, and entirely turn his right, warned the Archduke of the pressing necessity which there was to reinforce the Prince of Würtemberg, and to check the progress of the army opposed to him. Renouncing therefore his diversion in the Palatinate, and the Hundsruck, he began on the 6th of June to retire from those two countries, and directed his march rapidly towards Mayence with the greater part of his army. He there passed the Rhine on the 9th, and proceeded by forced marches to encounter the French, who occupied the Lahn to the number of 50,000 men.

The Archduke not doubting that General Jourdan would hasten to pass the Rhine likewise with his division of the army to join General Kleber, felt how important it was to get the start of him, and to engage the French before their junction. Having secured the defence of the lower Lahn by three corps placed at Limbourg, Weilbourg, and Nassau, he marched in person towards the upper Lahn against the left wing of the French army commanded by general Lefebvre.

On

On the 15th, the Archduke made the right wing of his army pass the Lahn, and the Dille, at Westlaer. [*Note. 3.*] General Werneck, who commanded it, attacked the French, but was repulsed, and could not succeed in dislodging them from the advantageous position which they occupied. A brisk cannonade continued on both sides for the rest of the day: but towards seven o'clock in the evening a reinforcement of Saxon cavalry being arrived, the Archduke immediately attacked the enemy. The Austrian Cuirassiers of Karakzay and Nassau, in spite of the obstacles arising from the nature of the ground, and a tremendous fire of grape shot, made their way up the heights which were defended by the French infantry, charged them several times with the greatest intrepidity, and at length entirely broke them, and took from them several pieces of cannon. At the same moment a body of Austrian grenadiers attacked the enemy's center, and dislodged them from the woods which they occupied.

The French driven from their position took up another in their retreat equally good with the former. They were very soon attacked again. Four squadrons of Austrians and Saxons gained the steep heights, on
which

which some battallions of the enemy were posted, charged them with impetuosity, forced them and completed the victory. It cost the Imperialists about 500 men; the loss of the French was more considerable. Four of their battallions were cut to pieces by the Saxon and Austrian cavalry, which took also 12 pieces of cannon, and made a great many prisoners.

The French corps which defended the lower Lahn, not having met with better success, were obliged to quit the banks of that river to fall back on the Sieg. The Archduke pursued them without allowing them any respite, took some more prisoners, and got possession of a large quantity of provisions, of cannon, of artillery waggons, and baggage, which the difficulty of the country, the animosity of its inhabitants against the French, and the disorder of their retreat, made it impossible for them to save.

His Royal Highness did not give them time to recover or to collect together again. He manœuvred in such a manner, as to oblige General Jourdan, who had passed the Rhine at Neuwied on the 12th of June, to repass it on the 18th with the right wing of the French army. At the same time, he
sent

sent forward his advanced guard, about 11000 men strong, under the orders of General Kray, in pursuit of General Kleber, who was retiring towards the Sieg with 25,000 men.

On the 20th of June, General Kray came up with Kleber, who finding himself superior in numbers, attacked the Austrians with all his forces, and carried almost every point of their position. This first success promised the French a complete victory; but they were deprived of it by the bravery of three Austrian battallions, who unshaken by the numerous artillery of the French, suffered nine battallions to advance to within a hundred yards, and charging them with fixed bayonets, put them completely to the rout. This advantage gave time to the Saxon and Austrian cavalry to rally, to return victoriously to the charge, and finally to stop the progress of the enemy. The Imperialists lost in this affair, 5 or 600 men; they killed and wounded of the enemy 1,500, and took 700 prisoners. In this action the Austrians performed prodigies of valour; the event was the more honourable for them, as the French more than doubled them in number.

General Kleber defeated in this very position, which 18 days before he had taken from the
Austrians,

Austrians, was obliged to continue his retreat precipitately quite to the lines of Duffeldorf.

Thus in fifteen days the Archduke marched from the banks of the upper Nahe to those of the upper Lahn, gained two battles, and drove the French from the walls of Wetflaer to those of Duffeldorf. One cannot sufficiently admire the bravery of this young Prince, the rapidity of his movements, and the ability of his manœuvres. In this short space of time, he gave sufficient proofs of what his army and Germany might expect from him.

C H A P. II.

*Opening of the Campaign on the upper Rhine—
Evacuation of the Palatinate by Marshal Wurmser
—Departure of that General with 30,000 men
to Italy—Passage of the Rhine and capture of
Fort Kehl by the French—Their progress in the
country of Baden—Battle of Renchen—Battle of
Rastadt—Passage of the Sieg and the Rhine by
Generals Kleber and Jourdan—Battle of Monta-
bauer—Battle of Friedberg—Capture of the Fort
of Kœnigstein by the French—Their entrance into
Frankfort—Battle of Etlingem, and retreat of
the Imperialists.*

WHILST these events took place on the lower Rhine, the Imperial army commanded by Field Marshal Wurmser, and the French, under the orders of General Moreau, [Note 4.] had also opened the campaign on the upper Rhine. When the Archduke quitted the Hundsruck to march to the right bank of the Rhine, Marshal Wurmser at the same time withdrew his troops from the lines
of

of Spirebach, and made them take an excellent position before the fort of the Rhine, opposite to Mannheim. His right extended to the town of Frankenthal, and was covered, as well as his front, by inundation and canals, that joined to the little river of Rhebach, which bounded and defended his left.

General Moreau made two attacks on this position on the 14th and 20th of June, which produced no effect but the loss of some hundreds of men on both sides, and to confine the Imperialists within their entrenched camp before the Fort of the Rhine. Moreau made these two feints merely to fix the attention of Mr. De Wurmser to this point, and to deceive him with respect to his real designs. After leaving a small corps before the Austrian camp to observe it, he turned suddenly back on the 21st, and marched rapidly with the greatest part of his army towards Strasburg, where preparations were making for a more important enterprize.

The loss of the Milanese, and the desire of reconquering it, having determined the Court of Vienna to send Marshal Wurmser into Italy with 30,000 men of the army which he commanded in Germany, these troops began their march early

in June. Their departure diminished the Imperial army on the upper Rhine, nearly one half, and of course increased proportionally the superiority of the French, and may in fact be said to have opened to them the gates of Germany. They were informed of this movement in good time, [*Note. 5.*] indeed before it had actually taken place; and determined to take advantage of the opening, which the departure of so large a force left in the line of defence on the upper Rhine, an opening which Prince Charles's expedition on the lower Rhine, would not admit of his filling up for a considerable time. The French could not have chosen a more favourable moment to attempt the passage of the Rhine, and to invade Suabia, of which they had already formed the project. They hastened to carry it into execution; made their preparations with no less promptitude than secrecy; and disguised them under the pretext and appearance of some other expedition.

On the 24th of June, before the break of day, General Moreau embarked in boats 3000 men, who landed on several small islands that lye between Strasburg and the fort of Kehl. They easily drove from thence the Imperial Piquets, who in their
retreat

retreat, either had not time or address to break down the bridges which communicate with the right bank of the Rhine. The French therefore were enabled to pass over them, and suddenly attacked the redoubts of the Fort of Kehl, which were occupied by some troops of the circle of Suabia. These troops, surprized, and besides as ill-disciplined, as they were badly commanded, although attacked only by infantry without any cannon, either would not or did not know how to make use of the means of defence, with which this important post furnished them. They suffered it to be taken by the French, who found in it 500 men, and 15 pieces of cannon, and who when they had become masters of it, lost no time in putting themselves in condition to keep it. They immediately re-inforced it with a considerable number of men; and worked hard in the course of the day to establish a bridge of boats between Kehl and Strasburg.

The Imperial army on the upper Rhine having been considerably weakened by detaching 30,000 men from it to Italy, and Mr. De la Tour, who commanded in the room of Marshal Wurmser, not having at all suspected that the French would
attempt

attempt the passage of the river opposite to Kehl, the Austrians had but a small number of light troops near that place. The nearest corps to it was that composed of some thousands of Suabians, who were encamped at Marle and Wildstedt, about two or three leagues from Kehl. If these troops had been more vigilant, or better commanded, and had on the first discharge of cannon marched instantly towards the Fort, they certainly might have prevented the French from getting possession of it, or even have re-taken it, before the latter could have been enabled to transport cannon and cavalry over the river.

These troops however of the Empire made no movement whatever, but suffered the French to establish themselves firmly on the right bank of the Rhine. The inexcusable inaction, and unmilitary behaviour of the Suabian corps during the remainder of the campaign, exposed their Generals to the suspicion of holding correspondence with the enemy. [*Note 6.*]

The French took advantage of this remissness and alarm of the Imperial troops, to complete their bridge of boats, and to pass over with their cavalry and artillery. They spread themselves
over

over the plain, to prevent the approach of any force that might be sent against them, either from Offenburg, or from Rastadt. On the 26th they attacked the camp at Wildstedt, and easily drove the Suabian troops from thence. The only resistance they experienced was from the Austrian regiment of Anspach Cuirassiers, who arriving at that instant, furiously charged a corps of French infantry, broke through them, and cut to pieces a considerable number.

As soon as Mr. De la Tour was informed of the French having passed the Rhine, and of their having invaded the territory of Baden, he gave instant orders to the regiments which were nearest, to march, and put himself in motion with the greatest part of his forces to meet the enemy, and to endeavour to stop his progress. The Prince of Condé was amongst the first to set out with the corps which he commanded, and moved rapidly towards Offenburg, hoping to arrive there before the Republicans had made themselves masters of it. He accomplished this object and joined on the 27th at Biehl, before Offenburg, some Austrian detachments, as well as troops of the circles, which had been driven from the camp at Wildstedt. On the 28th however,
this

this corps of Imperialists was obliged to abandon its position, as well as the town of Offenburg, the French having brought against them several strong columns. The latter made this movement to prevent the junction of the Prince of Condé with several small Austrian corps, which were marching to his assistance, and thus to divide the Imperial army of the upper Rhine. This last object was of the utmost importance to them, and on its accomplishment, the success of the invasion in a great measure depended. General Moreau was perfectly aware of this, and towards this point directed all his movements and employed all his means. He divided his army, 80,000 men strong, into three columns; that on the right, under the orders of General Ferino, [*Note 7.*] was directed to drive back into the Brisgaw the corps of the Prince of Condé, and of General Frölich. It met with some success against them, and got possession of the town of Bibrach, in the valley of Kintzig.

The center, commanded by General St. Cyr, forced the passes which lead along the vallies of Renchen and Kintzig, to the mountains of Suabia. Continuing to advance he made himself master (on
the

the 4th of July) of the mountain of Kniebis, and of the town of Freydenstadt, posts of the utmost importance, which the Suabians defended most shamefully, or rather, which they delivered up to the French. [*Note 8.*]

The left column, which was the strongest of the three, was under the orders of General Defaix. It was opposed to General La Tour; and was intended to act against the Austrian force, which was marching in great haste from the lower Rhine. General Defaix pressed forward to attack Mr. De la Tour before its arrival. On the 29th of June, he gained a pretty considerable advantage over him at Renchen, [*Note 9.*] where the Austrians lost 500 men and 10 pieces of cannon. He gained ground again on the following days; and on the 4th of July, pushed forward to the river Murg, and the city of Rastadt.

General La Tour, who had taken a very good position in front of this River, was attacked on the 5th along his whole line, by General Moreau, who was just arrived with a re-inforcement to General Defaix. The action lasted the whole day, and was very bloody on both sides. It terminated to the disadvantage of the Imperialists, who were

under the necessity of retreating the next day to Etlingen.

The Archduke Charles having succeeded in driving the army of the Sambre and Meuse across the Rhine and the Sieg, immediately returned, suspecting the project of the French on the upper Rhine, and sensible how much its defence was weakened by the large re-inforcements that had been sent into Italy. He was then informed of the passage of the Rhine, and the capture of the Fort of Kehl. Leaving 30,000 men under the orders of Lieut. General Wartenleben to cover the lower Rhine, and having re-inforced the Garrisons of Ehrebreitstein and Mayence, he set out with the rest of the army, and directed his course towards the upper Rhine by forced marches. He arrived on the banks of the Murg, at the moment when General La Tour was giving way to the efforts and the numbers of the French. His Royal Highness then took the command of that army, which formed a junction with his own at Etlingen.

The possession of the pass and town of Freydenstadt by the enemy, opened to them an entrance into the Dutchy of Würtemberg, cut off the communication between the armies of the Prince of Condé
and

and General Frölich, and that of the Archduke, and at the same time threatened the left of his Royal Highness's position. This latter circumstance obliged him to send a considerable corps into the mountains, to secure his left flank, and to endeavour to re-establish his communication with the corps above-mentioned. Notwithstanding the disadvantage of his position in general, and the inferiority of his forces, His Royal Highness determined to risque a battle. It afforded him the only chance by which he could hope to drive the French out of Suabia, and to maintain himself on the banks of the Rhine. It became the more necessary to loose no time in hazarding this last resource, as the new advances which the French had made on the lower Rhine encreased the Archduke's embarrassments, and made his situation every day more and more critical.

As soon as the French Generals, who commanded the different corps of the army of the Sambre and Meuse, were informed of the passage of the Rhine, and the departure of the Archduke, they instantly resumed offensive operations; and on the 28th and 29th of June they marched from Dusseldorf and Cologne to-

towards the river Sieg, from whence they easily drove the few light troops, which defended it. On the 2d of July, the commander in chief General Jourdan also passed the Rhine, opposite to Neuwied, where the Austrian General Fünck suffered himself to be surprized, and did nothing to oppose the passing of the French. The divisions of the Generals, Jourdan, Grenier, Kleber, and Lefevre, then effected a junction, and advanced with more than 65,000 men against Mr. De Wartenleben, who had scarcely 30,000 to oppose to them. This great inferiority made it impossible for the latter to face the French in all points. He gained however an advantage over them on the 3d of July, near Montabauer, where General Werneck took several hundred men, and some pieces of cannon. But having received a check the day following on his right, and finding that he was in danger of being surrounded by different corps of the enemy, M. De Wartenleben retired behind the Lahn, which the whole French army passed on the 9th of July, in three columns.

The advanced guard of the left column was attacked on the same day by the Austrians, who
 routed

routed it ; but the main body coming to its support, a warm action ensued, the success of which was various, but in which the Austrians had finally the advantage. On the 10th the latter were attacked on all the points which they occupied between the Mein and the Lahn ; and after an obstinate engagement which they maintained near Friedberg, [*Note 10.*] in which they suffered some loss, General Wartenleben was again obliged to retreat in order to secure the position of Bergen before Frankfort. On the 11th, the French invested the Fort of Kœnigstein, which capitulated a few days afterwards from the want of water ; the garrison were made prisoners of war. On the 12th they arrived before the city of Frankfort, to which the Austrians had retired. The day following they summoned the Magistrates of this Imperial city to open its gates ; but the Austrians, who were still in possession of it, would not permit them, and even shewed a disposition to defend the city, the fortifications of which will not admit of its making a long resistance. That which the Austrians maintained had no other object but to gain time to remove their provisions and their magazines, of which Frankfort was the depôt. On the
night

night of the 13th the French erected a battery of mortars, and bombarded the town, which they set fire to. The magistrates and inhabitants then renewed their entreaties to Mr. De Wartenleben to evacuate the city, to which he assented, having accomplished his end; and on the 14th he agreed on the terms of capitulation with General Jourdan, who in consequence entered Frankfort the day following.

After the evacuation of this city, the necessity of General Wartenleben's giving way to the prodigious superiority of numbers daily increased. He continued his retreat up the river Mein, directing his course towards Aschaffenburg and Würzburg, in order that he might approach the Archduke's army, and establish some communication with it.

Whilst General Wartenleben experienced this ill success on the lower Rhine, His Royal Highness the Archduke Charles had not been more fortunate on the upper. After the retreat to Etlingen on the 6th of July before-mentioned, the Prince received the intelligence that General Jourdan had again crossed the Rhine, and forced Mr. De Wartenleben to renounce every attempt to defend
the

the approaches to the Lahn. It was easy for him then to foresee, that the latter, with so very inferior a force, would even be obliged to abandon Frankfurt; and that he should find himself between the victorious armies of Jourdan and Moreau. Placed in a situation so critical, the Prince saw that he could not escape from the dangers which threatened him, but by a decisive victory; and that he had no other means of preventing the invasion of the greater part of Germany. Resolved to try the chance of a battle, and circumstances not admitting of delay, he nevertheless found himself under the necessity of deferring it till the 10th, all the troops which he expected from the lower Rhine not being yet arrived. He employed the 7th and 8th in making the necessary preparations, and in fortifying his position.

His right extended to the Rhine, near to the village of Durmersheim. His center was in front of Ettlingen; [*Note 11.*] and his left rested against the town and mountain of Frauenalb.

The French were posted in front of and along the river Murg: their left at Rastadt; and their right in front of Guertsbach.

General

General Moreau, being informed that the Archduke had not received all the re-inforcements which he expected, and not doubting but that an attack would be made upon him the moment they arrived, resolved to prevent it. He re-inforced himself on the 8th with almost the whole of the center column commanded by General St. Cyr. In the morning of the 9th, whilst the Archduke was completing his dispositions, and placing the different corps which were to be engaged the following day, he found himself attacked in every point of his position, by the whole French Army. They directed their principal efforts against the left of the Imperialists, and endeavoured to turn it by getting round the mountains. Though all the troops which were to form the left of the Austrian line were not yet arrived, General Keim, who was at the head of it, made a very firm resistance. He repulsed four successive attacks; but the French having made a fifth with fresh troops, and the Saxons who were ordered to support General Keim not being yet come up, he was obliged to abandon his position, which the French had out-flanked, and to fall back to Pfortsheim, where he was joined by the Saxons.

The

The Archduke had been more fortunate on his right and in front, where he had completely repulsed all the attacks of the French. But the retrograde movement of General Keim having entirely uncovered the left of the army, and enabled the enemy to take possession of the mountains which commanded it, the Prince found himself under the necessity of quitting the field of battle, and of retreating towards Pfortzheim, where he arrived on the following day.

The Imperialists lost in this action 2,000 men, of whom 1,000 were made prisoners. It cost the French full as dear, but the event of it gave them the important advantage of detaching the Austrians entirely from the banks of the Rhine, and from the fortified towns of Philippsburg and Mannheim. The Archduke had had the precaution to throw into both sufficient garrisons, as Mr. De Wartenleben had done into Ehrebreitstein and Mayence, before they were invested by the French.

By leaving near 25,000 men in these four fortified places, Prince Charles judged that the enemy would also be obliged to leave behind a part of their army to blockade them; and that the garrisons of Philippsbourg and Mannheim might a good deal

interrupt the communication between the armies of Moreau and Jourdan, by threatening and harassing their rear, and by falling suddenly on their convoys and small detachments. This judicious disposition produced the full effect, which the Archduke expected from it. The garrisons of Manheim and Philipsbourg made many useful excursions; disturbed the formation of the enemy's magazines; pushed their parties as far as Heilbron; and even fell in with and took some French couriers and detachments, in the very heart of Franconia.

C H A P. III.

Battles of Canstadt and Eßlingen—Contributions imposed by the French—Armistice concluded by them, with the Duke of Würtemberg, the Margrave of Baden, and the circle of Suabia—Second battle of Eßlingen—Continuation of the retreat of the Imperial Army—Battle of Mettingen—Retreat of General Wartensleben to Amberg, and of the Archduke to Donawert—Projects of that Prince.

AFTER the battle of Ettlingen, the Archduke, as has been before observed, retreated to Pfortzheim, where he remained the 11th, 12th, and 13th. On the 14th he learnt that the center of the enemy's army, meeting with little opposition from the troops of the Duke of Würtemberg, and those of the circle of Suabia, had penetrated farther, and were directing their march towards the town of Studgard. That he might not lose the communication with the Prince of Condé, the Archduke broke up his camp at Pfortzheim on the 14th, and encamped again near Vahingen, on the river Entz, where he

the 15th and 16th. The enemy continuing to advance into the Duchy of Würtemberg, the Archduke marched again on the 17th; arrived on the 18th at Ludwigsburg (a country house of the Duke of Würtemberg's, near the Neker) and sent two small corps the very same day, to post themselves at Canstadt and Esslingen. It was of consequence to the Archduke to make himself master of these places, on account of their situation on the Neker, and of the magazines which they contained. The French having entered Stutgard in the course of the same day, and knowing the importance of the post of Canstadt, wished to dislodge the small body of Austrians which defended it, under the command of General Baillet, (brother to General Latour,) attacking at the same time the corps at Esslingen, which was under the orders of Prince John of Lichtenstein. These two Generals defended themselves with great bravery. Notwithstanding three successive attacks, the French were unable to dislodge General Baillet from Canstadt. They were however, rather more successful against the Prince of Lichtenstein, and found means after repeated efforts, to make themselves masters of the heights which commanded his flank and

and rear. In this emergency the Prince hearing that a body of troops was ordered to his assistance, resolved to stand at his post, and continue the combat. He was already on the point of being surrounded, when General de Vay at last made his appearance with the expected succours. The French now found themselves attacked in their turn, both in flank and rear, and at the same instant the Prince of Lichtenstein pressing hard upon their front, they were put to the rout, with the loss of about 1,500 men. This advantage cost the Austrians 900 men.

On the 19th, the Archduke, after having passed with his army over the Neker, pitched his camp at Feldbach, that he might cover the communication with the town of Ulm, and save the principal magazines on the upper Danube. Whilst the French were thus forcing the Archduke to retire from the Rhine to the Neker, they likewise after several slight engagements, compelled the Prince of Condé, and General Frölich, to yield up the Brisgau, as well as the country of the Black Forest. These two commanders effected a junction at Villingen; but being opposed to very superior numbers, they found it necessary to fall
back

back to Sigmaringen on the Danube. In the mean time General Wartenleben continuing to give way before the numerous army of Jourdan, was retiring across Franconia; and found himself when arrived at Würzburg, on a line with the front of the Archduke; and from this time, (July 20th) the march of the respective armies became more regular and better combined.

From this period also the Imperial army commenced a methodical retreat, and a war of manœuvres. It was divided into three principal corps, amounting to nearly 80,000 men, having been reduced to that number by detaching 30,000 men to Italy, by leaving 25,000 to garrison the different Fortresses, and by the losses sustained in the different actions.

The first of these three corps, about 25,000 strong, occupied both banks of the river Meyn, under General Wartenleben, and was opposed to the army of Jourdan, which amounted to about 55,000 men. The Archduke, with 40,000 men, was posted upon the Neker, which he defended against General Moreau, who commanded more than 50,000.

The

The third body, consisting of about 15,000 men, was divided between the Prince of Condé and General Frölich, and defended the upper Danube against General Ferino, who having been re-inforced by General Laborde, was at the head of 20,000 men.

The losses sustained in different engagements, and the necessity of leaving bodies of troops to blockade the fortified places, had weakened the armies of Jourdan and Moreau; the superiority however of their numbers over the Imperialists, was still greater than at the opening of the campaign. [*Note 12.*]

From the middle of the month of July, the French began to reap in part those advantages which they expected from the invasion of Germany. They found the country which they occupied, abundant in resources of every kind; and they imposed on the inhabitants heavy contributions. The weight of them was chiefly felt by the people of the Brisgau, who had taken up arms against the Republicans. The town of Frankfort was compelled, for the second time since the commencement of the war, to share its riches with the French, being taxed by General Jourdan, to
the

the amount of six millions of French livres in specie, and two millions in provisions. The Margrave of Baden, the Duke of Würtemberg, the circle of Suabia, and all the petty Princes whose estates are comprehended in it, seeing themselves on the point of becoming a prey to the French, who already occupied their territory, solicited a suspension of arms, which they obtained separately, but for which they paid dearly. Their joint contributions amounted to twenty-five millions of French livres, 12,000 horses, an equal number of oxen, 500,000 quintals of wheat, rye, and oats; 200,000 pair of shoes, with an immense quantity of other necessaries. We have seen above, that the Archduke Charles had arrived on the 19th of July on the banks of the Neker, whilst at the same time the corps of Condé, and of Frölich were on the Danube, and that of Mr. De Wartenleben was posted upon the Mein. The extreme inferiority of his force preventing the Prince from acting offensively, his sole object was to protract his defence, and to retire as slowly as possible, in order to give the Court of Vienna time to send him those re-inforcements which it was then collecting.

The

The Archduke having received information that the enemy meant to attack the important post of Esslingen, which commands the high road from Stutgard to Ulm, sent re-inforcements thither on the 20th. The next day it was attacked by a numerous body of troops, as had been expected. General Hotze, and the forces under his command, defended the position with equal success and bravery. The French were constantly repulsed, and lost about 2,000 men. It did not cost the Austrians more than half that number. They owed this success entirely to the obstinacy with which they fought. The most striking proofs of it were given by one battallion of the Hungarian regiment of Spleny, which defended its post during the whole day, without being either relieved or re-inforced, and maintained its ground until night, though they had lost in the course of the engagement 3 or 400 men.

On the 22d, the enemy having made a movement, which indicated an intention to turn the right wing of the Archduke, by posting themselves on the road from Stutgard to Donauwert, he abandoned Esslingen and the banks of the Neker, on the night of the 22d, turned to the

right to frustrate the intention of the French, and fixed his head quarters at Gemund. From thence, he marched on the 26th, still continuing to give ground. The progress made by the enemy on the Mein and Danube, again obliged the Prince to retreat. He moved on the 1st of August to Heydenheim, on the 2d to Nerersheim, and on the 3d to Nordlingen. [*Note 13.*] Several skirmishes took place during that interval, in which the Imperialists, although retreating, frequently had the advantage.

The Archduke was obliged to yield so much ground, on account of the advances made on his right and left by the enemy in the latter days of July. Jourdan's army had entered Würzburg on the 26th, and General Wartenleben had been compelled to fall back towards Bamberg, Nuremberg, and Anspach. The three corps of the Prince of Condé, Generals Frölich and Wolf, had been forced to retire on the right bank of the Danube, thus abandoning upper Suabia to the French. [*Note 14.*]

The conquest of Suabia and Franconia, spread great alarm throughout Germany. The French were on the frontiers of Bohemia and Bavaria, and
their

their great superiority of numbers, excluded every hope of being able to put a stop to their progress. But neither the misfortunes which he had just experienced, nor those he had to apprehend, were capable of discouraging the Archduke. He opposed the unshaken constancy of his soldiers to the number of their enemies. He compensated by his talents for the deficiency of his means; and did every thing which could be expected from the most consummate General. Thinking it unnecessary to cover Bohemia, where numerous obstacles opposed themselves to an invading enemy, [Note. 15.] the Prince wisely took the resolution of drawing towards himself the greater part of Wartenfleben's army. By these means, he had it in his power to meet with a greater mass of force either of the French armies which might chuse to attack him; and by keeping along the Danube, he reserved to himself the power of moving with ease to either side of that river, according to the positions and motions of the enemy. This plan, as well executed as it was conceived, concentrated his defence, gave him the means of prolonging it, and more effectually protected the hereditary dominions.

On the 3d and 5th of August, the French attacked the advanced posts of the Archduke. On the first of these days, they were victorious; but on the other, were defeated.

Several engagements at the same time also took place between the armies of Wartenleben, and of Jourdan. One corps of the latter was repulsed with loss on the 4th of August, by General Kray. They were again engaged on the 6th and 8th, on both which days the Austrian cavalry much distinguished itself. The French General Doré was killed, and General Richepanse wounded.

In spite of their bravery and partial success, the Austrians could not prevent the French from gaining ground every day. The forces of General Wartenleben were not sufficiently numerous to oppose the different columns of Jourdan's army, which incessantly harried their flanks, and threatened entirely to cut off their communication with the Archduke. The necessity there was for keeping up this communication, and the order which this commander had received to draw nearer to the Prince, determined him to leave Bamberg and the Mein, on the 7th, and to march first to Forch-

Forchheim, on the Rednitz, and then to Lauf, on the Pegnitz.

On the 8th, the French attacked and dislodged one of the advanced corps of the Archduke, taking 2 or 300 prisoners. This advantage, and above all, the retreat of Mr. De Wartenleben, induced Prince Charles to abandon his position at Nordlingen, to take another between that town and Donauwert, which he wished to cover. He established his head quarters at Mettingen, upon the little river Egar, his left extending towards Hohenalheim, and his right towards Allersheim. The Prince of Condé had retreated to Mindelheim, and General Wolf had retired into the defiles near the town of Bregents, of which, the French took possession.

On the 10th, at night the Republicans attacked the body of Austrians under the command of General Hotze with great impetuosity, and forced a part of his position, taking 300 prisoners. This slight check was no obstacle to the project which the Archduke had resolved to carry into execution that very day. Being well-informed of the situation of General Moreau, he had judged that he might attack him with advantage, and had determined to do so on the
night

night of the 10th. The Prince made his preparations for a general action, which was to take place in several columns. His principal object was, to turn the right of Moreau, and to fall suddenly on his rear, whilst the whole length of his Front should be attacked at the same time. As the French were very much superior in number, the sole hope of success which the Archduke could possibly indulge, was rested in the goodness of his dispositions, and the effect of a surprize. He concerted his movements in such a manner, that before break of day five of his principal columns might engage the enemy. A violent storm which came on in the night and lasted several hours, damaged the roads to such a degree, that the different corps could not reach the places of their destination so soon as was expected. This delay enabled the enemy to discover the measures taken against them, and gave them time to prepare their defence. The battle began about seven o'clock in the morning, and continued the whole day with various success. The three columns which formed the centre of the Austrian army, and were commanded by the Prince of Furstemberg, and the Generals Hotze and Latour, succeeded in

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dislodging a part of the enemy's centre. The column on the right, under the orders of the Prince of Lichtenstein was not so fortunate; General Moreau having marched all his corps de Reserve to the left in the very beginning of the action, was enabled to repulse the Prince of Lichtenstein, and obliged him to yield a good deal of ground. This movement having laid open the right and center of the Imperialists, the French attacked them with advantage, and succeeded in driving them back also. The Archduke was occupied in reinforcing his right, for the purpose of recovering the ground it had lost, when he received a report from General Wartenleben, intimating that he had been compelled to abandon his post on the Pegnitz, and to retire to Amberg; that the right of Jourdan's army was arrived at Nuremberg on the 9th, and was approaching nearer to the army of Moreau. As this last movement put the right of the Archduke, which the French were endeavouring to turn and separate from Mr. De Wartenleben, into eminent danger, that Prince judged that whether he was conqueror or conquered, he should be obliged in either case, to fall back to the banks of the Danube

Danube and the town of Donawert. He determined therefore to put an end to a battle which now became useless. It was however with regret that the Prince formed this resolution, having just learned that his left wing conducted by General Riese, had turned the right of the enemy, had advanced four leagues upon their rear, and made a great number of prisoners. The Archduke had sufficient command over himself to make a sacrifice of this brilliant success, of which the consequences might have been of the utmost importance; and to encamp with his whole army, on the very spot he had occupied before the action. This engagement cost the Austrians 1,500 men, and the French 3,000, of whom 1,200 were taken prisoners; the latter likewise lost several provision waggon, and several pieces of cannon.

The Prince having rested his army on the 12th, retired on the 13th to Donauwert, where he established his head quarters. The battle of the 11th disconcerted the projects of Moreau for some time. His reserve of artillery and military stores, on the point of falling into the hands of General Riese, had been obliged to fly a considerable way to effect their escape. This circumstance

stance, as Moreau himself expressed in a letter to the directory, prevented him from attacking the Archduke during his march. The Prince profiting by this on the same day (the 13th) crossed the Danube by the bridge of Donauwert, with the greatest part of his forces. He however left two bodies of troops on the left side of that river, which occupied the roads from Nordlingen and Hœchstet to Donauwert. [*Note 16.*] It was at this period that Prince Charles conceived the bold project, which was afterwards productive of such brilliant success. Till that time nothing had been able to check the victorious march of the French. They were masters of Suabia and Franconia. General Jourdan was directing his march towards the Danube, and threatened at the same time Bohemia, and upper Austria. The army of Moreau was on the frontiers of Bavaria; his right wing had seized the important posts of Bregents, and was advancing into the Tyrol. The victories of Buonaparte in Italy, gave that General hopes that he likewise should be able to penetrate into the Tyrol, and to form a junction with General Moreau. The French believed themselves on the point of

realising the vast plan which they had framed; a plan, the object of which was to unite three large and victorious armies in the heart of Germany, and to pour their combined force against the hereditary states of the House of Austria.

Any other General but the Archduke, and any other army but his, might have been alarmed at such a situation of affairs. But this young Prince, intrusted with the defence of his brother's dominions, and the safety of Germany, wished to prove himself worthy of the confidence reposed in him, and to shew that he was capable of sustaining so great a load of responsibility. He saw that some daring and sudden enterprize, was the only possible method of extricating himself from the surrounding dangers. Assured of the attachment of his Generals, and of the constancy of his troops, and conscious of the example which he should himself set them, he expected every thing from their courage, and something from fortune. The forces and military means of the Prince increased daily, the nearer he approached to his brother's dominions. Considerable re-inforcements had been sent him, which in some degree lessened

sened the great disparity of numbers between him and the French, who were besides much weakened by the different engagements, and by the detachments they were under the necessity of leaving in their rear.

The Archduke, however, finding himself too weak to attack both the French armies at a time, resolved to unite almost his whole force against one of them, and to risk every thing to defeat and disperse it. As the army of Jourdan more immediately threatened the States of the Emperor, and was in all respects much less advantageously posted than that of Moreau, the Prince resolved to direct his operations against the former. He judged, that by leaving a part of his forces to keep General Moreau in check, he might gain some marches over him, and fall unexpectedly with the rest of his army on General Jourdan. The Archduke was perfectly aware of the great dangers to which this plan exposed him. He saw plainly that he left Moreau with little opposition or impediment; but he flattered himself that this General would hear of his march too late to be able to afford the least assistance

to his colleague, and that even when he heard of it, and discovered the weakness of the corps opposed to him, he would be tempted to attack it, that he might make himself master of Munich, and create a diversion in favour of Jourdan. The event shewed the justness of the Archduke's conjectures, and fully answered his expectations.

C H A P. IV.

March of the Archduke—Retreat of General Wartenleben behind the Naab—Battles of Teining and Neumarkt—Retreat of General Jourdan—Battle of Amberg—Defeat of General Jourdan at Würzburg—Surrender of the Citadel—Jourdan's retreat to the Lahn—Battle of Ashaffembourg—Kœnigstein re-taken by the Imperialists—Bad condition and losses of the army of Jourdan—That General repasses the Lahn—Death of the Republican General Marceau—The French retire beyond the Rhine and the Sieg—Prince Charles marches towards the upper Rhine.

ON the 14th of August, Prince Charles made at Donauwert every preparation necessary for the execution of the plan which he had formed. He left about half of his army with General Latour, with orders to defend Bavaria, and the river Lech. On the 15th, after having recalled all the corps from the other side of the Danube, he ordered the

the bridge of Donauwert to be burnt, and left that town with 20,000 of his best troops. The next day he continued to march rapidly along the right bank of the Danube, and crossed that river on the 17th, at Neuburg and Ingolstadt, leaving a garrison in the latter place, which was capable of defence. He halted on the 17th and 18th before those two towns. His resolution had been to attack on the 19th that column of Jourdan's army, which had taken possession of Nuremberg, and threatened Ratibon; but he was informed in the night of the 18th, that General Wartenleben had been driven from the town of Amberg, and had retreated to Schwartzfeld, behind the river Naab.

In consequence of this change in the position of the armies of Jourdan, and Wartenleben, the intended motion of the Archduke became extremely dangerous, as it would have rendered his communication with Mr. De Wartenleben very precarious, and thrown considerable difficulties in his way, in case he had been obliged to retire.

The Prince, on this account, altered the direction of his march, advanced more to the right, and arrived on the 20th at Hemman. His van guard,

guard, led by Major General Nauendorf, proceeded the same day to take possession of the heights of Tafwang; whilst a column under the orders of Lieutenant General Hotze, marched towards Bellugriefs, to secure at the same time the left of the Archduke, and the road from Ratibon to Nuremberg. The necessity of knowing precisely the situation of Mr. De Wartenleben, retarded, for one or two days, the Archduke's operations.

On the 22d, General Nauendorf attacked that column of the French which had advanced from Nuremberg and Neumarkt as far as the village of Teining, within a few miles of Ratibon. This body of the enemy, commanded by General Bernadotte, was dislodged, and driven back to Neumarkt. It was again attacked at that place the day after, by the united columns of the Archduke and General Hotze, was driven from it, and pursued as far as the neighbourhood of Altdorf, to which place it retired. Several squadrons of Austrian cavalry, and some light infantry, were sent by the Archduke, at the same time, to occupy the high road to Nuremberg.

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These preparatory successes, having placed that Prince on the right flank, and even in the rear of General Jourdan's army, who was still upon the Naab, he hastened to profit of his advantageous situation, and to accomplish his designs. He had concerted with Mr. De Wartenleben the plan of a general attack, for the execution of which the whole army set forward, on the 24th, divided into seven different columns. Of these, three marched *d* against the front of the French army, whilst the others were to turn to it upon the right and left.

As soon as Jourdan heard of Bernadotte's defeat, and of the movements which were making against himself, he abandoned with precipitation all the posts which he occupied, and retired to Amberg in the night of the 23d, not daring to risk a battle, which from the situation of the Archduke, and the difficulties of the country through which he would have been obliged to retreat, might in case of a defeat, have ended in the total destruction of his army. The Austrians, without giving him time for recollection, attacked and defeated him at Amberg, on the 24th. He was compelled to fall back to Sultzbach, leaving 900 men in the hands of the Austrians, who
cut

cut in pieces two battallions of his rear guard. [Note 17.] Jourdan continued to retreat on the next and following days by forced marches, passing successively through Velden, Betzenstein, Forcheim, Ebermanstadt, and Bamberg, where he arrived on the 29th. His army crossed the Mein at Eltman and Hallstadt on the 30th, and halted at length near Lauringen and Schweinfurt. During these eight days of continued retreat, Jourdan was pursued and incessantly harraßed by the Imperial light troops, who frequently intercepted his couriers, and got possession of a part of his baggage. The celerity of his retreat prevented the Archduke from coming up with the main body of his army, and forcing him to engage. That Prince, however, directed the march of the different columns with so much ability, that one of them reached Nuremberg before the French, and prevented them from passing through that town, and along the great road of Franconia. This skilful manœuvre obliged the right wing of Jourdan's army to retire by a worse and a longer rout, compelled that General to repass the Mein with his whole army, and deprived him of every hope of

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being

being able to join Moreau, or of receiving any assistance from him.

To prevent the latter General from profiting too much by the weakness of Mr. La Tour's corps, and from causing any powerful diversion in favour of Jourdan, the Archduke had sent back General Nauendorf on the 25th of August, with 10,000 men to support him. The Prince having thus freed his mind from all anxiety about what might happen in Bavaria, thought only of taking advantage of his late successes over Jourdan, and forcing him to a complete retreat, either by a victory, or by the effect of his manœuvres. His Royal Highness having arrived on the 31st at Bamberg, and having informed himself of the posts which the enemy occupied, was confirmed in his hopes of being able to drive him entirely out of Franconia, by compelling him to retire to the upper Lahn, across the country of Fulde. To attain this end, it was necessary to make himself master of the town of Würzburg; and that Prince neglected nothing which could give him speedy possession of it. The van guard of one of his columns, commanded by General Hotze, arrived before that town on the 1st of September, and forced its way

way into it in spite of the resistance of the French garrison, which was driven out, and obliged to retire into the Citadel.

This van guard was followed by the whole of the Austrian army, divided into three different corps; that on the right commanded by the Archduke in person, that in center by General Kray, and that on the left by General Staray.

Jourdan, conscious that the preservation of Würzburg was of the utmost consequence, had made every exertion to arrive there before the Austrians. This however he found himself unable to effect, and did not appear before that town until several hours after it had been in the hands of his enemies. He then resolved to dislodge them, by attacking the corps which occupied the place before it could be supported by the rest of the Imperial army.

On the 2d he fell with great impetuosity upon General Staray who had joined his van guard under General Hotze, and succeeded in forcing a part of his position. But finding every effort to dislodge him from the principal points fruitless, he retired at night to Kornach, nearly three leagues distant from Würzburg. Well aware

that the Archduke would soon attack him if he remained in that position, he resolved to make a stand, thinking it both his duty and his interest, before he abandoned the countries he had conquered, to risk a battle, which if he was successful, might restore to him Würzburg and Franconia.

He waited for the Archduke in a very advantageous position; his right wing being placed on a height, at the foot of which ran the Mein and another small river with very steep banks; his center was also posted upon a chain of hills, the slope of which was bordered with wood, above which they placed a great number of cannon. These eminences were terminated by a plain, on which Jourdan drew out his left wing composed almost entirely of cavalry. It was disposed so as to protect the infantry which occupied the heights, and to be capable itself of receiving support from the fire of the artillery and musquetry. Jourdan had besides left General Lefebvre with one division of his army to cover the road from Schweinfurt to Fulde; and communicated with that General through the means of a small intermediate corps.

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The Archduke was no less desirous to engage, knowing that the solidity of his successes depended upon the celerity with which they were obtained; and that it was necessary to hasten the complete defeat of Jourdan, that he might have time and means to drive Moreau out of Germany.

On the 2d His Royal Highness caused two bridges to be thrown across the Mein at Detelbach and Geroltschoffen, with the intention of attacking the French the next day. He had for this purpose divided his army into three columns, that on the left being commanded by General Staray, that in the center by General Wartenleben, and that on the right by General Kray.

General Staray was the first who was engaged, and met with some success in the beginning of the action; but the passage of the Mein having retarded the march of the other two columns, he very soon had to support alone the weight of the whole French army. He not only lost the ground which he had gained, but even saw his own position in danger of being forced.

At this critical moment which might have ended in the loss of the battle, the Archduke sent orders to General Wartenleben to ford the Mein immediately

immediately with all his cavalry, and to charge the left wing of the enemy without delay.

This manœuvre which was well executed, had the desired effect. Jourdan was forced by it to march back his troops to the left, and Mr. De Staray was in consequence relieved. The Austrian cavalry then charged that of the French in the plain, and compelled it to give way and seek for shelter under the fire of the infantry and artillery which were posted on the heights and in the woods which bordered them. The Imperial horse was so much annoyed by the fire from the batteries, that they were obliged to fall back, after having charged twice successively.

As the French could not be driven from their position without the assistance of infantry, the Archduke was under the necessity of waiting the arrival of the column under the orders of General Kray, and of the remaining part of that commanded by Mr. De Wartenleben. As soon as they appeared, the Prince ordered a general attack to be made on the whole of the enemy's line. Eight battallions of grenadiers penetrated the wood in spite of the heavy fire kept up from the batteries, and the swarm of *Tirailleurs* who were

were posted in it. They advanced with fixed bayonets to the top of the hills which the French infantry occupied, and dislodged them from thence in a few minutes.

From that instant Jourdan gave up all thoughts of defending his ground, and began to retire. His retreat was conducted for some time with order, under the brave and steady protection of his cavalry and flying artillery; but the former being attacked by the Austrian horse was put to the rout, and the retreat was from that time conducted with the greatest confusion.

Night, and the excessive fatigue of the Imperialists, saved the French army from total destruction. It lost on that day 2,000 men killed and wounded, more than 3,000 taken prisoners, 10 pieces of cannon, and a vast number of baggage and provision waggons. This victory cost the Austrians no more than 800 men. They were indebted for it to the example set them by the Archduke, to his coolness, his quickness of perception, and to the ability of his manœuvres.

The defeat of Jourdan drew after it the surrender of the Citadel of Würzburg, the garrison of which consisting of 700 men with their commander

mander General Belmont, chief of the French artillery, were made prisoners of war. The Austrians found 150 pieces of cannon, with a large quantity of ammunition and provisions in this place and in Schweinfurt, which was evacuated by General Lefebvre. These stores were the produce of the contributions levied by the French in the surrounding country. The raising of these contributions, joined to the vexations and outrages exercised upon them by the Republicans, had irritated the inhabitants of Franconia to such a degree, that they armed on all sides during the retreat of the French, stopped several of their convoys, plundered their military chests, and either massacred or took prisoners all the stragglers.

Jourdan, after his defeat at Würzburg, retired to Hamelbourg, and continued his retreat towards the upper Lahn, across the country of Fulda and Weteravia. He was closely pursued by the Archduke, who in order to compel him to abandon the banks of the Mein entirely, detached General Meerfeld on the 5th with ten squadrons of light cavalry, destined to form a junction, with the garrisons of Mannheim and Mayence, and by these means

means to bring 15,000 men upon the rear of the enemy. The Prince in the mean time sent a strong van guard, under the orders of General Kray, to take possession of all the avenues of the forest of Speffart. [*Note 18.*] That General finding them occupied by a body of 2,000 French attacked them vigorously, and drove them, after a brisk cannonade, from their advantageous position, killed 400 men, and took 600 prisoners. The rest were pursued by the Austrian cavalry as far as the Town of Aschaffembourg, and dispersed on the other side of the Mein. The town of Aschaffembourg, which General Kray took possession of, was of importance to the Austrians, its bridge over the Mein, being the only one between Frankfort and Würzburg.

The Archduke deserves the highest praise for the ability he displayed in getting the start of Jourdan, so as to arrive before him at Nuremberg, Würzburg and Aschaffembourg. This able manœuvre completely separated Jourdan from Moreau, detached him by force from the Mein, and put it out of his power to maintain his ground between that river and the Lahn.

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The Archduke arrived on the 7th and passed the 8th at Aschaffembourg. Having learned that the French had evacuated Frankfort the preceding night in consequence of the movement which has been just mentioned, he pushed forward his vanguard to the Nidda. On the 9th he marched to Dettingen, and on the 10th to Windecken, his advanced guard occupying the important post of Friedberg. He was joined here by 10,000 men of the garrison of Mayence, who had taken possession of the Fort of Kœnigstein, which had on the 8th been abandoned by the French.

General Jourdan, it has been already observed, had retired through Fulda, directing his march towards the Hessian town of Hanau. His design was to take possession of the strong post of Bergen, where he flattered himself he might be able to make a stand against the Austrians when joined by the troops, which had been blocking up Mannheim and Mayence. With this intention he marched to Aschaffembourg, but finding that place already in the hands of the Austrians, he was obliged to change the direction of his march. He then turned to the right and advanced to the upper Lahn and Westlaer, where he arrived on the 9th,
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and employed himself in re-assembling the broken remains of his army. Ever since his defeat at Würtzburg, it had been in the most undisciplined, and completely disorganized state. His retreat had been made with a confusion and disorder not to be described. The different corps of the French army having no regular supply of provisions, nor any settled points of retreat, had no longer waited for the orders of their Generals. They had fled in different parties, plundering and laying waste the countries through which they passed. A great part of the infantry had thrown away their arms and were without shoes. Constantly harraßed by the Austrians and the Peasants who had risen upon them, Jourdan's army was struck with terror and despondency; it presented less the appearance of a retreat than of a tumultuous flight. The want of subsistence, excessive fatigue and desertion, diminished it as much as the sword of the enemy, and the loss which it experienced in its retreat from the Naab to the Lhan, was generally estimated at upwards of 20,000 men.

The Archduke went and encamped at Friedberg on the 12th, having left a large body of reserve at Windecken. The same day he sent

his right wing under General Kray against Westlaer, which the French abandoned at his approach, and took a position on the heights, which commanded that town.

In the mean time the left wing of the Prince's army advanced under the orders of General Holze towards Weilburg, but were unable to dislodge the enemy from thence. On the 14th His Royal Highness began his march, and prepared to attack the center of the French, at Limbourg and Dietz; whilst General Kray came upon the rear of their left through Westlaer, and Major General Mylius kept in check their right wing which extended to Nassau.

Prince Charles having been re-inforced by the corps of reserve left at Windecken, on the 16th attacked the front of the enemy, which a part of the garrison of Mayence, under the order of General Neu, succeeded in turning near Kirchberg. The French, threatened at all points, did not attempt to defend them, and retired behind the Lahn, abandoning the towns of Dietz and Limbourg to the Imperialists. Their chasseurs however maintained their ground in the suburbs of the

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latter place; and night coming on prevented their being driven from them.

The Archduke assembled his whole army on the 17th, between Limburg and Dietz, intending to make a vigorous and general attack. But General Jourdan, although re-inforced by a part of the army of the North, and by the division of General Marceau which had blocked up Mayence, did not dare to hazard a battle; the great disorder and depression which still reigned in his army leaving him but little hope of success. Giving up all idea of defending his position on the Lahn, notwithstanding its advantages, he profited by a thick fog which lasted the whole morning, to conceal his retreat from the Austrians, and to steal a few hours march upon them.

All the different corps of his army left the banks of the Lahn on the same day. The left and center directing their march towards the Sieg, whilst the right joined the division which was then blocking up Ehrebreitstein, and together with that threw itself into the works which the French had thrown up before the bridge of Boats at Neuwied.

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This last body was pursued by General Neu, who arrived near Neuwied on the 19th, whilst the French corps, which retired towards the Sieg, were harraffed by the Archduke, who directed his march towards Altenkirchen; and by General Kray, who proceeded to Dillembourg and Siegen.

The vanguard of the Archduke, conducted by General Hotze, came up on the 20th, near Hochsteinbach, with the rear guard of the French, commanded by Marceau General of a division; defeated it, and took a great number of prisoners: amongst them was General Marceau himself, who being mortally wounded by a carabine shot, died the next day at Altenkirchen. This General, scarcely twenty-seven years of age, was one of the most enterprising and skilful of the republican Officers. His death was much regretted by the whole French army. His adjutant General was killed in the same action, and two of his aid-de-camp's were taken prisoners.

It might have been expected that the French, who had now drawn nearer to Duffeldorf and Cologne, and were certain of an easy retreat, would

would have endeavoured to defend the famous post of Ukerath, so often taken and re-taken, during this campaign. But the same reasons which had deterred them from attempting to maintain the still better position on the Lahn, banished all thoughts of making a stand in that of Ukerath: they did not even remain there one single day. Two divisions of their army passed the Rhine at Cologne; and the main body fought for safety in the entrenched camp, before Duffeldorf, leaving only a few light troops on the banks of the Sieg.

Thus ended the retreat of General Jourdan, a retreat of more than one hundred leagues, in which he lost near one half of his army, and was driven in twenty five days, from the frontiers of Bohemia, to the walls of Duffeldorf.

This retreat formed a strong contrast with that of General Wartenleben, who disputed every foot of ground with scarcely 25,000, against 50,000 men, who never suffered any considerable part of his army, to be either cut off or endangered; and who employed near two months, in retiring from the Sieg to the Naab.

A comparifon drawn between thefe two retreats, feems to confirm the opinion, that if the French are endowed with the qualities which lead to victory, they are not, in the fame degree, poffeffed of thofe which are requifite to fupport a defeat; and that the latter qualifications are eminently poffeffed by the Auftrians. This campaign of Jourdan's proved, that if the valour of the foldiers, and the boldnefs of their Generals, are fufficient to render an army victorious, the only hope of fafety, in cafe of a defeat, muft be placed in the paffive obedience of the troops, in the regular fubordination of the officers, in the ability of the Generals, and in the folid organization of all its Parts. It was to the want of all thefe circumftances that Jourdan owed the rapid abandonment of his conquelts, and the deftruction of his army. Two great defeats would not have occafioned a lofs equal to that which he fufained by the want of difcipline among his foldiers, by the fpirit of independance among his Generals, and of difobedience among his fubaltern officers. The great irregularity in the diftribution of provifions, and the extreme
disorder

disorder which reigned in the interior government of his army, were more fatal to him than the sword of the Austrians. They produced disobedience and discouragement among the soldiery, caused a considerable desertion, and obliged the different corps to follow their own discretion, in directing their retreat to whatever places could provide them the subsistence which they were then so much in want of. A total disunion in the motions and positions of the whole army, was the consequence which rendered it impossible to oppose a victorious, active, and well regulated force. The excessive contributions, extortions, and outrages exercised upon the inhabitants of the conquered countries, excited in them the most violent animosity, which shewed itself evidently, from the very beginning of the French disasters. The disorder of their retreat, the plunder and violence by which it was marked, gave the Franconian Peasants, at the same time, new causes of resentment, and a favourable opportunity of revenging themselves. The bad military and political conduct of the French, occasioned the loss, not only of their

conquests, but likewise of the Partizans they had in Germany. When conquerors they were detested; when conquered, they were despised.

His Royal Highness judging that Beurnonville, who had just succeeded Jourdan in the command of the army of the Sambre and Meuse, could not recommence offensive measures for a long time, with an army totally disorganized, and which, if it may be so expressed, had lost all its powers of action; thought he had done nothing, as long as there remained any thing to be done. He had delivered the north of Germany from its enemies, but the south was still in their hands; and the Prince determined not to lose a moment in wresting it from them. He left 40,000 men for the defence of the lower Rhine, under the orders of Lieutenant General Werneck, who pushed forward his advanced posts on the Sieg, and fixed his head quarters at Ukerath.

His Royal Highness again began his march towards the Meyn, the 22nd of September, passed that river on the 25th, and having made all the arrangements necessary for the safety of Ehrebreitstein

breitstein and Mayence, he bent his course towards the upper Rhine, with about 15,000 men, to second the operations of Mr. de Latour, and to oblige Moreau likewise to repass the Rhine.

C H A P. V.

Position of the armies of Generals Latour and Moreau, on the 15th of August—Battle of Ober Kamlach—Passage of the Danube and Lech, by the French. Defeat of Mr. De Latour at Friedberg—Battles of St. Gast, Ingolstadt, and Munich—Armistice concluded between the French Republic and the Elector Palatine—Moreau quits his position on the Iser.—His rear guard and that of General Desaix are routed—Moreau determines to retreat.

WE left General Moreau's army on the confines of Souabia and Bavaria. I have not yet given an account of the events which took place in these two countries since the 15th of August, when the Archduke separated himself from Mr.

De Latour at Donauwert. As the Prince and that General ceased from that time to have any immediate connection with one another, I thought that an uninterrupted relation of the operations of the Archduke, would be more distinct as well as more interesting. I shall now recall the attention of my readers to Suabia and Bavaria, and give an account of events not less important, and in the final result no less fortunate than those which I have just been describing.

It may be remembered, that before he left Donauwert, Prince Charles had ordered the bridge of that town over the Danube to be burnt down, after having passed with all his troops to the right bank of the river. The Archduke having set out from Donauwert on the 15th to commence his operations against Jourdan, had, as is above-mentioned, left the command of the Austrian troops which remained in Bavaria to General Latour. In order to prevent the French from penetrating into it, Mr. Latour had taken a defensive situation behind the river Lech. His army occupied three principal points, Rain, Fridberg and Landsberg. His advanced posts were beyond the Lech, covering the town of Augsbourg.

Two other small detached corps, under the orders of Generals Frölich and Wolf, were at Wangen and Kempten, protecting the left of the army of Latour, and keeping up his communication with the Tyrol.

The French army was at the same period partly on the left, and partly on the right bank of the Danube, between the rivers Iller and Lech. Such was the position of the armies of Latour and Moreau on the 15th of August. No action of any importance had taken place between the two armies since the affair of the 11th, except that of the 14th at Ober Kamlach. The army of the Prince of Condé had particularly distinguished itself on that occasion, 2,200 of the *Infanterie Noble* having attacked and driven from their position 5,000 Republicans. This success had been purchased with the loss of 500 gentlemen.

General Moreau learning that Prince Charles had concentrated his forces at Donauwert, resolved to march likewise with the rest of his army along the right bank of the Danube. It passed that river on the 17th at Dettingen, Hœchstet, and Laningen. By this movement Moreau realized the plan which had been formed by the Archduke to drive him with
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his whole force to the right bank of the Rhine. Although he had left a small corps at Donauwert to keep up his correspondence with Jourdan, Moreau was so ill informed of the motions of the Archduke, that on the 21st of August, (six days after the departure of the latter) he believed him still at Rain, as appeared by his letter to the Directory.

When he at last was informed of the Archduke's movement, he determined, as that Prince had expected, to take advantage of the weakness of Mr. La Tour, persuaded that he could pursue no plan as likely to disengage his colleague, as to enter Bavaria, and to make himself master of Munich. He lost no time in carrying this diversion into effect, flattering himself that it would oblige the Archduke to renounce his projects against General Jourdan, and to return immediately.

On the 22d Moreau pushed forwards his advanced posts as far as the Lech and drove those of the enemy to the right bank of the river. He reconnoitred the different fords on the 23d, and repaired the bridges which the Austrians had destroyed in their retreat. These preparatory dispositions being made, he undertook the passage of the Lech on the 24th at three different places.

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The right wing crossed it the first, under the orders of General Ferino, opposite to Haustetten, at a ford which the Austrians had neglected to guard. The French of course found there no resistance. The only obstacle they had to surmount was the rapidity of the current, by which their first platoons that threw themselves into the river were carried away. A great many men were drowned, amongst whom was the Adjutant General Houel. This column having nevertheless succeeded in effecting the passage of the river out of sight of the enemy, advanced against Kuffing and the heights of Othmaringen, from whence it threatened the left wing of the Austrians, and by this feint favoured the passage of the center column.

This last, commanded by General St. Cyr, forded the Lech on the right and left of Lechhausen, under the protection of artillery and musquetry. It forced this village, and as soon as the cannon were brought over the river, it attacked in front the position of Friedberg, whilst General Ferino took it in flank and got possession behind it, of the great road to Munich. The Imperial corps which defended Friedberg, being attacked on many points at the same time was not able to defend

defend them ; it was soon obliged to retreat, leaving in the hands of the French (according to General Moreau's report) 1,500 men, and 16 pieces of cannon.

The left wing of the French was also successful in forcing the passage of the river opposite to Langenwied, and the Austrians entirely driven from their position, took up another between the Lech and the Iser. This expedition could not fail to have cost the French a considerable number of men either killed or drowned.

The passage of the Lech opened to the republicans, the entrance into Bavaria. They found themselves in an abundant country ; and got possession of considerable magazines, which the Austrians had not time to save. They flattered themselves that this success would determine the Archduke to desist from his enterprise against Jourdan. Moreau had no doubt of this, and indeed expressed these expectations to the Executive Directory, by a letter on the 25th. In this however he was mistaken. As it has been before observed, the Archduke contented himself with sending on the 25th to Mr. de Nauendorf,

endof, with 10,000 men, to cover Ratisbon, and to support Mr. de la Tour. This reinforcement put the latter General in condition to prevent the enemy from penetrating beyond the Iser; and thus rendered of no effect the diversion which Moreau endeavoured to make in favour of General Jourdan.

After the passage of the Lech, the French gained ground for four days successively on the Austrians, who took a fresh position between the Iser and the Amper. General Latour posted himself behind the first of these rivers, opposite to Munich, which the advanced guard of the French entered on the 30th of August. He stationed another corps at Freysingen; whilst General Mercantin went to occupy Landshut, where he communicated with some light troops which covered Ratisbon. The approach to this city was besides defended by the troops which the Archduke had left at Ingolstadt, a fortified town, where there is a bridge over the Danube.

Whilst Mr. de la Tour took this position, before which Moreau found the termination of his progress, the latter posted his right at Dachau, his center at Paffenhoffen, and his left at Bombach.

bach. This position was no less singular than dangerous; his left was liable to be attacked with advantage by the Austrian corps, which was in possession of Ingolstadt; and his center could not advance against Ratibon, without being exposed to be taken in flank, by the corps which was at Landshut. To improve his situation, by securing his left, Moreau resolved to dislodge the Austrians from the *Tete de Pont*, at Ingoldstadt.

But whilst he was endeavouring to quit the dangerous situation in which he had placed himself, the Generals Nauendorf and Mercantin determined to take advantage of it. On the 1st of September, at break of day, one part of the left wing of the French having advanced against Ingoldstadt, the other part of it was attacked with great vigour by the Austrians, was entirely routed, and pursued by them as far as Langenbrücke, and the Chapel of St. Gast. This attack forced the French to renounce that which they meditated against Ingoldstadt, and to return to make head against General Nauendorf. He had completely defeated the corps which had been opposed to him, and had advanced several leagues;

leagues; but the main body and corps de Reserve of the French coming up, stopped the progress of the Austrians, whose cavalry being entangled in a morass suffered considerably. After some fruitless attempts to dislodge the enemy from their principal position, the Austrians returned to that which they held before the action. During this engagement the French had made an unsuccessful attack on General Latour, opposite to Munich. These affairs cost both sides some hundred men; both claimed the advantage, which was in fact nearly balanced. It belonged however rather to the Imperialists, since they disconcerted the plans of the enemy against the *Tete de Pont* of Ingolstadt, the garrison of which defeated the small French corps that was left before it. In Moreau's report to the directory of the transactions of this day, he again observes, *that the army of the Sambre and the Meuse, would soon resume offensive operations.*

Moreau having failed in his project against Ingolstadt, determined to dislodge the Austrians from Freylingen, and to drive them on that point beyond the Iser. In this attempt he was

more fortunate. General St. Cyr, on the 3d got possession of Freysingen, as well as of the bridge of that city.

From this day to the 10th the armies of Moreau and La Tour preserved nearly the same position. Between these two periods there were several affairs of advanced posts, some of which were pretty warm, and in one of which, the Republican General Lambert was killed. I abstain from giving a detail account of those actions, as they produced no material alteration in the situation of the armies.

I must not observe the same silence respecting a transaction which took place in the interval. The Elector Palatine had quitted Munich a few days before the French got possession of that city. That Prince had, before his departure, appointed a commission authorized to treat with the conquerors, and to negotiate with them a suspension of arms. As soon as Moreau entered Bavaria, these commissioners sent deputies to prevail on him not to treat their country as that of an enemy, offering to provide by contributions whatever might be necessary for the maintenance of the French army.

After

After many days of negociation they obtained from General Moreau, and from Hauffman, the commissioner of the Republic, a suspension of arms, of which the principal conditions were: that the Elector Palatine should withdraw all the troops which he had with the imperial army into Bavaria; that he should give the French Republic ten millions of French livres, payable at different periods, of which the most distant should be four months from that time; that he should deliver to the French 3,300 saddle and draft horses; 200,000 quintals of grain; 100,000 sacks of oats; 200,000 quintals of hay; 100,000 pair of shoes; 10,000 pair of boots; 30,000 ells of cloth; and 20 pictures, which the French should be at liberty to select from the galleries of Dusseldorf and Munich. Hauffman and Moreau took every possible security for the payment of these demands in every event, and it was at this price that they *con-*
descended to grant the Elector Palatine a neutrality for all his dominions in Bavaria, Franconia, and Westphalia. They exacted from that Prince besides, that he should immediately send to Paris deputies charged to conclude a separate peace with the Republic. These were the advantages which
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the reaped from the invasion of Bavaria. It detached from the Germanic confederacy one of its most powerful members, [Note. 19.] and took away some thousands of men from the Emperor's army, whilst to that of the Republic it produced money, subsistence, and a very considerable addition of military stores and resources. These advantages were no doubt great, but the acquisition of them cost the French dear; it brought along with it the disasters which they experienced during the remainder of the campaign; and the loss of all their conquests in Germany was the sequel and effect of the momentary subjugation of Bavaria. By advancing into that country, Moreau separated, and as it were, insulated himself from Jourdan, lost the means of acting in concert with him, as likewise the possibility of affording him any ready assistance. By transporting all his force to the right bank of the Danube, Moreau enabled the Archduke to conceal his movements from him, and gave that Prince time to come up with Jourdan, and to drive him beyond the Mein.

As soon as he was apprized of the measures taken by the Archduke yielding to the tempt-

temptation of an easy conquest, he too readily persuaded himself that the invasion of Bavaria would recall to it the 20,000 men who had advanced against Jourdan. Being during the space of fifteen days as ill informed of the Austrian movements, as of the situation of the army of the Sambre and Meuse, Moreau never knew with certainty the number of men that Prince Charles had taken with him, nor of those which he had sent back. He continued nevertheless to advance in Bavaria, still confident that it was the only means by which he could save his colleague. Hence it resulted that the Archduke was enabled to push General Jourdan to the utmost, and to drive him beyond the Rhine; and that Moreau finding himself soon reduced to his own force alone, had no part left but that of a retreat, which was become perilous in proportion as it had been delayed.

The light troops dispatched by the Archduke, after the battle of Würtzburg, on the left flank and rear of Moreau's army, were so vigilant and so well distributed, that they cut off that General from all communication with Jourdan. Several couriers sent both by these Generals and by the directory

directory were intercepted, and Moreau was during three weeks very imperfectly informed of the state of affairs in Franconia. Whether that General, as he wrote to the directory, wished to have some account of the Archduke, or whether he was at last sensible of the necessity of advancing against that Prince, in order to succour Jourdan effectually, on the 10th of September he made a large corps of cavalry, drawn from his left wing cross the Danube. Moreau, willing to put himself in a situation to support or follow this column, quitted on the 11th his position on the Iser, but whilst executing this manœuvre, he was attacked near Munich, by the Prince of Furstenberg and General Frölich, who defeated his rear guard, of which they killed or took prisoners more than 2,000 men.

The division which had passed the Danube, under the orders of General Desaix, pushed forwards to the town of Aichstedt, on which it levied a contribution of 300,000 florins (£30,000 sterling.) The march of this column again threw Franconia into alarms; from which she was but just recovering. It was supposed that Moreau's whole

whole army was going to pass the Danube; that this General intended to occupy the road from Ratibon to Frankfort, and that after having got possession of Nuremburg and Würzburg, he would march with all his forces against the Archduke's rear, to seize his magazines, his convoys, and his posts of communication; and that that Prince would soon find himself enclosed between the armies of Jourdan and Moreau.

To put himself in condition to prevent these designs, or to render them abortive, Mr. La Tour began instantly to pursue Moreau, who directed his course towards Neuburg. At the same instant General Nauendorf passed the Danube below that town, in order to meet the French corps which had crossed that river at Donauwert. The march of Mr. de Nauendorf, together with the accounts that were received from France and from General Jourdan, determined Moreau immediately to recall General Defaix to the right bank of the Danube; but before the latter could execute the order, he was overtaken on the 14th by General Nauendorf, who completely defeated his rear guard, killed a great many of his men, and took 1,000 prisoners.

From this moment Moreau thought of nothing but retreating towards the Rhine, through Suabia. Whether from an ignorance of the state of affairs in Franconia, whether pursuant to his first plan, or in consequence of orders from the directory, he had continued for a fortnight in the same position. By remaining so long in Bavaria, where he had kept in check a part of the Austrian forces, he had hoped to give Jourdan time to rally his army, and flattered himself that his colleague when he had received re-inforcements, might be able to stop the Archduke, and resume the offensive. The contrary however had happened. The successive defeats of Jourdan, and the dispersion of his army, no longer allowed Moreau to expect any great efforts from that quarter. The army of La Tour was besides in this interval a good deal augmented. It had received all the re-inforcements that had been sent from Bohemia and Austria. The extraordinary levies which had been made in these two countries, and the military enthusiasm which had been displayed at Vienna as well as in all the hereditary dominions, might in a very short time double the Austrian force in Bavaria.

Moreau

Moreau was likewise aware that detachments from the Archduke's army were then marching to Suabia, and might get possession of the passes, by which he communicated with that country and with France. Under those circumstances he perceived, that without exposing his army to inevitable destruction, he could no longer defer his retreat, which already presented many dangers and difficulties. He therefore determined on it, and had then no other object, but to effect it with as much steadiness and method, as there had been disorder and precipitation in that of Jourdan.

C H A P. VI.

Moreau repasses the Lech—Battle of Isny—The Fort of Kehl is taken by the Austrians, and re-taken by the French—Moreau continues to retreat—Mr. De Nauendorf prevents his entrance into the Dutchy of Würtemberg—The Peasants of Suabia arm against the French—Affair of advanced guards at Schussenried—Moreau sends a part of his baggage and troops through Switzerland—Defeat of the Austrians at Biberach—The French force the pass of the valley of Hell and arrive at Freybourg.

AFTER the affair of the 14th, Moreau drew together the different corps of his army, contracted his line, and retired behind the river Lech; but finding himself too much pressed by Generals La Tour and Nauendorf, who followed him very close, on the 17th he made a movement forward, repulsed the advanced posts of the Austrians, and again extended his line to Landsberg, Friedberg, and Rain.

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On the same day General Frölich made himself master of Immenstadt and Kempten. On the 19th he dislodged the Republicans from Isny, after an engagement in which they were defeated with the loss of 500 men. By the capture of this last place, Mr. de Frölich outflanked the right wing of Moreau, whose left was at the same time turned by General Nauendorf, who had advanced in force to Nordlingen. The latter on the 20th obtained possession of Donauwert, and likewise of the position of Shellenberg. [*Note 20.*] From thence he pushed on parties towards Ulm, Dillingen and Gemund, which formed a junction at Canstadt on the Neker, with some detachments of a corps commanded by Major General Petrarch.

This corps had been formed by part of the garrisons of Phillipsbourg and Mannheim, and by the ten squadrons of light cavalry, which the Archduke had detached under General Meerfeld after the battle of Würtzburg. Soon after this junction, General Petrarch had marched into the Margraviate of Baden, had successively beaten and driven from Bruchsal, Durlach, Carlsruhe, and Rastadt, several small bodies of the enemy, who occupied the valley of the Rhine. These detach-

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ments after their defeat having thrown themselves into the Fort of Kehl, Mr. de Petrarch was ordered to follow them, and to attempt a *Coup de Main* on that important post, the capture of which would have cut off Moreau's principal communication with France, and have multiplied the difficulties of his retreat. The French had covered that fort by considerable intrenchments, but which were at that time neither in a finished state, nor sufficiently provided with artillery.

Mr. de Petrarch, on the 17th of September, caused an attack to be made on the fort of Kehl by two battalions, who carried it by storm, killed 1200 men, took 800 prisoners, and forced the remainder to retreat beyond the Rhine. But one of the two staff officers who conducted the attack having been killed in the action, and the other taken prisoner, the inferior officers, deprived of their leaders, supplied their place with but little intelligence and activity. With a degree of negligence scarcely credible, they omitted the obvious precaution of immediately breaking down the bridge of Kehl; and suffered the soldiers to ramble in disorder about the town and fort. Mean while a reinforcement of 3,000 men, who

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at the beginning of the action had marched from Strasburgh, passed over the bridge, attacked and easily routed the Austrians, who supposing the engagement at an end, were entirely off their guard. They were, in a very short time, driven from the fort of Kehl, and from all the entrenchments, with the loss of 400 men. Thus did a few moments of improvidence and disorder rob them of the whole fruit of their victory, and deprive them of an invaluable post, which afterwards cost so much blood and expence. Few examples can be produced, which have more strikingly proved the absolute necessity of unremitting attention and vigilance in war, or more clearly shewn the fatal consequences which may result from one moment of mistake, or of forgetfulness. The fault committed at Kehl by the officer on whom the command devolved by the loss of his superiors, cost the Emperor in the sequel many thousands of his best soldiers, and occasioned the expence of many millions.

Mr. de Petrarch having rallied the two defeated battalions, and supported them by some fresh troops, made a new but unsuccessful attempt on the fort of Kehl. Leaving then some troops to
blockade

blockade it, he retired to Bichoffsheim, a small town about fifteen miles distant from it. From thence he sent a detachment to take possession of the valley of Kintzig, as well as of the defile of Kniebis; and marched with the remainder of his troops towards Stutgard and Canstadt, where his advanced guard arrived on the 24th. By this disposition, and by these movements, Mr. de Petrarch made himself master of one of the five principal passes of Suabia, placed himself in the rear of Moreau, deprived him of all direct communication with Straßburgh, carried off the magazines formed by the French in the Duchy of Würtemberg, and intercepted their convoys and their couriers. Having opened an immediate communication with Mr. de Nauendorf, he straitened the front of Moreau's retreat, and obliged him to make it through the southern part of Suabia.

Pressed on his rear by Mr. de Petrarch, and turned on both flanks by Generals Nauendorf and Frölich, Moreau was obliged to re-commence his retreat. On the 20th he repassed the Lech at Augsbourg and Rain, marched up the Danube in close columns, and arrived on the 22d at Weissen-

Weiffenhausen. His plan was to retire across the duchy of Würtembergh, and the country of Baden, through Ulm, Stutgard, Canstadt and Kehl. To this end he had sent forward the Commissaries of provisions, the army bakers, and a part of the baggage. The whole of this was fallen in with, and captured on the 22nd on the road from Ulm to Stutgard, by an Austrian detachment from the latter town.

The march of the commissaries' department towards Stutgard, and its orders to have in readiness in that town, as well as at Canstadt, bread and provisions necessary for four divisions of Moreau's army, proving beyond a doubt that General's intention to pass the Danube at Ulm, with a view to retire through the duchy of Würtembergh, General Nauendorf left Nordlingen in haste, to endeavour to be at Ulm before the French, and arrived in the neighbourhood of that town on the 23d. in the morning. Some hours afterwards, a strong column of the French army came out of Ulm, but found the Austrians posted on the heights, which command the road from that town to Stutgard. They did not attempt to force the passage, and the

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day passed without any engagement taking place. The next day General Nauendorf attacked the French, and drove them back to the gates of the town. Seeing themselves thus prevented, and not doubting that the Austrians occupied in force all the passes of the dutchy of Würtenbergh, the French gave up their intention of taking that route. On the 26th they left Ulm, leaving there a part of their pontoons, and considerable magazines. They continued to ascend the left bank of the Danube as far as Erbach, where they passed that river on the same day, the 26th, and from thence directed their march towards Biberach and Schuffenried. With a view to anticipate or stop them on the new route which they were going to take, General Petrarch marched from Orb to Villingen, leaving a small corps under Colonel d'Aspre, to occupy the mountain of Kniebis, as well as the valleys of the two rivers of the Renchen and the Murg, between which that mountain is situated.

In the mean time a column sent by Moreau to re-open the communication with Kehl, through the valley of Kenzing, was repulsed and forced to fall back on Fribourg.

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This General having, as has been just mentioned, passed the Danube on the 26th, and marched towards Biberach, and Schuffenried, was followed by Mr. de la Tour, who advanced on the 27th. to the Jller, and on the 28th to the Rottam. On the 29th. his advanced guard drove the French from Biberach, and pursued them as far as Groth, from which it was unable to dislodge them. The army of Mr. de la Tour was at that time divided into four corps: that at the right, under the immediate orders of that General in person occupied Biberach; the second commanded by General Mercantin, was behind Schuffenried. General Klinglin (who before the revolution had been a General in the French service) was with the third corps at Wolsech. The fourth was with General Frölich in the neighbourhood of Wangen. At the same time the two corps of Nauendorf and Petrarch, which were both out of the line, moved, the first to Heckeningen, and the second towards Rothweil and Villingen. The object of these movements was to bring these two corps nearer each other, and to make them co operate with more concert and effect. Mr. de

Meerfeld commanded the advanced guard of Mr. de Petrarch's corps.

It is obvious from this view of the position of the different corps of the Austrian army, that the principal passes of Suabia were shut against Moreau, and that the only ones remaining open to him were those of the principality of Furstenberg, and of the forest towns. He might not be free from uneasiness even with respect to the latter opening, in consequence of General Frölich's march towards the Lake of Constance.

To all these difficulties which opposed Moreau's retreat, were added other embarrassments equally pressing. The excessive contributions raised by the French, and the depredations and outrages committed by them on the inhabitants of Suabia, had irritated the latter to the highest degree. They supported with impatience the presence and the yoke of these greedy and tyrannical conquerors. They had scarcely experienced some reverses and began their retreat, when the hatred in which they were held broke out openly. The Peasants every where armed themselves, massacred or took prisoners the smaller detachments of the French, stopped their sick and

and wounded, pillaged their magazines, and retook a part of those spoils of which they had themselves been plundered. The Austrian Generals taking advantage of the disposition of the natives, pointed out to them the most eligible places for assembling, put at their head officers of experience, and posted their new auxiliaries on the mountains, in the woods, and in the defiles, through which the enemy were obliged to pass.

Menaced in every point at the same time by the Imperialists and the armed Peasants, and having in addition to surmount those obstacles which arose from the nature of the country, Moreau found himself in the most critical situation. To escape from Suabia, called for more courage, and for greater efforts than had been required to enable him to penetrate into it. It was incumbent on him to fight in order to retire; his safety could result only from a victory.

Surrounded by a multitude of small corps scattered over a great number of points, he was sensible that instead of facing them all at once, his situation demanded the adoption of a contrary disposition, and that he ought to march in a mass and in very close order. He judged rightly that

that by concentrating his army, he would be enabled to attack with superior force and to break through some point or other of the circle which was forming round him.

It not being possible for him, without great danger, to retire in the face of the principal corps under the orders of Mr. de la Tour, which pressed very closely upon him, Moreau was under the necessity of removing that hostile corps to a greater distance, in order to gain somewhat more space and greater facility of moving.

In the morning of the 30th, whilst the van guards of Generals La Tour and Mercantin were marching towards Schuffenried they were vigorously attacked by three divisions of the French army. These van guards fell back on the main body which followed them, and which stopped the progress of the Republicans. They were repulsed with loss, and the Imperialists kept their position. This affair cost the latter 600 men, of whom a great number belonged to the Prince of Condé's army. His troops formed the van guard of General Mercantin, and had to sustain the whole shock of the Republicans. They exhibited proofs of the greatest bravery, and the young Duke d'Eng-

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hien, who commanded them, shewed himself by his capacity and courage, the worthy descendent of the great Condé.

Moreau, having succeeded but imperfectly in his plans against Mr. de la Tour, hastened to take advantage of the only route which remained entirely in his power. In order to get rid of his sick, his wounded, and of all that train of equipage so embarrassing to a retreating army, and by the Romans so properly called *impedimenta*, he sent into Switzerland, by the way of Schaffhausen, a great part of his heavy baggage, accompanied by a considerable number of soldiers. On their entrance into the territory of Switzerland, they were disarmed by the troops, which the cantons had assembled on their frontiers, and sent into France across the cantons of Zurich and Soleure. Moreau by this means disengaged himself from whatsoever could most incommode and incumber his retreat; and kept with him only those troops, which were the best calculated for action. After the engagement of the 30th, Mr. de la Tour advanced as far as Groth, and Steinhausen; presenting his front to Moreau, who was posted between Schuffenried, and a small lake called the Feder See. The situation of the latter General grew every day

day worse, and his retreat became more and more difficult. The corps of Mr. de Petrarch posted between the sources of the Neker and the Danube, incessantly harraffed his rear. He had no longer any direct communication with France, and could entertain no hopes of receiving from thence any succour. Reduced to his own forces, he could only look for safety to the courage of his troops, to some successful manœuvre, or to the fault of his enemies.

The corps of Mr. de la Tour being the most numerous, the nearest, and consequently the most to be feared, Moreau resolved to make a new effort against it. He judged, that Mr. de Nauendorf having separated himself from Mr. de la Tour, the right of the latter would be unprotected, and might be attacked with advantage. He made his dispositions in consequence with great ability; and they were executed with secrecy, promptitude, and success.

In the night of the first of October, he made the left wing of his army cross the Danube, at Riedlingen. It re-crossed that river at Munderkingen, and at day-break fell upon the right of the Austrian army, which was posted between the Danube and the Feder See. Major General Kospoth, who commanded this right wing, not having been properly

perly vigilant on that point, was surpris'd and completely beaten. Nearly two battalions were cut off; and the rest fought for safety in flight. As soon as Moreau was informed of the success of his left wing, he attacked the whole front of Mr. de la Tour's line, but more feebly on the left, than at the other points.

That army was then divided into five principal corps, commanded by Generals Kospoth and de la Tour, the Princes of Furstenberg and Condé, and by General Mercantin, who was on the left of the whole. Mr. de Kospoth being routed, retired through Biberach. The corps of Mr. de la Tour being vigourously attacked by the French, and finding itself uncovered by the movement of Mr. de Kospoth, imitated it, falling back from the right, and retiring towards Ochsenhausen. The Prince of Furstenberg likewise changed his front in the same manner; so that these three corps, as well as the reserve artillery and the baggage, formed in close order behind the small army of the Prince of Condé. The latter, far from imitating the example of Generals Kospoth, la Tour, and Furstenberg, remained firm in his position. He found himself

alone opposed to the French, whose whole efforts there became directed against him.

In this situation, at once honourable and dangerous, the Prince of Condé displayed the talents of a most able General, and his army the most determined intrepidity. It shewed no hesitation in devoting itself for the glory of its commander, and the safety of the Imperial army. The Prince took a position before Schweinhausen, so judiciously chosen and which was so valiantly defended by his troops, that he kept in check the Republican army, engaged it even with advantage, and gave time to the other Austrian columns to save their baggage and their cannon, and to take a position behind the Rothambach. Mr. de Mercantin, who commanded the left, having then retired to Mulhausen, the situation of the Prince of Condé's corps became still more dangerous.

The Prince, pressed hard by the Republicans, charged them three times with his cavalry, led by the Duke d'Enghien, who took from them one piece of cannon; and who again distinguished himself as well by his valour, as by the adroitness of his manœuvres. After an action which
lasted

lasted many hours, the Imperial army having taken a secure position, the Prince of Condé also ordered a retreat. The loss of the Austrians on this day, was about 4,000 men and 12 pieces of cannon; that of the Republicans was considerably less. General La Tour spoke in the highest terms of the Prince of Condé and of his troops, to which he confessed he owed the safety of his army. The official accounts published at Vienna and at London, made a no less favourable report of the Prince on Condé's conduct.

On the 3d. Mr. La Tour took a position at Monschroden, Erlenhausen, and Laupheim. The victory which Moreau had gained at Biberach having given him more liberty in his motions, he took advantage of it on the 5th to recommence his retreat, and to make sure of the means by which it might be successfully effected. Mr. La Tour being weakened by his defeat, and disabled for some days from an active pursuit of Moreau, the latter left only the center of his army before that of Mr. La Tour. He ordered one division to open the entrance into the forest towns; and on the 6th passed the Danube with the rest of his army, between Sigmaringen and Ried-

lingen. The intent of the last movement was to cover the main body from Generals Nauendorf and Petrarfch, and also to force the passage of the black forest.

By these dispositions, the center of the French army, to which the artillery and all the baggage were entrusted, was covered on its right by the corps which was marching toward the forest towns; and on its left, by the two divisions which had passed the Danube. [*Note 21.*] Thus did the French army retreat in three parts, in paralled lines, the right and left opening the march and protecting that of the center, which on its side kept in check General La Tour, and prevented him from reinforcing the Generals Nauendorf and Petrarfch. It was in this regular and well-arranged order of retreat that Moreau directed his course towards the mountains of Suabia, and prepared to force their defiles.

On the 7th he marched towards Stockach, where he arrived on the 8th. He had the night before ordered General Defaix to take possession of Engen, who on the next day attacked the advanced guard of General Petrarfch, and dislodged it from Duttlingen. On the 1st General Defaix
having

having formed a junction with the two divisions which had passed the Danube, made a fresh attack on General Petrarſch, defeated him, and drove him from Schweyningen, as well as from the towns of Rothweil and Villingen, two very important poſts, without the poſſeſſion of which the French could not poſſibly penetrate the defiles of the black Foreſt.

General la Tour, after ſome days of inaction, occaſioned by his defeat at Biberach, now reſumed the purſuit of the enemy. He marched on the 7th. to Buchau, on the 8th. to Oſtrach, and on the 9th. to Mœſkirchen, whiſt General Moreau eſtabliſhed his head quarters at Engen. On the 10th, Mr. de Nauendorf made an attempt to recover Rothweil. In the beginning of the action he had the advantage; but it terminated in favour of the French, who vigorouſly repulſed him.

Whatever advantage the latter derived from poſſeſſing the poſt of Rothweil, it by no means decided the ſucceſs of their retreat; and they had as yet only ſurmounded a part of the difficulties which attended it. The greateſt impediments to it ſtill remained. It was abſolutely neceſſary that the French ſhould force their way, either through the
valley

valley of Kintzig, to get to Kehl, or through the valley of Hell, to make good their retreat to Fribourg. Moreau had not a moment to lose to succeed in one or other of these attempts. The entrance into these vallies were guarded by Austrian corps, and by armed peasants, whose number increased daily: there was every reason to apprehend that he would not succeed in forcing his way, if the Archduke Charles, who was rapidly advancing, and was already at Offenburg, should have time to join the troops which occupied the defiles that we are now speaking of. [*Note 22.*]

The center of the French army, which its two wings had hitherto preceded, and which had marched in a parallel line behind them, in its turn advanced to force the passage of the valley of Hell. Having formed a close column, it attacked on the 10th. Colonel d'Appe, who defended the entrance of the valley. The inferiority of his forces did not admit of his maintaining himself. He was driven from post to post, and wounded in one of the actions that took place. The French at length succeeded in passing this terrible defile. [*Note 23.*] They arrived on the 13th. at Fribourg, from whence they drove the Austrians; and advanced beyond this city,

city, the possession of which secured and completed their retreat. [*Note 24.*]

Whilst the center of the republican army was advancing to overpower by its mass the small corps which defended the valley of Hell, the two wings had formed a junction, that they might be in condition to check the Generals Nauendorf and Petrarch. They passed in their turn the valley of Hell, on the 14th, 15th, and 16th; whilst the equipage and ammunition waggon, which Moreau had with him, defiled by the forest towns under the protection of the right wing.

Mr. de la Tour had followed the enemy on the 10th to Engen and Stockach, flattering himself that he should be enabled to cut a part of them off, whilst they were endeavouring to force the entrance into the black forest; an attempt which it was supposed it would be extremely difficult to execute. But these narrow passes too feebly guarded, having been penetrated and traversed by the French, with little loss and great expedition: Mr. de la Tour gave up a pursuit from that time useless, which had now taken him up a month, and which had been conducted either in so unfortunate or so unskilful a manner. He
marched

marched to the right towards the valley of Kintzig, to form a junction with the Archduke Charles, a junction, which became necessary from the union of the whole French army, near Fribourg. The Generals Nauendorf and Petrarch had also marched, on the 14th. in order to join the Prince, the one to Eltzach, the other to Kintzig. On the 15th. the corps of the Prince of Condé, and General Frölich, were the only ones which continued the pursuit of the enemy into the defiles of the black Forest. [*Note 25.*]

The day after his arrival at Fribourg, Moreau caused Valdkirch to be occupied, and placed his advanced posts on the heights, which bound the right bank of the little river Eltz. A detachment of his army drove the light troops of the Archduke from old Brisach, and threw a bridge of boats over the Rhine, between that town and new Brisach.

C H A P. VII.

*Moreau endeavours to maintain himself in Brisgaw—
 March of the Archduke against Fribourg—Posi-
 tion of the opposed armies—Battles of the 17th, 18th,
 and 19th of October—Moreau retreats and takes
 the formidable position of Schliengen—He is forced
 to abandon it, and to re-pass the Rhine at Huningen.*

MOREAU having luckily escaped all the dangers which attended his retreat, having without any considerable loss conducted his whole army over the mountains of Suabia, having by the possession of the whole valley of the Rhine, as well as of the two bridges of Huningen and Brisach, a safe and perfect communication with France, might have thought (as it should seem) that he had done enough in saving his army, and have been inclined to retire with it beyond the Rhine. But whether this General had received contrary orders from the directory, or that he was elated by his successful retreat, instead of retiring into Alsace, he pro-

posed to maintain himself in Brisgau, and to attack his enemy instead of giving way to them. Accustomed from the beginning of the campaign to successes which he had no right to expect, and which he owed very often to the errors of the Generals who were opposed to him, he trusted that fortune would continue faithful to him, and hoped to crown his retreat with a victory. He wished to defeat the Archduke, and to relieve the fort of Kehl from its blockade. With this intention he ventured on the 18th into the valley of Kintzig, and marched to meet Prince Charles.

The latter had advanced from the upper Rhine in hopes, (if possible) of getting possession of Kehl, before Moreau had forced his way through Suabia. He had detached General Hotze into Alsace, merely to engage the attention of the troops which the French had in that province, and to prevent their sending any considerable force to succour Kehl. This diversion did not meet with the desired success. In vain did General Hotze overrun the Palatinate and Alsace, and levy contributions even at the gates of Strasbourg. The French shut up in their strong places, and knowing that that General could undertake nothing against them

them, took care not to weaken Kehl, to enable themselves to oppose this momentary invasion.

The good state of defence in which this fort then was, as well as Moreau's successful retreat and subsequent movements, obliged the Archduke to renounce for the present his intended attack upon it, which he contented himself with blockading with a small corps. He marched towards Fribourg, and arrived on the 16th at Molberg, where he took the command of Mr. de la Tour's army, which had been joined by the corps of Nauendorf and Petrarch.

Before the reader is presented with the detail of the battles which took place between the 17th and the 27th. of October, and which decided the issue of this campaign, it is material that he should be made acquainted with the positions respectively occupied by the two armies at the first of those periods. They had at that time ceased to be divided into several corps, at a distance from, and independent of one another. On both sides they occupied a line, almost all the points of which were connected with each other, and thus enabled to receive mutual support.

The line formed by the Austrian army had its right against the Rhine; extended itself along the front of the river Eltz; crossed the mountains of Simonswald, and terminated on the left at the entrance of the vallies of St. Peter and St Meger's, where the Prince of Condé and General Frölich were posted. These two corps had not an immediate communication with the rest of the army.

The right of the French occupied the mouth of the vallies just mentioned. From thence their line passed by Simonswald, Valdkirch, Emendingen, in front of the Eltz, and of Kintzingen, near the Rhine, to which their left extended.

It was in this position that the Imperial and Republican armies disputed the possession of the Brisgaw. On the 17th and particularly on the 18th, there were very smart actions between the advanced guards, which were favourable to the Austrians. On the latter day, the Duke of Enghien, who commanded the Prince of Condé's advanced Guard, defeated the right of the French, from whom he took the formidable posts of Hohlgraben, St. Meger's and St. Peter. On the same day General Frölich also made himself master
of

of some important points in the valley of Hell.

These actions were only the preludes to a general engagement, for which the Archduke had made the following dispositions. The right of his army, commanded by Mr. de la Tour, was to attack the small town of Kintzingen: General Wartenleben, with the center, was ordered to carry the heights behind the village of Malmeringen: General Petrarch, at the head of the left wing, was directed to advance on the road from Keimbach to Emendingen; Whilst General Meerfeld, with one brigade, was to penetrate the woods which were on the left, and Prince Frederic of Orange was to endeavour, with another brigade, to gain the commanding parts of the mountains, in order to turn the right of the French. These last were to be attacked at the same time at Waldkirch, by General Nauendorf; and in the vallies of St. Peter's and of Hell, by General Frölich and the Prince of Condé.

On the 19th, in the morning, all these columns put themselves in motion towards the points of their destination: but the badness of the roads, as well as other difficulties occasioned by the na-

ture

ture of the ground, very much retarded their march. They could not commence the attack till mid-day. General La Tour experienced the greatest resistance in that on Kintzingen. He was even several times repulsed with loss: but Prince Charles having put himself at the head of the grenadiers, they attacked the French with an irresistible fury, and drove them from the village. The left and centre having also met with great opposition, it was not without considerable difficulty that General Meerfeld made himself master of the woods above Keimbach. The enemy profiting from the advantage of their position, defended themselves step by step, and were not driven from it, till the Prince of Orange, after a most laborious march through a country that seemed impenetrable appeared on their right. This manœuvre quickly followed by a vigorous attack, decided the victory. The French abandoned Emendingen, and crossed the Eltz at Denningen, where they destroyed the bridge.

General Nauendorf was not less successful. At the moment that he put himself in march he was briskly attacked by a considerable corps of the enemy, commanded by General Moreau in person.

Mr.

Mr. de Nauendorf not only rendered fruitless all his efforts, but vigorously repulsed him, drove him from Valdkirch, and made himself master of the bridge at this town over the Eltz. By a ready and able manœuvre, this General turned three of the enemy's battalions, one of which laid down their arms, and the other two were broken and dispersed in the woods.

The Prince of Condé also and General Frölich gained ground on the corps which were opposed to them in the vallies of Hell and of St. Peter.

It appeared from the account that Moreau sent of this action, in which he suffered a considerable loss, that he had wished to avoid an engagement in the position which he then occupied. He had sent orders to the advanced guards of his center and his left to fall back behind the Eltz, in case they were attacked; but General Beaupuy who had been charged to see this order executed, having been killed in the beginning of the action, the French waited for the enemy before the Eltz, and engaged in a position which was very unfavourable to them.

General

General Moreau took a new one behind the Eltz, in the night of the 19th. His right rested against the mountains, and his left on some morasses behind the village of Versletten. This last disposition had for its object, to guard the mouth of the defile of Theningen.

In the morning of the 20th, the Archduke pushed his advanced guard across the Eltz, opposite to Emendingen, and gave orders to General La Tour to pass this river at Deningen, whilst General Nauendorf should advance in the plain towards Fribourg. Mr. de la Tour having been under the necessity of repairing the bridge at Deningen, under the fire of the enemy's artillery, lost many men and a good deal of time. It was already night before he was in condition to pass the river. This delay prevented the Archduke from making a general attack on the enemy, as he had intended. The Prince of Furstenberg however dislodged them in the course of the day from the village of Rûgel, the possession of which opened to the Austrians the road to Old Brisach.

The advanced guards of each army passed the night of the 20th within half cannon shot of each other.

other. The Archduke prepared to execute at break of day, the attack which he had been prevented from making the day before. But Moreau did not think proper to wait for it, and retreated during the night, after having sent a considerable detachment across the Rhine at New Brisach, and destroyed the bridge there.

Such was the result of Moreau's efforts to maintain himself in the Brisgau. All he gained by them was a delay of six days, during which he lost 2,000 men taken prisoners, and a like number killed and wounded. The loss of the Austrians was not the fourth of it. To the great regret of the whole army General Wartenleben had his arm broke on the 19th by a grape shot.

The Archduke entered Fribourg on the 21st, where he was joined by the corps of the Prince of Condé, and of General Frölich, which assisted him in driving the rear guard of the enemy out of that town. The Austrians followed the French whom they supposed to be in full retreat towards Upper Alsace; but whether Moreau wished to gain time that he might prevent the Imperialists from attempting any other enterprise before the end of the campaign, or whether he wished still

to endeavour to maintain himself on the right bank of the Rhine, he halted at Schliengen (twelve miles from Huningen) in a very strong position.

His right wing was placed on the neighbouring heights of the villages of Kandern and Sutzenkirchen. Beginning at these two points his line extended along that chain of hills which terminates the valley of the Rhine, fifteen miles from Basle, and passed by Ober and Nieder Eckenheim, Liel, Schliengen, and Steinstadt. His left was posted above the latter village, beneath which ran the Rhine. The center occupied the high grounds of the villages of Liel and Schliengen. The whole front of the line was protected by a small river which takes its course in the mountains near Kandern, and runs by Ober and Nieder Eckenheim, Liel, and Schliengen to Steinstadt, where it falls into the Rhine. The French had besides posted a large body of infantry in front of their center on a very lofty point between the villages of Schliengen and Feldberg. I should add to this detail of the position taken by Moreau, that the high grounds on the left bank of this river, completely command those of the right bank. This circumstance gave the French a great advantage in defend-
ing

ing the approach of their line. It was in this formidable position that Moreau hoped once more to check the Austrians, and in which the latter did not hesitate to attack him.

The enterprize was opposed by so many almost insurmountable obstacles, that it required the talents of the Archduke, and the enthusiasm with which his valour had inspired the troops, to be able to overcome them. The Prince did not think fit to endeavour to turn round the heights occupied by the right wing of the French. The season and the bad condition of the roads rendered this measure tedious, and doubtful in its event. An attack by open force, in spite of its dangers, was more suitable to circumstances, and above all, to the enterprising character of the Archduke. He resolved whatever it might cost, to dislodge the enemy from the heights of Kandern, Fuerbach, Sutzenkirchen, Ober and Nieder Eckenheim. The attack was disposed in the following manner:—The army was divided into four principal columns. That on the right was formed by the corps of the Prince of Condé, its van guard being under the orders of the Duke d'Enghien. The second commanded by the Prince of Furstemberg, consisted

of nine battalions and twenty-six squadrons; the third, of eleven battalions and two regiments of cavalry, was conducted by General Latour; and the fourth column, composed of the whole van guard of the army, was headed by General Nauendorf.

The two first columns were ordered not to attempt a serious attack, the ground being too much against them, but merely to keep in check the left wing of the enemy, so as to prevent them from sending reinforcements to their right. The real attack was to be made by the two columns on the left, which were to advance against the right of the enemy, and endeavour to turn it.

The corps of the Prince of Condé having been drawn together at Neuburg, pushed forward to Steinstadt, and although it had received no orders to drive the French from that village, the troops were so animated with a desire of signalizing themselves, that they made an attack with fixed bayonets, took possession of the place, and maintained themselves in it the whole day, though constantly under the fire of the enemy.

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The Prince of Furstemberg formed his column at Mulheim, and posted himself on the heights opposite Schliengen, which he defended with success.

The corps of General Latour was divided into two Columns. That on the right attacked the French in the vineyards which they occupied between Feldberg and Schliengen, whilst the left dislodged them from Eckenheim and pushed forward the attack to the mountains beyond the hollow way. The enemy defended themselves with great obstinacy, but were driven at length from the vineyards, and from a part of the woods which lie between Nieder Eckenheim, and Feurbach.

General Nauendorf left the environs of Feldberg, and reached the points he was to force, after a long and difficult march. He divided his corps into several small columns, which made separate attacks on the villages of Sutzenkirchen, Feurbach, and Kandern. After a severe conflict the French yielded in all these points, and Mr. de Nauendorf found the communication opened between himself and Mr. de la Tour, through the means of an intermediate corps commanded by General Meerfeld. A violent storm, and afterwards night coming

ing on put an end to the action, and to the efforts of the Austrians.

As the posts which they had taken possession of commanded the flanks of those still occupied by the French, the Archduke prepared to attack them the day after, on the heights of Tannenkirchen, where the right wing of the enemy had retired and had taken a position *en potence*, no less formidable than that from which they had just been driven.

General Moreau foreseeing that if he was compelled to abandon this last post, the Austrians might place themselves between him and the bridge of Huningen, or drive him back upon the Rhine, determined to re-commence his retreat, and to continue it till he reached the other bank of the river. He began his march during the night, and encamped on the 25th at Atlingen. The day after, his army passed the Rhine at Huningen, almost in the presence of the Austrians, who did not endeavour to disturb these last moments of its retreat. The French Army was protected by a strong rear guard under the orders of Generals Abbattuci and la Boissiere.

It was thus that General Moreau, after having remained four months in Germany, after having
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conquered Suabia and Bavaria, and threatened Austria, was obliged to pass the Rhine in order to protect the frontiers of France. No one can deny that he made a most able retreat. His successes from the 24th of June (the period at which he passed the Rhine at Kehl) till his entrance into Bavaria, resulting almost necessarily from the great superiority of his forces, were not decisive of his military talents. But his retreat has left no room to doubt of his abilities, and ranks him amongst distinguished Generals. Indeed every one must acknowledge that he conducted his army with infinite skill in the midst of the Austrian corps which surrounded him, and that he chose well his opportunities to attack and defeat them one after another. The movement which he made against Mr. de la Tour was well combined, and it was to the complete success of this manoeuvre that he owed that of his retreat, which was judicious and methodical. He saved his sick, his wounded, his artillery and his baggage.

However able the conduct of General Moreau may have been, professionally speaking, it presents however many errors, which have been
partly

partly pointed out in the course of this work. Even his retreat is not altogether free from blame. By remaining stationary during eight days in a bad position, full of defiles occupied by the enemy, he ran the risk of being either completely routed, or finding himself in want of military stores. If it did not so turn out, Moreau had no merit in it: it must be attributed to the faults committed by the Austrian Generals, and particularly by Mr. de la Tour. The French army owed its safety to the two following causes.

First, To the great distance there was between the corps of Frölich, Condé, Latour, Nauendorf and Petrarch, which prevented them from having a quick and easy communication, and deprived the different Generals of the power of combining their motions or attacks with precision and security. By forming an immense circle round Moreau, they enabled him to bear with his whole force against any point of the circumference, which he found it necessary to break through: which that General did not fail to do, as often as circumstances required it.

Secondly,

Secondly. To the diversion made by General Hotze in Alsace, which proved of the utmost utility to Moreau. This incursion had two objects: first to induce the French to draw off a part of the troops stationed in Strasbourg and Kehl; and secondly to hinder them from making any attempt on the lower Rhine, by compelling them to detach a part of the army of the Sambre and Meuse for the protection of Alsace, and the Dutchy of Deux Ponts. The first of these two objects was not attained, and the second was but imperfectly executed. If instead of sending General Hotze with 9,000 men into Alsace, he had been ordered to join Mr. de Petrarch without delay, it would have enabled that General to act more effectually against the French, instead of being obliged to confine himself to slight attacks, on account of the small number of his troops. Having every advantage which the nature of the country could afford, and being moreover seconded by the inhabitants, Mr. de Petrarch might have checked Moreau in the defiles of Suabia, or even have prevented him from penetrating into that province. These

9,000 men, posted in the valley of Hell, would have rendered it inattackable. What would have become of Moreau, had he not been able to force this passage, and arrive at Fribourg? All entrance into Switzerland was shut against him. Had he attempted to violate the neutrality of its territory, 25,000 men assembled by the different cantons in that of Schaffausen might have opposed his entrance into their country, and have placed him between themselves and the Austrians. In this case, his only resource would have been to pass through the forest towns; defiling through which, an army impeded by equipage, stores, and artillery, might have been destroyed, or at least have lost its rear guard. The end of this campaign might have been very different.

After Moreau's return into Alsace, the respective armies were again separated by the Rhine almost the whole length of its course, from Basle to Cologne. Henceforward this campaign, which ought seemingly to have been put an end to by the season, no longer excited that lively degree of interest, which two numerous armies, opposed
to

to each other in a vast and open country, naturally inspire. Great battles, and those decisive movements, which produce the acquisition, or the loss of a great tract of country, were no longer to be expected. Military curiosity had no other object, than the sieges carried on against the heads of the bridges at Kehl and Huningen, as well as some unimportant events which took place on the lower Rhine, and which I am about to relate.

C H A P. VIII.

Disposition of the armies of the Archduke and Moreau, after the latter had re-entered France—Operations of General Werneck on the lower Rhine—Bournonville succeeds Jourdan in the command of his army of the Sambre and Meuse—Condition of that army—Operations of Generals Hotze and Neu, on the left bank of the Rhine—Passage of that river by the Austrians on the 21st—Affair on the Sieg the same day—Battle of Kreutznach—General Hotze retires into the intrenched camp before Mannheim—He is attacked in it without success—Neutrality of Neuwied agreed upon—Armistice concluded on the lower Rhine.

PRINCE Charles, after having driven the army of the Rhine and Moselle into Alsace, thought of nothing but to wrest from them the two places still in the hands of the French on the right bank of the Rhine, viz. the heads of the bridges of Kehl and Huningen. He ordered them to be invested at
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the end of October, and made every necessary preparation for these enterprizes. He entrusted the direction of the attack to be made on the head of the bridge of Huningen, as well as the command of the left wing of his army to the Prince of Wurtemberg, and marched himself with the rest of his forces to Offembourg. He fixed his head quarters in this town that he might personally be able to direct the operations of the siege of Kehl. The Prince ordered the right wing of his army under General Staray towards Rastadt and Mannheim, in order to unite it to the troops which occupied the latter place, and to secure a powerful support to its entrenched camp in case of an attack.

On the other side, General Moreau disposed his army nearly in a manner similar. He left his right wing under the orders of General Ferino, in the environs of Huningen, to defend the head of the bridge, marched the center of his army towards Strasbourg, and established his head quarters near that town, in the village of Illkirch. He gave the command of his left to General Defaix, who marched towards Landau, in order to oppose General Hotze, and
compel

compel him to retire into the fort of the Rhine, before the Town of Mannheim.

Having now informed the reader of the positions taken by the armies of Prince Charles and General Moreau for the remainder of the campaign, as well as for their winter quarters, I shall recall his attention for the last time to the lower Rhine.

It may be remembered that the Archduke having forced Jourdan's army to cross the Rhine and the Sieg, left General Werneck on the 22d of September with about 40,000 men, to keep the French in check on the lower Rhine. This General, well worthy by his military talents of the confidence reposed in him by the Archduke, placed his advanced posts on the Sieg, and his head quarters at Uckerath. His operations could only be defensive, and his sole aim was to prevent the French from taking the field again. To attain this he had two objects to fulfil, first to confine the enemy between Duffeldorf and the Sieg, and secondly to block up the head of the bridge at Neuwied as closely as possible.

The campaigns of 1795 and 1796 having furnished many examples of the facility with which an army superior

perior in number could force the passage of the Sieg and the Lahn, General Werneck endeavoured to find in the nature of the country, and the works of art, the means of obviating the defects of several points of his position. In order to improve and center the defence of the Lahn, he contrived to unite by combined entrenchments the towns of Montebauer and Limbourg to the fortrefs of Ehrebreitstein. Foreseeing besides a possibility that the enemy might force these entrenchments and the passage of the Lahn, Mr. de Werneck caused the Town of Friedberg to be fortified, that he might add a second line of defence to that of Frankfort.

The reader may remember, that at the end of his retreat Jourdan was deprived of the command of the army, the remains of which he was bringing back. The complaints made by this General against the plan of the campaign which he had been obliged to follow, against the want of means in which he had been left, and against the bad conduct of the civil commissaries attached to his army; all these, but still more, the misfortunes which he had experienced, dissatisfied the directory, of whom Jourdan had been till then
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the favourite. Instead of an increase of authority which he demanded as necessary to restore order to his army, he was stripped of his command, which was bestowed on General Beurnonville, already known by his campaign of Treves in 1792, and by his imprisonment in Moravia. Scarcely had the latter returned into France, than he was sent, in compensation for his long captivity, to take the command of the army of the North in Holland. He brought a part of it to the assistance of Jourdan in the end of September, and succeeded a few days after to the command of the army of the Sambre and Meuse.

This change of commanders did not accelerate the restoration of good order throughout the army. On the contrary it appeared that Jourdan in spite of his misfortunes still retained many partisans in it in all its different classes. Several Generals and Subaltern officers wished to share his disgrace, and desertion which was already very considerable became more prevalent than before. These circumstances did not second the wishes of the directory, and the efforts of Beurnonville, to restore to the army that confidence which it had lost. The business indeed was less to reform than to new model it altogether.

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The elements of it were either dissolved or relaxed; it no longer retained either union or spirit. The Generals were discontented, the Officers disheartened, and the soldiers were without confidence and subordination. This army was in want of horses, artillery, clothes, arms, and provisions. It was deficient in those various military means, without which, an army, whatever be the number of its soldiers, cannot undertake an active war, without experiencing embarrassments. This however was what the French Government expected from it, wishing the army to recommence offensive operations as soon as possible, that whilst there was yet time, a powerful diversion might be made in favour of Moreau. Notwithstanding the orders of the Directory, and his own exertions, General Beurnonville could not put the army of the Sambre and Meuse in a condition to act effectually. In vain did he cashier officers, break commissaries, dismiss contractors, and shoot some soldiers: his army was not rendered by this more fit to be employed, and these internal arrangements consumed the

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time,

time, during which it was still possible to undertake some enterprize.

To the abovementioned causes, which prevented Beurnonville from recommencing offensive operations, was added the necessity of defending his own position. General Hotze, as I have before related, passed the Rhine at Mannheim, on the 2nd of October, with about 9,000 men, and sent a part of his forces into Alsace, to attract the attention of the enemy, to destroy their lines, and to levy contributions. Another division of the same corps marched to the right, and pushed parties into the Palatinate, and the Nahegau, as far as Kaiserlautern and Baumholder.

This unexpected irruption alarmed the French corps which were in front of the Nahe, and in the Hundsruck; and they marched towards the Dutchy of Deux Ponts, to protect it from the incursions of the enemy. General Neu, governor of Mayence, taking advantage of the weakness of the French corps which blocked up that place, drove it back, after several brisk engagements, behind the Nahe; and took possession of the town of Bingen, as well as of some important points on that river.

As

As the motions of General Neu, combined with those of General Hotze, rendered it possible for them to attempt something more important; Beurnonville hastened to march a large part of his army towards the Hundsruck. He thus weakened himself greatly on the right bank of the Rhine, deprived himself of the power of undertaking any thing in that quarter, and gave General Werneck an opportunity of making some attempt.

This General wishing to profit by the removal of a part of Beurnonville's army, as well as to favour by a diversion the operations of Generals Hotze and Neu, assembled some boats, and caused several small detachments to cross the Rhine on the 21st of October, both above and below Coblenz. His aim was to spread alarm along the left bank of the Rhine, by making debarkations on several points, and more especially to break the bridge of boats at Neuwied, in order to cut off the troops which defended the head of that bridge. [*Note 26.*] General Kray, to whom this expedition was entrusted, succeeded in the latter object, and effected the destruction of the bridge, which was already much

damaged by the swell of the Rhine, and by trees and all sorts of lumber brought down with it. These different detachments had several smart actions, but as their numbers were too small to enable them to make any advance into the country, they repassed the Rhine with the loss of about 300 men, after having been on the point of getting possession of the town of Coblentz.

Beurnonville, anxious to signalize himself by the news of some brilliant exploit, sent an account of this affair, full of bombast and falsehood. After having exalted the talents of his Generals, and especially his own, he described the tremendous attack made by the Austrians; the *irresistible courage of his soldiers both on land and on the water; the inconceivable fire kept up by his artillery*; and concluded by stating, that *all the Austrians had been killed, drowned, or taken prisoners*. The number of the latter amounting by his account to 1,000. [Note 27.]

On the same day, the 21st, a very severe engagement took place on the Sieg between the advanced guards opposed to each other, in which the French were worsted, and suffered much.

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The two divisions of the army of the Sambre and Meuse sent into the Hundsruck and upon the Nahe, restored superiority to the French in that part of the seat of war. On the 26th. they attacked the Austrians posted on the right bank of the Nahe, with their right at Bingen, and their left near Kreutznach. Notwithstanding the inequality of strength, the Imperialists defended themselves with success, and stood their ground. The French renewed the attack on the 27th, and the resistance made by the Austrians was no less vigorous than that of the preceding day; but their left, over which the enemy had the advantage of ground, having been turned, they were compelled to retire upon the Selz, after having lost about 300 men. The loss of the Republicans was not inferior. They left besides, 200 prisoners in the hands of the Austrians.

The Executive Directory construed this advantage into a great victory, in order to compensate for the news of Moreau's defeat, and of his retreat beyond the Rhine, which happened at the same period. This success was however of very little importance, either with respect to the issue of the battle, or the extent of Country
which

which it put the French in possession of. The situation of the Hundsruck, and of that part of the Palatinate, which lies between the Moselle and the Rhine is such as to make it difficult to defend it against a superior force. These two countries belong almost necessarily to the most numerous ; and especially, as I have before observed, to the possessors of the places on the Sarre, Moselle, and in Alsace. Of this the present war had added its testimony to that of all the preceding ones.

These countries, as well as the dutchy of Deux Ponts, are indebted to their situation, for the misfortune of having been occupied and laid waste, one after the other, by the contending armies. They have experienced more cruelly than any other country the dreadful scourge of war. They are ruined for a great number of years. [*Note 28.*]

Three days after the advantage gained by the French, in the neighbourhood of Kreutznach, they retired again upon the Nahe ; their aim in dislodging the Austrians from the banks of that river, having been merely to cover the march of a division of the army of the Sambre and Meuse, which was directing itself towards Kaiserlautern, in order to drive from thence the light troops of General Hotze. After
his

his retreat across the Rhine, Moreau likewise ordered a division to march towards Landau and the Palatinate. At the approach of these two divisions, General Hotze, too weak to oppose them, and having besides no great interest in doing so, retired into the entrenched camp before Mannheim. The French followed and attacked him without success, on the 7th of November. In spite of all their exertions, he remained master of the post he had taken possession of, the right of which was covered by Frankenthal, and the left by a little river called the Rhebach. I have given, in the beginning of this work, a description of this entrenched camp, known by the name of the Fort of the Rhine. After this action, the position of the Austrian and French armies from Mannheim to Dusseldorf, presenting nothing to either, which was at once necessary and easy to acquire, both sides remained in a state of inaction, which the rigour of the season and want of repose almost forced upon them. Although General Beurnonville had drawn together, in the first days of November, two large bodies of troops near Andernach and Cologne, and had made apparently great preparations for an impending attack, yet he

contented

contented himself with mere appearances. General Werneck, on his side, was just as inactive, and made no serious attempt upon the head of the bridge at Neuwied. Nothing happened but a few skirmishes and cannonades, which had no other effect but to cost the lives of some men on both sides.

This reciprocal inaction, it was believed, was occasioned, or at least would soon be followed, by a suspension of hostilities upon the lower Rhine. This belief was confirmed by the Austrian and French Generals having at Neuwied several conferences; the first effect of which was an agreement that neither party should occupy that place, and that it should be considered as neutral. [Note 29.] These conferences being renewed in the months of November and December, terminated in a more important agreement. The Austrian General Kray, and the Republican General Kleber, concluded, on the 6th of December, a suspension of hostilities between the two armies on the Lower Rhine. The conditions were, that the Austrians should retire behind the Sieg, and the French behind the Wüpper; that the latter should evacuate the head of the bridge at Neuwied, carrying their
cannon,

cannon, and leave only a piquet guard of 25 men; that the Austrians were to have a similar guard in the town, and that no post should be occupied by a greater number of men; that upon the left bank of the Rhine, the river Nahe should be the line of separation between the two armies; that upon giving ten days previous warning, they should mutually be at liberty to re-commence hostilities, and to re-occupy the posts which they had held before the suspension.

On the 10th, the French withdrew their troops and their artillery from the head of the bridge at Neuwied, and on both sides the armies went into winter quarters. It therefore occasioned much surprise, when a proclamation of the Austrian commander at Frankfort declared that he was ordered to contradict the report of a suspension of hostilities on the lower Rhine; that, such a measure was directly contrary to the Emperor's sentiments and intentions; and that the latter movements of the troops on the lower Rhine had been owing to nothing but the nature of the war in that country at that season of the year. It was difficult to reconcile this disavowal of the armistice with its real

execution. The contradiction can only be explained by supposing that the Generals Kray and Kleber had tacitly concluded a convention subject to the condition of its being ratified at Vienna and at Paris; and that it was to be carried into effect provisionally. This supposition becomes the most probable from the circumstance, that this suspension was not officially published by the two Generals who concluded it. By some it was supposed that it had displeased the Archduke, but it is not to be believed that General Kray would have ventured upon such a measure, without being previously authorised to it by that Prince. Others imagined, and with more appearance of reason, that the Archduke caused the report of a suspension of arms to be denied, and prevented its being officially published, in order that his troops, which at that time were besieging Kehl with no less constancy than hardship, might not envy the repose enjoyed by the army on the lower Rhine.

General Beurnonville who was sent back to the army of the north about the end of December, it was said, at that time was deprived of the command of the army of Sambre and Meuse, as a punishment
for

for having allowed it to remain in a state of repose, and for having consented to the suspension of arms. It was very singular to see this suspension disavowed by the higher powers on both sides, and yet carried strictly into execution. The fact is, that it resulted less from the wish of the parties than from the rigour of the season, and the nature of the country which the respective armies occupied. All the country upon the right bank of the Rhine from Mayence to Dusseldorf is exceedingly mountainous, much covered with forests, and intersected by a great number of little rivers, or rather torrents which overflow the vallies during winter. There are very few roads, and those are almost unpassable during the bad season. When it arrives, an army has hardly the possibility of acting in such a country and therefore it was very natural for the Generals on both sides to wish to save their soldiers from unnecessary fatigues, and to agree upon a state of inaction, to which they were in truth compelled by irresistible circumstances.

Whether the suspension was really agreed to or not, its conditions were nevertheless exactly ob-

served. They gave equally repose to both parties, but were more advantageous to the French, since they secured to them the preservation of the head of the bridge at Neuwied, in the possession of which they were to be re-established on the re-commencement of hostilities. Thus ended the campaign upon the lower Rhine. I now proceed to give an account of the sieges of Kehl and of the head of the bridge at Huningen.

C H A P. IX.

Description of the fort and entrenched camp of Kehl—

Siege of that place—Its surrender by capitulation—

Siege of the head of the bridge at Huningen—Reduction of that place, and end of the campaign.

AS the siege of Kehl attracted the attention of Europe for above two months, and was remarkable for its length, and for the expence of blood and treasure on both sides, before I give a detail of its progress, I shall say a few words on its local and military situation. [*Note 30.*]

This celebrated fort, so often taken and retaken in the different wars between France and the Empire or the House of Austria, is situated upon the right bank of the Rhine, opposite to the town or rather to the Citadel of Strasbourg. Before the war, it communicated with it by a bridge built upon piles, and divided into two parts by an island. This bridge formed the principal communication between France and Germany; it was broken down on both sides at the commencement of the war.

At

At this period the fortifications of Kehl, once the bulwark of Germany, were almost entirely destroyed. Some time afterwards, in order to prevent the Imperialists from re-instating the works, the French bombarded the fort and even the town of Kehl, at the extremity of which it is situated. This bombardment demolished almost all the buildings that were within the circumference of the fort, as well as a great part of the town. This however did not prevent the Austrians from throwing up some works of earth, to secure this point from a *Coup de main*, and to be enabled to command with their fire the islands which lay between the two banks. It was in this condition that I found that fort at the end of the year 1795.

The reader recollects the manner in which the French took this fort at the beginning of this campaign. From the time that they got possession of it, knowing its importance they hastened to fortify it, and skillfully employed all the means of defence which its situation affords. To render this fort more difficult of attack and of approach, they covered it by an intrenched camp, the right of which was flanked by an elbow of the river, and by an island in it. Its left extended to the fort itself. The front, which

was

was a good deal more advanced than the wings, was covered by a strong dike, armed with redoubts, and provided with a good ditch. It concealed the intrenched camp, and thus secured it from the fire of cannon. They increased the difficulties of approach by cuts made in the Kintzig and the Schutter, small rivers which fall into the Rhine near Kehl.

The retrograde march of Moreau, as well as the capture of Kehl by General Petrarch, who (as already seen) lost it again on the same day, made the French redouble their labour and exertions to complete the state of defence of the fort, and of the intrenched camp. They supplied it with a numerous artillery, and to render the communication with Strasburg more ready and more sure, they constructed two bridges, one of boats and the other a flying one.

The fort of Kehl was in this formidable state of defence, when the Archduke determined to make himself master of it. This enterprize presented great difficulties, required long labours and immense preparations. One sees by the detail which I have entered upon, that it was not an ordinary siege ; that the business was less to take a fort than a form-

formidable camp; and that it was one army that was besieging another. The time that was necessary to bring together the troops, the workmen, the artillery, and the magazines, retarded the opening of the siege. More than half the month of November was employed in making lines of circumvallation, as well as other works preparatory to opening the trenches. The Archduke, that he might be nearer to superintend and to animate the labours of the siege, took up his head quarters at Offenburg, about ten miles from Kehl. Mr. de la Tour, who commanded the besieging troops, took up his at Wildstedt, five miles distant from the place which was uselessly summoned on the 11th of November.

In the night of the 21st of the same month, the trenches were opened on the right bank of the Kintzig. It was not there however that the Austrians proposed to make their principal Efforts. Their works on this point had no other object but to establish a cross fire against the fort and the intrenched camp, in order to favour the approach from the village of Kehl, and to cover the right flank of the real attack. In the same night, (viz. the 21st) General Moreau caused the garrison to
be

be reinforced with a strong corps of infantry drawn from Straßburg. On the 22d, at break of day, these troops, commanded by General Desaix, made a vigorous sortie, attacked with fixed bayonets the left of the line of contravallation, and got possession in an instant of the village of Sundheim, as well as of three redoubts of which they spiked the cannons.

Encouraged by such rapid success, the French attacked the other redoubts of the first line; and advanced at the same time against the second. They were less fortunate in this last enterprise. Prince Frederic of Orange, who was posted with a body of troops behind a dike, which joined the redoubts on the left of the first and second line, resisted in this position all the efforts of the enemy. After an engagement as bloody as it was obstinate, and in which this young prince gave the strongest proofs of bravery and talents, he prevented the French from penetrating any further. They experienced no less resistance in their attack on the other redoubts of the first line. Although surrounded and left to themselves for some time, they were defended with a courage equal to the fury of the assailants. In vain did the French grenadiers several times leap into the ditch, and endeavour to

scale the palisades and mount the parapet. They were constantly repulsed, and filled the ditches with their dead.

The long defence made by these redoubts, and the firmness of the Prince of Orange, gave time to General La Tour to collect the corps of reserve, and to bring them into action. He retook the village of Sundheim, and maintained himself there, notwithstanding a fresh attempt made upon it by the French. The latter were soon after attacked at the same time by the Prince of Orange, and the Generals La Tour and Stader, who dislodged them from the redoubts which they had taken, and forced them at last to retire within their own lines.

This action, one of the best disputed during the campaign, as well as one of the most bloody, considering the numbers that were engaged, and the space in which it was fought, cost the Austrians 1,300 men, and the French more than 2,000. Four Generals of the latter were wounded, amongst whom was the Commander in Chief. On both sides prodigies of valour were performed. The Austrian regiments of Stuart and Staray particularly distinguished themselves. The Prince of Orange gained very great credit; and the Archduke gave
fresh

fresh proofs of talents, and of that cool courage, for which he is remarkable. A sortie so vigorously made at the first moment of opening the trenches, marked the importance which the French attached to the fort of Kehl, and shewed what sacrifices they were disposed to make to retain possession of it.

On the following days the Austrians continued their labours, which the bad weather rendered slow and difficult. In order to interrupt them, the French made a fresh sortie in the night of the 27th, in which they were instantly repulsed with loss. In the night of the 28th the besiegers began their approaches on the right bank of the Schutter; and joined them to one part of the parallel already formed between that river and the Kintzig. From the 28th, the batteries of this first parallel, as well as those of the redoubts which flanked it on the right and left, began to play on the French entrenchments.

On the 5th of December, the Archduke himself at the head of one battalion of grenadiers, took the most advanced *fleche* on the right of the enemy. Advantage was taken of this to extend to this point the parallel of the left, all the batteries of which

began to play the same day, and the fire from which was encreased on the 11th by some new batteries erected on the same point.

The Austrians were not so fortunate in an attack which they made on the 11th on the first line of the advanced works which covered the right flank of the entrenched camp. They attacked it with bravery, and carried it; but the French having returned to the charge with superior force, they drove back the Austrians into their own entrenchments. The latter renewed the attack the day following; had at first the same success, and in the end the same disadvantage. In the evening they made two more attempts, the issue of which was precisely the same. They lost a great many men in these actions, in which both sides shewed the greatest obstinacy. The unlucky issue of these attacks, which failed only because the besiegers could not maintain themselves in the works after they had carried them, on account of the terrible fire of grape-shot and musquetry to which they were exposed, determined the Archduke to renounce for the present all attempts to carry them by force, and to confine himself to the operations of art:—The approaches were therefore continued; and a second parallel was constructed,

structed, but with incredible labour. The thaw which happened at this time having filled the trenches with water, and rendered almost impracticable the removal of the heavy artillery from one parallel to the other. Those obstacles produced new delays in the formation of the siege, which had been successively retarded by the cold, by snow, by rains, and by the overflowings of the rivers Kentzig and Schutter. The enemy besides defended every inch of ground. The besieged and the troops which guarded the trenches were frequently engaged in actions, sometimes very warm; which joined to an almost incessant cannonade and bombardment, cost the lives of a great number of men. Still more perished from diseases occasioned by the nature of the soil, and from the season. From these the besiegers suffered still more than the besieged. The former as well as the latter were confined within their works, and without any protection from the severities of the weather. The Austrians had no local means of cannonading and bombarding the French, which the latter did not equally possess against their adversaries. The French had besides the immense advantage of being relieved and assisted at pleasure by troops drawn

drawn from Strasbourg, where 30,000 men might be easily quartered.

But neither the fatigues nor the dangers attending these operations shook the constancy of the Austrian troops, nor the determination of the Archduke. He never ceased during the whole course of this memorable siege, to animate the men by his exhortations, to encourage them by his example, and to support them by the confidence with which he had inspired them. The soldiers endured patiently those sufferings which the Archduke shared with them; the Prince's last triumphs were to them a certain pledge of the success of this enterprise.

On the night of the 19th, the Austrians made a successful attack on one of the advanced works of the fort. They carried an entrenchment thrown up near the post house of Kehl, made 200 prisoners, and took 4 pieces of cannon and 2 howitzers.

The fort, as well as the entrenched camp of Kehl, driving their principal means of resistance from their communication with Strasbourg, the length of their defence necessarily depended on the preservation of the bridges. The French had neglected nothing to strengthen and secure these bridges from the effects of bombs and of cannon.

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They had directed their construction, and the disposition of the entrenched camp accordingly. It was so situate, that the Austrians could not fire directly against the bridges, which were besides protected by batteries raised in many islands, which the French had occupied since their treaty with the Margrave of Bade.

The most certain means then of expediting the reduction of Kehl being to destroy the bridges, the Archduke would not omit any means to effect it. He caused several strong fire ships to be built in the river Kintzig, which being launched in the Rhine, and sent down the current, might break the bridges either by their weight or their explosion.

On the 22d, at night, the Austrians launched one of these fire ships. To draw off the attention of the enemy, they redoubled the fire from the cannon and mortars, and at the same time attacked the advanced piquets of the enemy. But the French, who had expected that the besiegers would make use of these fire ships, were prepared to prevent their effects. They had constructed an *estacade* above the bridges, which stopped the machine. It was immediately seized by the French pontonniers, who had the good fortune

to prevent the explosion by removing the match. Other machines of a similar nature, launched a few days afterwards, shared the same fate as the former. The Austrians succeeded no better against the enemies entrenchments. They were repulsed several times, and lost a great many men; but far short of 1500, which was the number at which the French estimated their loss in this affair.

The obstinacy with which the French defended their works rendered the acquisition of them more slow and bloody; but did not prevent the Austrians from completing the batteries of the second parallel, and from making the approaches of the third. These having at length been pushed to within 200 paces of the outward works of the left, and of the right of the center of the entrenched camp, the Archduke determined to make the assault on these two points. The Prince's aim, in wishing to make himself master of them, was to be enabled to draw a third parallel across the enemy's entrenchments from the Rhine to the Schutter.

The Archduke made in consequence the following disposition: four battalions under the conduct of Prince Frederic of Orange, were to attack the right: Major General Zopf, who had also
four

four battalions under his command, was to assault the works on the left, and one in particular called the Suabian Redoubt.

This plan was carried into execution on the 1st of January in the evening. The Prince of Orange advanced with his usual intrepidity against the enemy's works, attacked them with fixed bayonets, and carried them. Not satisfied with this first success, he continued to push the French, took from them many other works, and pursued them even into their camp. The latter having rallied, and being reinforced by the corps de reserve, commanded by General Le Courbe, made head in force against the Prince of Orange. This circumstance, joined to the extreme darkness of the night, as well as to the sort of confusion which it necessarily occasions, did not admit of the Prince's maintaining himself in the most advanced works which he had taken. He determined therefore to abandon them, after having spiked 15 pieces of cannon which he could not bring away; and took post in the front of the first works which he had been ordered to attack. In this position he maintained himself, notwithstanding all the efforts of the enemy; and

thus covered the workmen, who were forming behind him the projected parallel.

Whilst the Prince of Orange was thus getting possession of the works, which flanked the right of the center of the entrenched camp, those which flanked its left were attacked with the same success by General Zopf. The principal one was, as has been before observed, the Suabian redoubt. This work, situated on the left flank of the dike which covered the entrenched camp, was of considerable extent, having a ditch, demi-bastions, strong palisades, and a double row of *troups de loup*.

General Zopf attacked it gallantly ; and notwithstanding its formidable state of defence, drove the French from it, killed a great number of them, and pursued them into their entrenched camp. He then returned to post himself before the redoubt he had taken ; and began a brisk cannonade with the same pieces of artillery which he had seized from the enemy. In the mean time the workmen completed the communication of this redoubt with the head of the sap directed against it, and united it by a parallel with the village of Kehl. The successes of the Prince of Orange and of General Zopf against the
right

right and left of the dike having forced the French to abandon it, the Austrians immediately raised a *banquette* on its scarp, to be enabled to lodge themselves under cover.

At break of day, the besiegers perceived that many points of which they had got possession were enfiladed by the batteries of the entrenched camp. It was however of so much importance to preserve them, that they maintained themselves there in spite of the tremendous fire to which they were exposed. They joined these works, by a parallel, to those which had been taken by the Prince of Orange. The actions of which I have just given an account were very bloody. The French estimated the loss of the Austrians at 2,000 men, and their own at scarcely the half of that number. I have reason to believe that it was precisely the reverse.

The capture of the Suabian redoubt and of the dike deprived the French of a safe communication between the right and the left wing of the entrenched camp: but as this was very near (as I have already observed) to the fort of Kehl, it was very much protected by its fire. This circumstance forced the besiegers to suspend the attack on the two wings, till they had established some batteries, which might

batter two considerable works, raised behind the right of the center, break their palisades, and silence their artillery.

These batteries were finished and ready to play on the morning of the 6th of January. The Archduke had determined that an assault should be made on the above-mentioned works on the same day; but fortunately he was not obliged to have recourse to this destructive measure. The French, seeing that if they were forced in this point, they should have no means of safety but in crossing the Rhine on a flying bridge, did not think it prudent to remain any longer in this perilous situation. They evacuated therefore all the works of the right wing in the night of the 5th.

This retreat having considerably diminished the enemy's front, the operations from that time became more direct and more concentrated. The besiegers found themselves so circumstanced as to be able to play on the bridges; and they constructed batteries to destroy them. The Archduke, impatient to terminate a siege so tedious, so expensive, and so fatiguing for the troops, was unwilling to lose a moment in taking from the French the entrenchments which they were still in possession of. In
the

the night of the 6th he ordered the left wing of the entrenched camp to be stormed. The Austrians were completely successful, and drove the French from their camp into the fort. But this happened at the moment when the French were relieving their troops on service. The guards that were relieved and relieving united on the glacis of the fort, and returned to the charge against the Austrians. The combat was extremely obstinate. Notwithstanding the favourable circumstance which had doubled their forces, the French were not able to recover their entrenched camp, and were forced to retreat into the covered-way of the fort. The besiegers hastened to lodge themselves in the works which they had taken, and joined them by a parallel to the head of the town of Kehl.

The French having thus successively lost the numerous and formidable works which supported the fort of Kehl, could no longer hope to preserve it. They were on the point of losing their communication with Strasburg, except by boats, as their bridges could not fail of being shortly destroyed by the batteries raised against them. They therefore came to a determination to capitulate. General Defaix had a conference with the Archduke on the

the 9th. and settled with him a capitulation; in consequence of which the French abandoned the fort of Kehl the day following, and withdrew entirely beyond the river, taking with them their arms, their baggage and artillery.

Thus, after the trenches had been open seven weeks, the Imperialists recovered possession of an important post, which had been taken from them in a few hours. History will certainly record this siege of Kehl as one of the most remarkable events of this war. The French made a very brilliant defence, which did great honour to their engineer officers, who on this occasion gave a fresh proof of their superiority, already known, over those of other nations. If one may be permitted to say, that the Austrians did not shew so great talents for attack, as the French did for defence, it is but just to recollect the obstacles of every description which they had to overcome, and the immense works which they were obliged to make, notwithstanding the frost, the snow, the rains, and the thaws. The constancy and the determination with which they supported the dangers, the fatigues and the tediousness of the siege, are above all praise. The Archduke discovered

covered throughout, that firmness, that resolution, and military obstinacy, which almost always in the end procures success; and which so often gave it to the great Frederic.

This siege cost on both sides, immense sums, and what is more to be regretted, the lives of a vast number of men. The loss of the Austrians has generally been estimated at 10,000 men; and this calculation, though exaggerated, is not very far from the truth.

This severe loss of men was the more felt by the Austrians, inasmuch as it fell principally on the flower of their infantry. The loss of the French was little less, and chiefly affected also their best troops. Whatever importance they attached to the possession of the fort of Kehl, the obstinacy with which they defended it proceeded less from the hope of preserving it, than from that of weakening for the rest of the campaign, the victorious Army of the Archduke, and of preventing that Prince from undertaking any other enterprise beyond the Rhine, or from going to seek new triumphs in Italy.

It was from the same motives, and also to prevent the Austrians from uniting all their forces
against

against Kehl, that the French persisted in maintaining themselves in the *tete de pont* at Huningen. They had constructed it while their armies were still in Germany. It was supported and flanked by a considerable horn-work, raised on an island of the Rhine, called Shuster Insel. It was besides, as well as this horn-work, protected by the fire of the fortrefs of Huningen, and by that of many batteries erected on the left bank of the Rhine. [Note 36.]

After Moreau had repassed the Rhine, at the end of October, the Archduke left a body of troops to blockade the *tete de pont* of Huningen. It was invested early in November, by the Prince of Furstenberg, who commanded the left wing of the Imperial Army. That Prince caused the necessary works to be raised to support the investment, and mounted some batteries on the points which commanded the head of the bridge. As it was neither so well fortified or so advantageously situated as that of Kehl, it was not supposed that it would make so long a resistance, and that the French would, for the sake of defending it, expose the town of Huningen to destruction. However, whether they determined to engage

engage on this point the attention of a part of the Austrian force, or whether the latter, relying too much on the advantages they possessed against this place had not employed sufficient means to reduce it, its defence was protracted to a much longer time than had been expected.

The Austrians, after having in vain summoned the French to evacuate the *tete de pont*, began to cannonade and bombard it, as well as the Shuster Insel and the town of Huningen. From the commanding situation of their batteries, and the judicious direction of their fire, they were enabled to break the bridge which joins the two banks. This success insulating the *tete de pont*, made it liable to fall very soon into the hands of the Austrians; but in spite of the continued fire of the latter, the French contrived to repair the bridge and re-establish the communication between the island, the town, and the *tete de pont* of Huningen.

The Prince of Furstemberg, disappointed in the hope that the reduction of the place must follow the breaking of the bridge, determined to attempt to take it by force. On the 30th of November, he ordered an assault on the enemy's entrenchments. His troops got possession of the half moon of the

horn-work ; but the French having been re-inforced, re-took it after a bloody engagement. It cost the Austrians 800 men, and not fewer to the French. They lost amongst others General Abbaticci, to whom they owed the success of this day. [Note 32.]

After this fruitless attempt, the Prince of Furstemberg judging with reason that the fate of the *tete de pont* at Huningen depended on the issue of the siege of Kehl, and that the reduction of the latter place must draw after it that of the former, contented himself with cannonading and bombarding it. His batteries several times set fire to the town of Huningen, some part of which was burnt, and which was abandoned by almost all its inhabitants. In order to destroy the works of the Austrians, and to interrupt their workmen, the French made many forties, in which they had generally the disadvantage. Some of the actions occasioned by these forties, took place on the territory of Basle, which almost touched (if one may say so) the *tete de pont*. From this vicinity, it was very difficult for the Imperialists or the French to refrain, during an action, from seizing those advantages on the territory of Basle, which it might present to them ; and it was not easy for the Swiss to prevent it.

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The French already dissatisfied by the arming of the Swiss in the canton of Schaffhausen during the retreat of Moreau, complained that they had suffered their territory to be violated by the Austrians. Barthelemy, the envoy of the Republic, made some bitter representations on this subject to the deputies of the cantons assembled at Basle. The latter, frightened by his menaces, hastened to pay attention to his complaints; and broke two officers of Basle, who were accused of collusion with the Imperialists, or at least with not having taken care that the neutrality of the Swiss territory should be respected. This severity scarcely satisfied the French, and disposed the Imperialists to complain in their turn. The Archduke and Prince of Furstenberg ordered lively remonstrances to be made to the cantons, and formally called upon them to secure the inviolability of their territory. These respective applications only produced the effect of throwing the cantons into great embarrassments; but did not prevent either of the parties from entering the Swiss territory, whenever it was convenient to them, with a view either to attack or defence.

The month of December passed without being marked by any thing important ; the Austrians contenting themselves with finishing their approaches regularly, without making any attack by force. Immediately after the reduction of Kehl, the Archduke sent to the Prince of Furstenberg the heavy artillery which he had made use of at the siege of that place. Its arrival enabled the Prince to attack with sufficient vigour the *tete de pont* and the works which defended it. The French finding themselves a good deal straitened, and unable to make any long resistance, determined to abandon the right bank of the Rhine, on which it was no great object to them to remain after the fall of Kehl. They capitulated on the 2d of February, and on the 5th, re-crossed the Rhine with their arms and baggage. On the same day the Austrians took possession of the *tete de pont*, as well as of the Shuster Insel. It was specified in the capitulation, that the Imperialists should not fire on the town of Huningen, and that on the other hand the French should not fire from the town on the Austrian posts, opposite to it. They agreed in general, that things should be replaced on the right bank of the Rhine in the same condition as they had

had been before the passage of that river by the French.

The reduction of the *tete de pont* of Huningen, put an end to the campaign in Germany. I think it right to close the recital of it with some reflections and general observations, which may enable the reader to form a judgement on this campaign. This shall be the subject of the last chapter.

C H A P. X.

THE plan adopted by the French in the campaign which I have been describing in the preceding chapters, was in every respect similar to that, from which they had two years before reaped such important success. This plan, which was practicable only with a great superiority of force, consisted during each of these campaigns in making the greatest efforts against the right and left wing of the enemy, with a view to outflank their center, and to reduce them to the necessity of abandoning, or
of

of suffering it to be surrounded. As the French had in the year 1794 employed the greater part of their forces upon the Sambre, and in West Flanders, to induce the allies to quit the center, in which point they were strong, and to draw them to their wings, where they were weak; so having formed in 1796 the resolution to invade Germany, they made no attempt to attack in front the towns of Mannheim and Mayence, but proceeded to effect a passage over the Rhine at a distance from those places; and instead of consuming their time, and wasting their strength in the siege of them, advanced rapidly into Suabia and Westphalia. They wished to become masters of Ehrebreitstein, Mayence, Mannheim, and Phillipbourg, by the same method by which they had recovered in the year 1794 the towns of Valenciennes, Condé, Landrecies, and Quesnoy, and to gain, by a single manœuvre, that which would in former times have been the result of two or three successful campaigns.

Every person, who may have taken the pains to compare the present war with those which have taken place for a century past, must have remarked, that the French have by no means confined themselves to the ancient course of military operations,
and

and that they have added a system of tactics, more vast in its object and in its means. The revolution which has changed every thing amongst the French, has influenced the composition and the spirit of their armies, as well as the conceptions of those persons, who have been charged with the direction of them. The result has been a new military system formed on a calculation of the relative state of Europe and of France: a system, engendered by the spirit of conquest, diverted solely to that end, and intended to make the superiority of numbers ultimately triumphant. It would require a separate treatise, to unfold completely this system, and to shew in what respects it departs from those principles, which have hitherto been looked upon as fundamentals in the theory of war. [*Note 33.*] The limits of the present work confines its author to the pointing out the most striking application, which the French have made of this system, by forbearing to undertake any siege, and by venturing to leave fortified places at great distance behind them. They foresaw, that by carrying the war to a distance from those towns, they should by force detach their enemies from them; and judged, that if they could obtain, and keep possession of the countries situated
beyond

beyond these fortresses, they would in the end fall into their hands perfectly undamaged, and without having cost them either blood or money. They proposed to acquire the fortified places by making themselves masters of the surrounding countries ; as formerly these countries were secured by getting possession of the fortified places. These had hitherto been the means of conquest ; they now meant to make them its result. This method by which the French acquired so great a number of fortified towns in 1794, met not with the same success in 1796 ; but their failure did not arise from the strong places, which they left behind them ; and as these had not impeded the progress of Jourdan, neither were they the causes of his first disasters. If that General had been victorious at Amberg, or at Wurtzbourg, the fortresses of Ehrebreitstein, Mayence, Mannheim, and Phillipsbourg would no doubt have ultimately fallen, as Luxembourg did in 1795.

The elements of the Austrian army having undergone no alterations, and its distinctive qualities being the stability of forms, and the uniformity of organization, the regulators of it have made no change in their theory, nor its Generals in their practice. By persisting in these two respects in
their

their ancient military system, whilst their enemies adopted one more advantageous, they no doubt contributed much to the success of the French. One might be inclined even to look upon this as the principal cause of it, if that were not sufficiently discovered in the loose texture of the coalition, in the treachery of some of its members, in the weakness of the Germanic confederation, [*Note 34.*] in the Emperor's pecuniary embarrassments, and in the obstacles and disadvantages of every kind, against which he has been constantly obliged to struggle. These considerations lead us rather to praise than to depreciate the Austrian army; and when we reflect that it was the first, and that it is now the last to bear the weight of this war, when we recall to our recollection all that it has lost in men, and in territory, we are induced to admire its perseverance, and to be satisfied that without its solid composition and unshaken constancy, the whole continent of Europe perhaps might by this time have been compelled to submit to the arms, or the principles of the French. It must be at least admitted that the Austrian army is the strongest barrier which has been opposed to the torrent of the Re-

publican troops, and that it has alone rescued Germany during the year 1796.

No person has contributed more to the salvation of that vast country ; no person has stronger claims to the gratitude of its inhabitants, and to the admiration of posterity, than the Archduke Charles. Obligated for a long time to struggle with an inferior force against an enemy brave, ably conducted, and emboldened with victory, he has been deficient in no one of those qualities, which the exigence of his situation and circumstances peculiarly demanded. He has shewn himself courageous, skilful, patient. He has frustrated the hopes of France, and surpassed those of Germany.

This prince found himself at the opening of the campaign at the head of a formidable army, though one less numerous than that of his enemies. He might then flatter himself that he should make amends for this inequality of means by a superiority of talents and activity. He had then no doubt formed some project for the advancement of his brother's interest, and the promotion of his own glory. At the moment when he was on the point of putting them into execution, 30,000 of his best troops were taken from him

him and sent into Italy. The Archduke made no complaint of the great reduction, which his army by this means experienced, and still less did he think of endeavouring to prevent the measure by his credit and his natural influence with the Emperor. Finding himself incapable of undertaking any offensive enterprize, and reduced to the necessity even of a defensive system extremely difficult to maintain, this young Prince shewed neither disgust nor despondency. He exerted himself to compensate the loss of those troops which had been taken from him, by making the best use of those which remained with him. He went to seek for victory on the banks of the Lahn and the Sieg; and when an invasion, the success of which the French had hoped for, only by effecting it at a distance from that Prince, opened to them Germany, and allowed them to display in that country their numerous battalions, the Archduke ceased not for an instant to oppose to them a firm and methodical resistance. He always could discern when it was proper to engage or avoid an action and distinguish those posts of which it was expedient to dispute every inch with obstinacy, from those whose importance would not have repaid the value of his

soldiers blood. He effected his retreat, losing as little ground, and gaining as much time as possible.

As soon as his approach to the hereditary dominions had sufficiently increased his force, and in the same proportion diminished that of the French, he then began to entertain the confident hope of delivering Germany, he then executed with resolution plans formed with wisdom. He displayed against Jourdan the courage and enterprizing spirit of his character, which had been long fettered by a defensive system. He defeated that General, pursued him without respite, outstripped him by his celerity, circumvented him by his manœuvres, and compelled him to fly beyond the Rhine.

Having accomplished the defeat of one of the Republican armies, he hastened to direct against the other his fortune and his talents. He fixed the former and gave new splendor to the latter. He baffled by superior ability the General opposed to him, rendered useless the courage of his soldiers, and relieved Germany from their presence. In two months the Archduke passed from the frontiers of Bohemia to the walls of Dusseldorf, from that town to Basle, and from Basle to Offembourg, always fighting and always victorious. Not satisfied
with

with being so by halves, he resolved that the end of the campaign should afford a complete reparation for the disasters of its commencement, and allowed no respite to his enemies, till he had wrested from them the only remains of their first triumphs. Scarce had he accomplished this, when instead of indulging a well-merited repose, he listened only to the interests of his country; and not hesitating to change the command of a victorious army for that of another which knew nothing of war but defeats, he flew to meet new dangers in Italy.

The Archduke no doubt as well as every other Prince, who at his time of life has had the command of large armies, has of course listened to the counsels of experience. It is well known that he has profited by those of Lieut. General Bellegarde, [*Note. 35.*] and of the Colonel of the staff Schmidt. To the talents of these two officers, and more particularly of the former, we most readily pay due homage. They are no doubt worthy of that confidence, which the Emperor and the Archduke have reposed in them. They deserve praise for having made so good an use of that confidence, and are entitled to the grateful acknowledgements of Germany. They have probably

con-

contributed much to the Archduke's success, and by their experience have supplied his deficiency in that respect. But the qualities which that Prince may most justly claim as personally his own, are his great courage equalled only by his modesty; his coolness, and quickness of perception in the heat of battle; that energy which makes him forget the weakness of his constitution, and to support the greatest fatigues; and finally that impartial justice with which he rewards with one hand and punishes with the other. He has found the means to give to his Generals, and to the officers of his army, an activity before unknown to them, and to which may be attributed the latter successes of the Austrian Army. He has re-animated discipline, not by increasing its severity, but by inspiring every one with the love of their duty, the desire of praise, and the fear of reprehension. [Note 36.] He has found the means of compelling the Generals of his army to shew more zeal and more obedience in executing Mr. de Bellgarde's plans, than the Emperor was able to obtain from them in 1794 in favour of the celebrated General Mack. He knew how to raise his authority above the abuses, the pretensions, and the intrigues, which besiege the head

head quarters of an army no less than a court, and to force every particular interest to act in unison with the interest of the whole. These are the qualities and the facts which characterise the Archduke Charles, and of which history will not be unmindful. The conduct of this Prince, at once prudent and splendid, has beyond contradiction had a greater influence than any other circumstance on the issue of this campaign.

That issue replaced the opposed armies in nearly the same position, which they occupied before the rupture of the armistice. The slight changes which resulted finally from the campaign, were in favour of the French. They acquired a *tete de pont* at Neuwied, as well as a part of the palatinate, and of the Hundsruck. In the course of this work it has been pointed out how little military importance these latter countries possess. The acquisition of the *tete de pont* at Neuwied, was a more substantial advantage, but considerably diminished by the vicinity of the fortress of Ehrenbreitstein. [Note 37.]

It is evident that few campaigns have produced a more insignificant result than that of 1796, at least as far as respects the gain or loss of territory, whilst

whilst perhaps there have been none, which in the beginning seemed likely to produce a more important one. However, though it has not been remarkable for great battles, and has produced no decisive alteration in the situation of the belligerent powers, it will not the less occupy the page of History. The interest which it will inspire will arise less from the consequences, by which it was actually followed, than from those which there was at one time reason to apprehend. The Archduke will be praised less for what he did, than for what he hindered the French from doing; and not so much for what he gained, as for what he preserved. The movements of the adverse armies during this campaign will furnish useful lessons to the foldier, and a copious fund of reflection to the statesman.

In reflecting on the trifling alteration produced in the relative situation of the French and Austrians, by four months of battles and military vicissitudes, it is impossible not to feel a lively regret that so many thousand men should have been sacrificed to the acquisition of some entrenchments, and of some square leagues of territory. It is easier to deplore the fate of these victims of war, than to determine their number with precision.

The

The researches and calculations which he has made allow the author nevertheless to offer on this point a probable estimate. He has good reason to believe that the loss of the Austrians in this campaign in Germany, has been between 25,000 and 30,000 men, and that of the French about 40,000. The disasters experienced by Jourdan have been the principal cause why the loss of the latter has so far exceeded that of the former. It was otherwise, during the rest of the campaign, on each side nearly balanced.

The French, as it has been observed in the beginning of this work, had a double object in the invasion of Germany. The first was to penetrate to the heart of the Emperor's Dominions, [*Note 43.*] and the second to maintain their army at the expence of that Prince, and of the different states of the empire. They failed in the first of these objects, but completely accomplished the second, during the four months, which they passed beyond the Rhine. They reaped great advantages from the dread, which their success and their political designs had diffused through all the states and courts of the second order in Germany. The greater part of these hastened

with eagerness to purchase, at a high price, the permission of being no longer enemies of the French. The latter drew immense sums from the Armistices which they granted, as well as from the contributions which they imposed on the hostile countries. Their rapid expulsion from Germany prevented them from being paid the whole of what was due, but a very great part they actually received; and during four months the armies of Jourdan and Moreau cost nothing to the French Republic.

But as much as the latter gained in money, and in military stores in Germany, she lost in her influence and ascendant over the minds of the inhabitants. A great number of these, and principally in the Imperial towns, had been the dupes of those professions of political and moral faith, which the French had diffused through Europe. Seduced by these philosophical abstractions, strangers could not be brought to believe that their practical result was not equally admirable. They were still under this infatuation, when the French themselves were no longer possessed with it. The former were imposed on by a brilliant theory. The latter had been undeceived by a cruel experience.

experience. The first viewed the revolution through a distant perspective, which occasioned its defects to vanish ; the second had seen it close in all its natural deformity. Like the fabulous lance which healed the wounds it had inflicted, the French were destined to cure those evils which themselves had caused. Their actions could not fail to destroy the effect of their writings ; and it required only to know them, to be no longer tempted to an imitation of their system. The inhabitants of the Netherlands and of Holland had already owed their conversion to the presence of the French. It produced the same effect in Germany. Their military manifesto proclaimed *war to the castle, and peace to the cottage* ; it was only in the first point that they kept their word. They had promised the greatest respect for property, and they sported with its rights. They had announced that happiness and liberty would follow their footsteps ; and wherever they were directed, they were marked by every excess of military despotism. This trial was not thrown away on the good sense of Germany ; and the national habits soon prevailed over the French metaphysics. The philosophers, and li-

terary men of Germany began to compare more closely the principles with their consequences ; and as to the people, they abandoned themselves at once to the sentiment naturally arising from their new situation. Their resentment broke out and was exercised, as soon as they had opportunity and power. The vengeance, to which the inhabitants of Westphalia, Franconia, and Suabia, gave themselves up against the French, and the terrible reprisals of the latter, have made these to be more and more detested in the countries they have conquered. It may be reasonably believed that were they again to attempt to penetrate them, they would find an enemy in every inhabitant.

All that the French have lost in Germany, upon the score of opinion, the Austrians have gained. If they at first met with disasters, they speedily repaired them by brilliant successes. If they traversed Germany by a retrograde march, they have since overrun it as conquerors ; and it is always the last victory which reckons with the people : it is that which leaves the prevailing sentiment.

The

The Archduke Charles has personally acquired a great weight of opinion in Germany. He has been the deliverer of that country; he is become its idol. One half of its Inhabitants have been witnesses to his exploits: they have attached themselves to his person, from admiration; and to his cause, from the sacrifices which they have themselves made for it. These dispositions, and these sentiments will, one day perhaps be useful to the house of Austria.

End of the Campaign of 1796, in Germany.

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NOTES

FOR THE

CAMPAIGN OF GERMANY.

Note 1. Page 6.

THE Elector of Brandenburg and the Duke de Bourbonville penetrated into upper Alsace in 1674, and established themselves there in winter quarters. M. de Turenne, who they imagined was at a great distance from them, secretly passed the *Vosges* and came unawares upon the quarters of the Imperial army. After having taken some of them, he marched rapidly to Colmar, where the Elector and the Duke were stationed. He attacked them on the 5th of January, defeated them, and obliged them to return in disorder to Strasburg, where they repassed the Rhine. Thus in a few days M. de Turenne, whose forces did not amount to 30,000 men, drove from Alsace 60,000, who had imagined themselves to be secure. These events were without doubt to be attributed as much to the position which the Imperialists occupied, and which lay between the mountains of the

Vosges

Vosges and the Rhine, as to the superior talents of M. de Turenne. This position would be at this time more dangerous, Strasburg belonging at present to France. It is in the memory of every one, that at the end of 1793 Marshal de Wurmser was not more fortunate in lower Alsace, and that after having resisted forty-two successive attacks, he was obliged to yield to the French, and was under the necessity of repassing the Rhine.

Note 2. Page 11.

This General had served in the French army first as a private, and afterwards as a Serjeant, before the revolution. When that took place, he followed the business of a Fencing Master, and his wife that of a Milliner. He was then appointed an officer of the National Guard, went to the frontiers when the war broke out, and was advanced gradually to the command of an army. It was he, who commanded the French at the battle of Maubeuge, in the month of October 1793. It is known that the Prince of Cobourg and General Jourdan both believed that they had been defeated, and both retreated at the same time. We may also recollect that Jourdan, quickly informed of the retreat of his enemies, returned to his former position, and re-took 40 pieces of cannon which he had left in a wood. Although he repaired his mistake, Robespierre did not forgive him. It cost him for some time the loss of his command. Few of the Republican Generals have been so often defeated as he has been.

Note

Note 3. Page 14.

It is in this Imperial City that the sovereign chamber of the Empire is held.

Note 4. Page 18.

This General was in 1789 the first of the clerks of the parliament at Rennes, in which his father exercised the functions of an advocate. Moreau was named in the beginning of the Revolution, Chief of the National Guard of Rennes. The war being declared, he was sent with the national volunteers of Brittany to the army of *la Fayette*; he there distinguished himself on many occasions, and obtained very soon the rank of a General Officer. In 1794 he took the Fortrefs of l'Ecluse on the same day that his father was guillotined in France. This circumstance concurred with his character, naturally honest, to inspire him with horror for the Jacobins, whose principles he never adopted.

Note 5. Page 20.

A few days before they resumed hostilities, an Austrian officer having been sent to have a parley with Moreau, this General did not conceal from him that he was informed that 30,000 men would be sent immediately from the army in Germany to that in Italy. The officer carried this intelligence to the Austrian head quarters, where the order for the departure of these

30,000 men did not arrive till two days after. This fact which has been transmitted to me by one on whose veracity I can rely, is a proof that the French are as well served by their spies who are near the cabinets, as by those near the armies of their enemies. In general they have had much better intelligence than the allies during this war, because they have better paid for it. This circumstance has contributed not a little to their success. It is well known that these means have never been neglected by the greatest Generals, and that they engaged good spies whatever the price of them might be. The Marshal de Luxembourg gained over the secretary of the Prince of Orange, and Prince Eugene succeeded in bribing the master of the post-office at Versailles, whom he rendered very useful to him.

Note 6. Page 22.

General Stein, Commander in Chief of the troops of the circle of Suabia, was openly accused of having delivered up to the French for a considerable sum of money, the fort of Kehl as well as the posts of Kniebis and Freydenstadt. He confirmed these suspicions by refusing under different pretexts to join the Prince de Condé to attack the Republicans before they were well established at Kehl. He behaved still worse to the Prince of Condé, for he represented his army every where as a band of robbers, and inserted in the newspapers the most unjust calumnies of it. However it was more
easy

easy for him to disavow than to confirm them, and the Count de Viosmenil, a General officer of superior merit, obliged him to contradict all the first reports against the army of Condé ; this disavowal was also inserted in the public papers of Germany.

Note 7. Page 24.

This General had been an officer in the Emperor's service in the regiment of Bender, was dismissed from it some years ago for misconduct, and then went into France in hopes of obtaining some employment during the Revolution ; he was then made an officer, and soon after a General. As the regiment of Bender was usually in garrison at Fribourg and other towns of the Brisgaw, Ferino was well acquainted with the latter country, and that was probably the reason of his being employed in that quarter.

Note 8. Page 25.

The Suabians, descendants from the ancient Suevi, of whom Tacitus speaks, appear to have much degenerated from the valour of their ancestors. It is almost considered as giving abusive language to any one in Germany to call him Suabian. It is nearly equivalent to calling him coward. The troops from this circle justified at Kehl and Freydenstadt the ironical acceptation given to the word Suabian in Germany. It is no doubt contradicted by many exceptions, and the regiment of

Bender is a very remarkable one. It is composed of Suabians, and there certainly exists not in the Austrian army a regiment of greater bravery, or one in every respect more military.

The mountain of Kniebis, the highest in Suabia, forms a defile which is one of the principal passes of that country. Freydenstadt is situated on a rock two leagues from Kniebis.

Note 9. Page 25.

It was near this town that Mr. de Turenne was killed in 1675. Although inferior in force, he had found means to stop the progress of Mr. De Montecuculli for two months, on the banks of the Renchen and the Kintzig; it was there that these two great Generals exhausted against one another, all the resources and combinations of the art of war.

Note 10. Page 29.

It was near this imperial city that the French in 1762 gained a victory over the allies.

Note 11. Page 31.

Near this village passed the famous lines of Etlingen, which were forced in 1734 by Marshal de Berwick and the Count de Saxe.

Note

Note 12. Page 39.

The author repeats that he pretends not to estimate with strict exactness, the force of the respective armies, still less that of their different divisions. Whoever has been engaged in war knows how much the daily losses, re-inforcements, and detachments, occasion a continual variation in the comparative proportion of two opposed armies. He has given only an approximating estimate to put the reader in possession of some reasonable datum, and to enable him to form a more adequate judgment of the course of the military operations.

Note 13. Page 42.

This Imperial city has been rendered famous by the different battles which have taken place in its neighbourhood. The Imperialists beat the Swedes here in 1634. The great Condé, at that time Duke de Enghien, gained a battle, in which the Commander in Chief of the Imperialists Merci, was killed, and General de Glen, who commanded under him, was wounded and taken prisoner. The Marshal de Grammont, the second in command of the French army, was likewise wounded and taken prisoner by the Imperialists. The city of Nordlingen was formerly the bulwark of Franconia against Bavaria.

Note

Note 14. Page 42.

On the 29th of July, General Frölich had surrounded and disarmed the troops of the circle of Suabia, who according to the terms of the armistice, could not serve any longer against the French. The apprehensions that the latter might force them to join them against the Austrians, determined the Archduke to take this step.

Note 15. Page 43.

Bohemia is surrounded by a circle of very high mountains, which form a natural rampart round it. These mountains are least elevated on the side of Moravia, and Bohemia is much more accessible in this point than at any other. This is a great advantage for the House of Austria, since it is likewise in possession of Moravia.

Note 16. Page 49.

It is this same village of Hochstedt which has been rendered so famous by the two great battles which were fought there at the beginning of the century, in the first of which the French were victorious, and in the second defeated.

Note 17. Page 57.

It was in this affair that the English Colonel Craufurd, attached to the Austrian army with the charge of sending to the British Cabinet reports of the military operations,

was

was severely wounded in the head and made prisoner. The military qualities of this officer, his talents and the judicious perspicuity of his reports, occasioned a general regret for his misfortune. It was not less felt in the Austrian army than in his own country. Prince Charles immediately made the most pressing instances for his being set at liberty, and succeeded in obtaining it from general Jourdan. The Colonel's wound having unfortunately prevented him for a long time from exercising his functions with the Austrian army, they were ably discharged in his absence by Mr. Robert Craufurd his brother, and for a short time, by Captain Austruther. Their reports imitated the exactness and precision of those of the Colonel.

Note 18. Page 65.

This forest, one of the most considerable in Germany, extends from the town of Aschaffembourg to the angle formed by the Abein between that town and that of Wurtzbourg. It was formerly infested by Brigands, and the passing through it was as dangerous as difficult. The last Bishop of Wurtzbourg some years ago constructed in the middle of this forest a superb causeway, which is become the great road from Frankfort to Vienna. It was during their retreat across this forest that the French had the most to suffer from the arming and the vengeance of the Peasants. They stopped the grand staff of the army, pillaged its chests, and forced General

Ernouf

Ernouf, the Chief of it, to seek for safety in the swiftness of his horse.

Note 19. Page 86.

The French had likewise succeeded a month before in detaching from the Coalition the Elector of Saxony. They had concluded with him under the mediation of the King of Prussia a treaty of neutrality, in consequence of which the contingent of that elector amounting to 9,000 men, separated at the end of July from the Austrian army, and sensibly weakened it.

Note 20. Page 93.

This mountain of Shellenberg, famous in all the wars of Bavaria, was fortified by the Swedes in the thirty years war. It was to this mountain that John de Wert retired after the battle of Nordlingen.

Note 21. Page 108.

The reader will no doubt have remarked that from the time Moreau began his retreat, his right was of course become his left, and his left his right. I have nevertheless continued the two first denominations, because in his encampments, and frequently even on his march, Moreau was obliged to face the different corps of Mr. de la Tour's army, by which he was pursued.

Note

Note 22. Page 110.

Prince Charles it has before been mentioned had marched from the lower Rhine on the 22d of September with about 12,000 men, who were followed at some distance by 10,000 more. He passed the Mein on the 25th, and the Necker on the 30th, after having sent General Hotze to make a diversion in Alsace. This General's expedition will be mentioned hereafter. If it has not already been so, it is for the same reason that no account has been given of the march of the Archduke, and of the operations which took place on the lower Rhine after his departure. It has been the wish of the Author to describe without interruption Moreau's retreat, under the idea that the chain and connexion of events taken in one view was preferable to a succession of dates. Such a chronological servitude would have caused great confusion in this historical summary, and would have deprived it of the small degree of interest it may otherwise possess. The Archduke having passed through Schwetzingen, Durlach, Carlsruhe, Rastadt, and Offembourg, arrived on the 14th at Mohlberg, and two days after formed a junction with the corps of Nauendorf and Petrarch, which from that time came under his immediate command.

Note 23. Page 110.

It is situated between the towns of Fribourg and Neustadt, is six miles long, and in many places not more than ten paces wide; a proverb of the country says, that in this pass one meets with Paradise and Hell. There is an Inn in it called the Kingdom of Heaven.

Note 24. Page 111.

The town of Fribourg was formerly very strong and the possession of it was necessary for every army that meant to have their winter quarters in the Brisgau. It was taken and re-taken several times during the thirty years war. It is particularly known in military annals by the two battles fought in its neighbourhood in 1644, the Imperialists being commanded by Merci, and the French by the great Condé. These battles are celebrated for the obstinacy shewn, and the great number of men who lost their lives on each side. The Marshals de Crequi and Villars both took it, the former in 1677, and the latter in 1713. The French commanded by Louis XV. in person, besieged it in 1744, and took it after thirty-seven days of open trenches. The siege cost the French a great number of men. They razed the works of the place, as well as the forts erected on a mountain which commands it.

Note

Note 25 Page 112.

The black forest stretches from south to north, from the four forest towns as far as Neunbourg in the Duchy of Würtemberg. It was anciently, still more extensive. Cesar has given a description of it in his commentaries. It constituted according to the most general opinion a part of that tract of country called by the Romans, *Sylva Hircinia*. Its mountains separate the Duchy of Würtemberg from the Margraviate of Baden.

General Frölich had successively taken possession of Bregenz, Lindau, and of Constance, which the French had evacuated on the 8th of October; but he had not been able to make himself master of the capital post of Stokach in time to cut off from the French the way of retreating through the forest towns.

Note 26, Page 139.

It may have been remarked that in the course of the campaign the French passed the Rhine several times at Neuwied. An island which is situated almost opposite that town, gave them at the same time the power of easily throwing a bridge over the Rhine, and the means of defending it by batteries erected on the island. The advantages which this point offered for passing the Rhine,

induced the French to establish there a permanent bridge, and to cover it by works, which they caused to be constructed during the summer. This *tete de pont* made them masters of a fixed passage over the Rhine, and gave them a point of support against the fortrefs of Ehrebreitstein, which is only twelve miles from Neuwied.

In 1672, Marshal Turenne being encamped with 20,000 men between Bonn and Coblenz, threw also a bridge of boats over the Rhine at Neuwied, and covered it in the same manner with entrenchments. The Elector of Brandenburg, who was with 30,000 men before Mayence attacked without success this *tete de pont* in which Mr. de Turenne had left 3,000 men. The bridge was soon afterwards destroyed by the ice.

Note 27. Page 140.

It was to this same General Beurnonville as great a braggart, though far less able and fortunate than Buonaparte, that Dumourier confided at the end of 1792 30,000 men, with a commission to attack the Prince of Hohenlohe, who defended the approaches to Treves with 10,000 men. After several attacks as unsuccessful as they were ill planed, Beurnonville was obliged to lead back to Metz and Thionville his army reduced to 15,000 men by the sword of the Austrians, and the Prussian Dysentery. He then wrote to the Convention
that

that the nature of the season and the country had not allowed him to fulfil entirely the commission with which he had been entrusted, but that he had made an enormous slaughter of the Austrians, and that he had lost in this expedition, *only the little finger of a ranger.*

Note 28. Page 142.

These countries have been still worse treated in preceding wars. There are still to be found the traces of those horrid ravages which the French committed in 1688 and 1693. Mr. de Louvois, Minister of war under Louis XIV. sent an order to the French Generals to lay waste the whole palatinate with fire and sword. These orders were but too cruelly executed; almost all the towns of the palatinate were burnt. It will no doubt be recollected that the Elector Palatine reduced to despair by the ruin of his country, which he beheld a prey to the flames from the fortrefs where he had taken refuge, wished to fight Marshal Turenne, and sent him a challenge which the latter refused. All the world likewise is acquainted with the manner in which Mr. de Louvois wished to draw from Louis XIV. an order for completing the destruction of this beautiful country, and the horror with which that Prince rejected the proposal.

Note

Note 29. Page 144.

The neutrality was so much the more advantageous to this town as by the position of its *tete de pont*, it found itself, if I may so say, placed between the Austrian and French Batteries, and consequently liable to be reduced to ruins if either of them undertook to maintain themselves there. It had besides suffered but too much already from the war, having been in 1795 bombarded and half destroyed by the French.

This town belongs to the Prince of Neuwied, famous in Germany for his eccentric humour and the suit which he has carried on against his wife in the Imperial Chamber of Westlaer. She succeeded in procuring the administration of his property and his principality to be taken from him on the ground of madness. He nevertheless many years ago had the wisdom to grant the town of Neuwied religious and commercial franchises which attracted thither a great number of merchants and manufacturers from every country, and of every religion. This town is commercial and regularly built; it is inhabited by a great number of Hernhutes or Moravian Friars.

Note

Note 30. Page 149.

This Fort belonged formerly to the town of Strasbourg, and became afterwards a fortress of the Empire. Marshal de Berwick took it in 1733 after ten days open trenches, and caused the fortifications to be razed.

Note 31. Page 168. Printed by error note 36.

In 1733 the French also caused the *tete de pont* of Huningen to be fortified in spite of the remonstrances of the canton of Basle, and they kept possession of it during the winter 1733-34, although their army had re-entered France.

Note 32. Page 170.

This General only twenty-six years of age, was like Buonaparte a Corsican by birth, and brought up in the artillery at the beginning of the Revolution. He possessed, it is said, as much courage and greater talents than Buonaparte. He has been less fortunate.

Note 33. Page 175.

Some works, and amongst others, that of Mr. de Guibert on tactics had already pointed out the modifications which it was requisite to make in the modern military

tary system; and the Changes which would result from the actual formation of the armies, and above all, from the carrying to perfection every thing that depends on engineering and artillery. The French have realised these in the present war, and have besides employed secondary means before unknown. Such for instance are telegraphs and balloons. They have employed the latter with some effect on various occasions, amongst others, at Maubeuge and Fleurus.

Note 34. Page 177.

The simple contingent of the Empire was fixed in 1681 at 40,000 men. Conformably to the decrees given by the diet of Ratisbon during this war, all the members of the Germanic confederation ought to have furnished a quintuple contingent, which would have raised the army of the Empire to 200,000 men. It has however never amounted to 60,000; the majority of the Princes and states having preferred paying their quota in money. The treaties of neutrality concluded by the most powerful members of the Empire, have reduced its army to a small force. It is not at this moment 12,000 men strong.

Note 35. Page 181.

This General, a Savoyard by birth, and I believe the youngest Lieutenant General in the Austrian army, has
never

never ceased to distinguish himself during the whole course of this war. He has constantly enjoyed the confidence of the Emperor, and will one day probably be at the head of his army.

Note 36. Page 182.

A single trait will enable the reader to form a judgement of the manner in which the Archduke commands and is obeyed. At the affair of the 24th of October that Prince gave orders to the Major of the light horse of Modena, to attack a redoubt situated amongst some vines. That officer charged the French who defended it, but the ground being extremely disadvantageous for cavalry, he was repulsed and obliged to fall back. The Archduke came up in the interim, and seeing what passed, said to the Major, "Sir you have misunderstood me, I gave you orders to *take* the redoubt." The officer felt the full weight of these words, and returned to the charge with all the force given by despair. He was killed, but the redoubt was taken.

Note 37. Page 183.

This fortress is built on a perpendicular rock, at the foot of which runs the Rhine, and opposite to which the Moselle falls into that river. It commands entirely the town and environs of Coblenz. It unites to all the ad-

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vantages

vantages of its situation the impossibility of being attacked, except on a very narrow front, and the capability of being defended by a small garrison. This fortress, one of the best existing, belongs to the Elector of Treves.

Note 38. Page 185. Printed by error note 43.

The armies of Jourdan and Moreau, had upon their colours, "Vienna or Death."

End of the Notes for the Campaign in Germany.

CAMPAIGN

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ITALY.

CAMPAIN

CAMPAIN

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C A M P A I G N

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1796

IN

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C H A P. I.

FROM the beginning of the year 1796, it was well known to persons best informed on the subject, that the French had determined to make very great military efforts in Italy. It had been easy to foresee this from the end of the preceding year, since they were unwilling to extend to the armies of Italy the truce, which had been agreed upon in Germany, at the close of that year, between the Imperial and Republican armies.

Many political and military considerations concurred, to determine the French Government to push the war in Italy with more vigour than it had been done the preceding years. The example of the Court of Spain, which had been hastily induced to
make

make peace by the invasion of its territory, and the loss of two or three strong places, gave the Directory reason to hope, that the same consequences might result from the adoption of the same plan against the King of Sardinia. They flattered themselves, that by threatening the fortresses of Piedmont, and attacking on all sides, at the same time, the territories of this prince, they would so far alarm him, that the apprehension of losing his crown would determine him to detach himself from the coalition.

To these motives were joined others of no less importance;—to carry the war into the proper estates of the Emperor—to destroy his preponderance in Italy—to shut up its ports against the English—and above all, to find in a rich and fertile country, money, subsistence, and resources of every description.

To carry these designs into execution with the better chance of success, the French Government contrived to disguise them, and in so doing had the good fortune to elude the vigilance of its enemies. Well assured, that snows and the nature of the country would prevent the Austrians and Piedmontese from attempting any offensive operations during

during the winter, it was in no hurry to reinforce the French army in Italy, and to repair the losses which it had sustained in the campaign of 1795. It even went farther: the want of pay and of subsistence having, as the reader perhaps recollects, caused considerable discontents among the national volunteers, the French Generals, finding that they could neither restore subordination amongst them, nor pay them, gave permission to all who wished it to depart, even winked at the absence of those who quitted their colours without leave, and thus suffered many thousands of their worst soldiers to return into France. The French Government did not take any great pains, in the first instance, to restore order and discipline into the army of Italy. Its weakness and state of disorganization were known to the allies; and they were therefore led to conclude, that it would not be necessary to oppose against it any considerable force in the ensuing campaign.

During the months however of January and February, the Directory, under pretence of appeasing or of preventing disturbances in the south of France, caused about 40 000 of their best troops to assemble in the provinces of Languedoc, Roussillon, and

and Provence. The greater part of them, having made the campaigns in Spain, had become accustomed to a hot climate, and were therefore enabled to resist that of Italy. During the month of April, almost the whole of these troops arrived by forced marches in the territories of Genoa: and soon after the opening of the campaign Buonaparte found himself at the head of an army of more than 60,000 men, of which 45,000 were under his immediate orders, the remainder being posted along the *Col de Tende* and the *Riviere di Genoa*.

The Cabinet of Vienna, anxious to repair the reverses which Mr. de Vins had experienced towards the end of 1795, had rather augmented the army in Italy; and deceived by the weak condition in which the French army had been suffered to remain, supposed that it would be inferior in numbers to the combined force of the Austrians, Neapolitans, and Piedmontese.

General Beaulieu was at the head of the Austrian army, which the gazettes in general estimated at 50 or 60,000 men; but I am certain it did not amount to 35,000 effective; in which was comprised a corps of about 7,000 Neapolitans.

The Piedmontese army, commanded by the
Austrian

Austrian Lieutenant General Colli, was about 20,000 men strong, who defended the Col de Tende, and the other approaches of Piedmont. Besides these, the Duc d'Aouste was at the head of rather more than 15,000 men in Savoy, where he made head against the army of the Alps, under the command of General Kellermann, whose force amounted to 25,000 men.

In looking over these estimates, we shall find that the French began this campaign with about 85,000 men, and the allies with about 70,000.

Hostilities began early in April. The French at first threatened many points at the same time, that the allies might be doubtful against which they really meant to direct their attack, and that consequently they might be obliged to divide their forces. They made many feints along the whole extent of the Col de Tende, which obliged the Piedmontese to extend their line of defence, that they might be enabled to secure all the passes that lead into Piedmont. The French spread a report, that they meant to get possession of Genoa; and contrived to give a colour to it, by advancing to Voltri (only six leagues from Genoa) a corps of 10 or 12,000 men, commanded by General Laharpe, who pushed forward

his advanced guard to St. Pierre d'Arena, a suburb of that city.

The moment that intelligence arrived of this movement, M. de Beaulieu set out from Alexandria, in the neighbourhood of which he had assembled his army, moved rapidly to Novi, took post in the front of the defile of Bocchetta, [*Note 1.*] and caused a strong detachment to advance to the gates of Genoa, to cover that city, and to keep General Laharpe in awe. Wishing to keep up his communication with the Piedmontese army, by joining his right to the left of General Colli, M. de Beaulieu divided his army into many corps, which occupied a front of nearly twenty leagues. By so doing he weakened his position, and gave Buonaparte an opportunity of attacking to advantage his different corps, too much separated to be enabled to afford each other mutual support and assistance.

The Chiefs of the Genoise Government, finding their country pressed by two powerful armies, without means of making their neutrality respected, receiving messages from either party, sometimes with assurance of protection, sometimes with menaces, found themselves in a very embarrassing situation. They could not prevent the territory of the republic
from

from becoming the theatre of war, and from providing the opposing armies with means of subsistence. Perfectly aware that at all events they must be at the mercy either of the French or the Austrians, they endeavoured to keep on good terms with both. They strove to preserve, as far as it was possible, the independence of the Republic. They did every thing that depended on themselves to maintain it;---collected their troops---ordered the militia within the walls---and supplied with artillery the fortification of their city, which can only be defended, and of course be properly besieged, but by a very considerable force. [*Note 2.*] The magistrates however thought less of defending it against foreign armies, than of preventing an insurrection of its inhabitants, the lower class of which was as much attached to the French, as the higher order were to the allies.

On the 10th of April, General Beaulieu made a brisk attack on the right of the enemy, drove it from Voltri, and forced General Cervoni, who commanded it, to fall back on the center of the French army, which had taken a position on the heights of Savona. The day following, he attacked with no less vigour all the advanced posts of their center, and made himself master of them, with the

exception only of the redoubt of Montenotte, which was their last entrenchment. Fifteen hundred men, commanded by the Republican General Rampon, occupied this redoubt, which was well constructed, and advantageously situated. They resisted with no less success than bravery all the efforts which the Austrians made in the course of the day to get possession of this redoubt. Night prevented the latter from renewing the attempt with more efficacy, and the two armies passed the night in fight of each other.

On the 12th, at break of day, M. de Beaulieu order the attack on the redoubt of Montenotte to be renewed: but he was soon obliged to desist from it, in order to defend himself against the division of General Laharpe, who during the night had turned his left flank. The action became very brisk, and was supported with courage on both sides, when the Austrians found themselves attacked on their right by almost the whole French army with Buonaparte at its head. This General had executed the same manceuvre on the right which Laharpe had done on the left. General Argenteau, who commanded the right wing of the Austrians was partly surprised, and made a defence as feeble as the attack of the

French

French was vigorous. They defeated Mr. d'Argenteau's corps, which was not supported by the Piedmontese, and put it to the route. The rest of the Austrian army, finding itself uncovered and attacked on all sides by superior numbers, made a long resistance, but at last gave way, and was forced to retreat, after having sustained considerable loss. The French official reports made it 3,500 men, of which 2,500 were made prisoners.

After this victory, which must have cost the French very dear, they advanced to Carcara, and established themselves on the heights that surround the town of Cairo, which the allies had abandoned. M. de Beaulieu, weakened by the loss which he had sustained at Montenotte, made no attempt to stop their progress. He continued to fall back, with the intention of approaching the Piedmontese army, and of concentrating his forces.

The French did not give him time to attain completely his object. They attacked him again on the 13th, and on the 14th forced him to risk a general action near Montelefino. Buonaparte followed the same plan and executed the same manœuvre which had succeed so well at Montenotte. He directed the greater part of his forces against the right wing
of

of the Austrians, so as to separate it from the Piedmontese, with whom it had a feeble communication. This disposition met with the greatest success. The left of the Piedmontese, and the right of the Austrians, still commanded by M. d'Argenteau, were forced and put to flight. The center of the Austrians had then to sustain the attack of almost the whole French army. It defended itself with the greatest bravery, attempted even several times to pierce through the center of the French line, and for a long time kept the victory undecided. Buonaparte, fearing that it might escape him, made new dispositions to secure it; he reinforced the right of his army, and ordered it to advance in three strong columns against the left wing of the Austrians, which was sustained by some entrenchments thrown up near Dego.

This left wing opposed a vigorous resistance to the French; and the fire from the batteries made a considerable carnage amongst them. One of their columns however, led by General Massena, succeeded in outflanking the left wing of the Austrians; the latter, pressed on all sides by more than double their number, were at length overpowered and routed. The French remained victorious in every quarter.

If

If one can give credit to the returns made by Buonaparte, the allies must have lost in this battle 2,500 men killed, 8,000 made prisoners, 22 pieces of cannon, and 15 stand of colours. Amongst the prisoners was Lieutenant General Provera. From the 13th his corps of 1,500 men had been surrounded by the left wing of the French army. Unwilling to surrender, and unable to rejoin M. de Beaulieu, he entrenched himself in a castle situated on the summit of a mountain. The French made several attempts to force this post, but were constantly repulsed with considerable loss. Of three of their Generals, Panel, Quenin, and Joubert, the two former were killed, and the latter grievously wounded. It was not till the end of the battle of the 14th that M. de Provera, having no longer any hopes of assistance, surrendered himself with his whole detachment prisoners of war.

Buonaparte, in obedience to the orders given to the French Generals, never to publish the number of their killed, wounded, and prisoners, did not mention in his relation of the victory of Montelefino, the number of men that it had cost him. I venture however to say positively, that it was very considerable. Three Generals having been killed or wounded

wounded in the actions of the 13th and 14th, there can be no doubt but that a proportionable number of officers and soldiers must have shared the same fate. The silence of Buonaparte, as to the loss of his own army, sufficiently warrants us to believe, that he has very much exaggerated that of the allies. This appears to have been by no means so great, from impartial reports; and subsequent events proved, that the latter were more entitled to credit than those of Buonaparte.

In fact, if, according to the letters of this General, as well as of the French Commissaries attached to his army, the allies had in five days lost 15,000 men, of whom more than 10,000 were Austrians, their artillery, their provisions, and camp equipage if in the battle of the 14th the army of M. de Beaulieu had been diminished one third, would it have been possible that this General could have been in a condition the very night after that action, to attack the French army, to put it to the rout, and to recover the position of Dego, which had been taken from him the day before? This however did actually happen: and we must infer from it, either that M. de Beaulieu's loss in the battle of the 14th was much less than the French pretended it to be,

or

that their own had been likewise very considerable. Such also must that have been, which the latter experienced at Dego in the night between the 14th and 15th, where they lost amongst others, the three Generals Cauffe, Dupuis, and Rondeau. They claimed however the victory in this affair, which according to their accounts, cost the Austrians 2,000 men, of whom 1,400 were made prisoners.

Though the battle of Montelezino had still further weakened the points of communication between the Austrian and Piedmontese armies, they nevertheless made no combined movement to approach towards one another, and to contract their line. They thus afforded to Buonaparte the opportunity of placing himself between them, and of forcing the Piedmontese to act separately; which was the principal object of the plan of the campaign that had been formed by the French.

Buonaparte leaving a considerable part of his army to observe that of the Austrians, to prevent their assisting the Piedmontese, or making a diversion in their favour, marched against the latter with the remainder of his forces. He ordered an attack to be made on their entrenched camp on the 16th, and although he did not succeed in forcing it,

the fear of being turned induced the Piedmontese to abandon it during the night between the 16th and 17th, after having left a garrison in the town of Ceva.

The Piedmontese army took an excellent position at the conflux of the rivers Tanaro and Curfaglia, entrenched themselves there strongly, and for four days resisted all the efforts made by the enemy to dislodge them; but the French having on the 21st, crossed the Tanaro in two places, General Colli not daring to hazard a battle in the position which he then held, quitted it during the night following, retiring towards Mondovi, to which place he feared his retreat might be cut off. The French pursuing him closely, attacked him at break of day near the village of Vico. The Piedmontese were defeated, without making any great resistance. They continued to retreat, and the French entered Mondovi the same evening. The reports of the latter stated the loss sustained by the Piedmontese at 1,800 men killed, amongst whom was one General, 8 pieces of cannon, 15 ammunition waggons, 11 stand of colours, and 1,300 men taken, amongst whom were three Generals. The Republican General Stengel, known by his defeat

defeat at the passage of the Roer in 1793, was mortally wounded in this action.

The Piedmontese army from that time entirely separated from the Austrians and obliged to rely altogether upon itself, took a good defensive position behind the river Stura. Its front was covered by the Stura; its right extended to the fortrefs of Coni, and kept up a communication with the corps which defended the pass of the Col de Tende; its left was supported by the town of Cherasco, situated at the conflux of the Stura and the Tanaro. This position was the best that Mr. de Colli could have taken, under the circumstances in which he found himself. It covered the strongest places of Piedmont, and defended the only routes by which the French could penetrate into it, as they were not then masters of the Milanese. The Safety of Piedmont and of Turin, depended on this line of defence being perfectly preserved. If the French succeeded in breaking through it, they would be enabled to penetrate into the flat country, and leaving the strong places behind them, might march to the very gates of Turin, from whence they were not more than ten leagues distant. The superiority of their numbers would have enabled them to

mask those fortresses which might have given them any inquietude, and to spread themselves over the plain of Piedmont, which the weak remains of M. de Colli's army would not have dared to dispute with them.

The reverses which the allies had experienced at Montenotte, Montelezino, and Vico, and the rapid progress of the French, filled the Court of Turin with just and serious alarms. The King of Sardinia, struck with the imminent danger which threatened him, could hardly flatter himself that M. de Colli would be able to resist the efforts of an enemy so often victorious, and not having reason to rely on General Beaulieu for any powerful succour, did not think it right to expose to the chance of a battle his possessions and his crown. He saw no means of preserving them but by an immediate peace, and lost no time in demanding one. He sent Plenipotentiaries to Genoa, charged to propose it to the French Commissioners; and at the same time dispatched an order to General Colli, to solicit a suspension of arms from General Buonaparte. After some difficulties the latter agreed to it. The principal conditions were, that the French should be put in possession of the strong places

places of Coni, Ceva, and Tortona; that till the latter could be surrendered, the town of Alexandria should be given up to them; that they should remain masters of all the Country on the right bank of the Tanaro, from the source of that river to its embouchure into the Po; that they should be permitted to cross the latter river below the town of Valence, and that the French troops should be allowed to a free passage through all the territories of the King of Sardinia.

This Armistice was soon afterwards followed by a treaty of peace between this Prince and the French Republic. I shall not enter into any detail on the nature, the conditions, and the political consequences of this treaty. It would be a deviation from my subject: I will only consider this transaction with a view to the effects it produced on the rest of this campaign.

Before I resume the narrative of it, may I be permitted to hazard some reflections on the events which I have just been recounting. They have indeed been too remarkable, and their consequences too important, to admit of our being indifferent as to the true causes which led to them. Some have attributed the disasters which the allies

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experienced in this campaign to the political errors of the ministers of the respective courts, as well as to the military misconduct of the Generals; others have seen nothing in the triumphs of the French, but the natural effect of the superiority of their forces, of the bravery of their soldiers, and the talents of their commanders. The opinions of the best informed people, as well as the reports of the most impartial, concur in attributing the misfortunes of the allies to a complication of these different causes.

The Court of Vienna had formally promised to raise its Italian army to 60,000 men, which however had never amounted to 40,000, including the Neapolitans. From the difficulty in providing soldiers, and money to pay them, the Piedmontese army was neither never so numerous as it ought to have been, according to the mutual engagements that had been entered into between the Courts of Vienna and Turin.

On the one side and on the other, intrigues, mistrust, and other secret causes still more unfortunate, conspired to prevent the Austrian and Piedmontese armies from being so strong in point of number, and from acting with that union and inden-

identity of views, that were necessary to give them a chance of success against an enemy, marching towards its object with a perfect unity of action and of interest.

The Court of Vienna appointed to the command of the Italian army M. de Beaulieu, a General remarkable for his courage, as well as for his good fortune in war. It placed great reliance, and with good reason on his zeal and his fidelity. But this General had never yet commanded in Italy, and of course could not have a perfect knowledge of the country in which he was about to wage war; a knowledge which the insufficiency of his forces rendered the more necessary. In doing justice to the military talents which distinguish M. de Beaulieu, let me at the same time be allowed to observe, that he does not possess all those qualities which ought to be found in a Commander in Chief.

He is particularly deficient in that address and those conciliating manners so necessary in a General, who unites under his command troops of different nations, or who is obliged to act in concert with them. It appeared that there did not exist between him and the Piedmontese Generals
that

that harmony and mutual confidence which alone could make amends for the inferiority of their forces, and give a concordance to their operations. Messrs. de Beaulieu and Colli, were besides independent of each other, and were only instructed to act in concert, which they did not adhere to so strictly as might be wished. The Austrians threw the blame of the defeats at Montenotte and Montelezino on the Piedmontese Generals, whom they accused of not having supported General Argenteau as they might have done. The Piedmontese on the other hand reproached the Austrians with having afforded them no assistance in the battles of the 16th, the 21st, and 22d, pretending that had they received any, they might have maintained themselves before Ceva and Mondovi. Both accused General Argenteau of having omitted or neglected to communicate the orders which he had received, to the Generals under his command ; and of having occasioned both these defeats by the bad dispositions which he made, and by the slight resistance which he opposed to the attacks of the French. One cannot but suspect that these imputations were well founded, as this General was soon afterwards re-

removed from his command, and even put under arrest.

It is impossible not to applaud the readiness with which M. de Beaulieu marched to cover Genoa in the beginning of April, and the courage with which he attacked the French corps which threatened this city. But he may be censured for having uselessly remained many days at Voltri, and for not having suspected that the design of the French was to compel him to quit the heights, on which he had advantageously posted himself. In flying to the assistance of Genoa, M. de Beaulieu separated himself from the right of his army. After having accomplished his object he ought instantly, as it seems, to have joined M. d'Argenteau. The city of Genoa had had time to secure itself from a *coup de main*. The best way of defending it would have been, besides, not to suffer himself to be beat by the French, and to prevent them from penetrating into Piedmont.

The inaction of M. de Beaulieu gave time to Buonaparte to prepare his movement against M. d'Argenteau, to defeat this General twice, and to obtain those first successes which decided the rest of the campaign. If M. de Beaulieu had contracted his

line, and collected his army, by drawing nearer to M. d'Argenteau: if, instead of occupying a very extensive front, the Generals Beaulieu and Colli had formed a junction, or at least had taken such positions as would have admitted of their affording each other mutual support: they might have defended all the defiles of the Appennines---have rendered Piedmont impenetrable; and have thus completely disconcerted Buonaparte's plans. If the latter had marched to Genoa to induce the allies to divide their forces, or against Lombardy, in the hope that the Austrians would fly to its defence, he could not have executed either the one or the other of these movements, and particularly the latter, without endangering his flank, and exposing himself to be continually attacked in a very perilous situation. He would have been under the necessity of marching through the flat country; whilst the allies, who were masters of all the heights, might have fallen upon him at such time and in such places as would have been most advantageous to them. If Buonaparte under these circumstances had experienced any reverses, the allies might have been enabled to drive him to the sea coast,

coast, and even to cut off his communication with the county of Nice, and with France.

It is impossible to deny but that the plan followed by General Buonaparte, was as wisely conceived as it was ably executed. He shewed great ability and promptitude in taking advantage of the superiority of his forces, and of the errors of those who were opposed to him. He had but one object, towards which he directed all his movements and applied all his means; this was to break the line of the allies. He succeeded in it, by bringing almost the whole of his force to bear on the weakest part of their line, a simple manœuvre, and which can scarcely fail of being successful, if executed with foresight, celerity, and vigour.

C H A P. II.

Retreat of the Austrians behind the Po---Passage of that river by the French---Armistice concluded between them and the Duke of Parma---Battle at Lodi---The French enter Milan---Insurrection of the inhabitants of Lombardy---Passage of the French over the Mincio---Retreat of General Beaulieu into the Tyrol---Armistice concluded between the French, the King of Naples, and the Pope---The French enter Leghorn---Insurrection of the inhabitants of Romagna---Siege and description of Mantua.

THE armistice concluded between the Piedmontese and French armies, was productive of the greatest advantages to the latter. It delivered the Republicans from one half of their enemies, provided them abundantly with military stores and provisions, and secured their position in Italy. It afforded them means of acquiring new successes at the same time that it furnished certain points of retreat in case of a reverse of fortune. Elated
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by so many victories obtained in so short a time, and strengthened by all the new resources which he had procured, Buonaparte did not delay a moment to take advantage of them. The possession of Tortona, with the liberty of passing the Po, near Valence, opened a way for him into the Milanese, which was become an easy conquest to an army already victorious and double in number to that opposed to it.

The Republican army began its march on the 30th of April, and advanced against the Austrians. As soon as Mr. de Beaulieu had heard of the suspension of arms agreed upon between the Piedmontese and the French, he had retired to Alexandria, and from thence to Valence, where he crossed the Po. He then took a position behind that river, between those of Tesin and Terdoppio, in order to protect the Milanese. Abandoned by the Piedmontese, and deprived of the support of their fortified places, he could no longer think of acting on the offensive. Nothing now remained for him but to exert all his efforts to keep the French as long as possible on the other side of the Po, and then to make an obstinate defence of the Milanese, in order to give the court of Vienna time to send

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re-inforcements, which the defection of the King of Sardinia rendered indispensably necessary. Thinking that the French would take advantage of the liberty of the passage stipulated in the armistice, and that they would endeavour to cross the Po near Valence or Tortona of which they were masters, Mr. de Beaulieu posted himself with the greatest part of his army within the reach of these two towns, so as to protect the course of the river Tefin. He lined only the left bank of the Po with a few troops, as far as Pavia and the mouth of the Tefin.

Buonaparte, foreseeing all the difficulties which must attend the passage of so rapid a river as the Po in the presence of the enemy, and knowing that Mr. de Beaulieu had not a sufficient number of troops to guard the banks of the river along the whole of its course, judged that by marching much lower down, he should find some point favourable to his passage, and weakly defended. By this movement he compelled Mr. de Beaulieu to abandon on a sudden, almost the whole of the Milanese, in order to prevent the loss of his communication with the town of Mantua, and the Tyrol. If on the contrary Buonaparte had at-

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tacked him on the Tefin, Mr. de Beaulieu would have been able to defend fucceffively the paffage of each river, to fave his magazines, and perhaps to gain fufficient time for the arrival of fome reinforcements, which might enable him to ftand his ground in the Milanefe. By directing himfelf towards the lower Po, Buonaparte gained befides the advantage of being farther advanced into Italy, of alarming all the petty ftates, of levying contributions in the Dutchies of Parma, Placentia, and Modena: and of procuring money, provifions, and horfes, with which his army was not as yet abundantly fupplied. In confequence of this, after having made a feint of attempting a paffage at Valence, he proceeded on the 8th of May, by a forced march to the neighbourhood of Placentia; and perceiving but a fmall number of the enemy on the other fide of the Po, he haftened to transport his van guard to the oppofite bank, on rafts and flying bridges. Some light troops which he had fent forward during his march took poffeffion of fome boats loaded with fick and provifions.

As foon as Mr. de Beaulieu received information of the march of the French towards Placen-

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tia and the lower Po, he sent between 6 and 7,000 men from Pavia to defend the points threatened; but they arrived too late to oppose the passage of the French, whom they found drawn up on the left bank of the river.

A smart skirmish ensued near Fombio, in which the Neapolitan cavalry lost many men, but gained much honour. This action was disadvantageous to the allies, who were compelled to retire upon the Adda. In the night of the 7th, Mr. de Beaulieu ordered another body of 4,000 men from Casale to succour that which was attacked at Fombio. This corps arrived about two o'clock in the morning at Codogno on the road from Placentia to Cremona, which road it found occupied by the French. The encounter between the two parties produced a fire of musquetry, the noise of which having drawn the Republican General la Harpe to that quarter, he received a ball which killed him on the spot. His death was much regretted by the whole army. Although the body of Austrians just mentioned, had forced the vedettes and driven in the advanced posts of the French, it found them too powerful to think of attacking them, or remaining long before them. This corps then marched to-
wards

wards Lodi, where General Beaulieu had retired during the same night with the rest of his army.

The victories of the French, and the peace unexpectedly made by the King of Sardinia, had excited the utmost alarm throughout all Italy. The retreat of the Austrians beyond the Po, left at the mercy of the French all the countries situated on the right bank of that river.

The Duke of Parma, whose territories they had already entered, saw that he had not a moment to lose in securing them from the Revolutionary Principles and rapacity of the French. He therefore solicited a suspension of arms, under the mediation of Spain, which was granted him at the price of 2,000,000 of French livres, 1,700 horses, 2,000 oxen, of an immense quantity of provisions, and of 20 paintings to be chosen by the French. Every step which they advanced into Italy augmented their military resources: each success furnished the means of acquiring new ones. Buonaparte was certain of being able henceforwards to pay, equip, and subsist his army at the expence of his enemies, as well as at that of the neutral powers. In passing the Po, he

had overcome the greatest impediment to the conquest of the Milanese, the main object in his plan of the campaign.

He left the banks of the Po on the 9th of May, and found himself on the 10th with his advanced guard in presence of General Beaulieu's rear guard, which was posted in front of Lodi and the river Adda. A brisk cannonade was commenced on both sides, in consequence of which the Austrians evacuated the town of Lodi, and retired to the other side of the river. Major Malcamp (son-in-law of General Beaulieu) who commanded this Austrian corps, caused several pieces of cannon to be placed at the end of the bridge which enfiladed it, whilst some other pieces placed on the right and left took it by a cross fire. He would not allow the bridge to be broken down, not imagining that the French would under such circumstances venture to attack it. Buonaparte had not attempted to force it, because the whole of his army was not yet arrived; but as soon as the major part of it had joined him, he assembled his General officers, and communicated to them the resolution he had formed of storming the bridge. The plan was

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unanimously disapproved of by his Generals. Buonaparte obstinately persisting in this rash design, assembled a council of grenadiers, to whom he made an animating speech which determined them to undertake the attack. [*Note 3.*] 4,000 grenadiers and carabiniers formed themselves into a solid column, and marched towards the bridge. As soon as they arrived at its extremity, they were received by a terrible discharge of grape shot, which it was impossible to withstand. They fell back with great loss, returned twice to the charge, and were again forced back by the fire of the Austrian cannon, which enfilading the bridge, were discharged all at once close upon them as soon as they had set foot on it. The French had already suffered enormously, and it might have been expected that they would have abandoned this desperate undertaking. But Buonaparte persevering in his resolution, ordered fresh troops to re-inforce the column engaged in the attack. Six Generals putting themselves at its head, animated them by their example, inflamed them by their words, and led them back to the charge. Taking advantage of a moment, when the thickness of the

smoke produced by the incessant fire, prevented the Austrians from perceiving and making a general discharge upon the French; the latter rushed upon the bridge, crossed it with rapidity, and falling impetuously upon the troops and cannon which defended its extremity, overthrew the one and made themselves masters of the other. The bridge being forced, all the other columns instantly passed it to support the former. This action equally brilliant and unexpected, disconcerted the Austrians, who abandoned their ground, finding themselves too weak to defend it, and began their retreat. It was protected by the Neapolitan cavalry, which gained infinite honour on this day. They charged the French infantry several times, always with courage, and sometimes with success. They shewed themselves, by the good countenance which they preserved, and the judiciousness of their movements, equal to the best veteran troops.

Buonaparte wrote to the directory that the allies had lost in this action 2,500 men, of which 1,000 were made prisoners, and that he had taken 400 horses and 20 pieces of cannon. He had the effrontery to pretend that this battle cost him

him only 400 men; and certainly never did he give a more glaring proof of the falseness of his accounts. The loss suffered by his army on that occasion was universally estimated at 4,000 men; and by some even greater. The very nature of the engagement rendered it more bloody than any of the preceding actions, and the French themselves considered it as the warmest contest during the campaign. It was absolutely impossible that they should be otherwise than great sufferers on the bridge of Lodi, where they were thundered upon without intermission by artillery and musquetry; and if they were three times compelled to fall back, it was undoubtedly in consequence of the terrible fire to which they were exposed, and of the great havock which it occasioned in their ranks.

One cannot however help acknowledging the intrepidity with which the French accomplished this perilous undertaking. It was a striking proof with how much indifference the French Generals throw away their soldiers lives. By making other dispositions, and by the delay of a few days, Buonaparte might have crossed the Adda with as little loss as he sustained at the passage of the Po. He would not indeed have had such brilliant things to relate,
but

but he would have preserved some thousands of his soldiers. He would have acquired less glory, but he would have shewed more real patriotism. He forgot that the leading principle of the greatest Generals, was to spare the blood of their soldiers; and that they only considered those as true victories in which they had but a small loss to lament. The void created in the French army by the battle of Lodi, was quickly filled up by reinforcements drawn from the army of Kellermann, whose presence in Savoy was rendered unnecessary by the peace concluded with the King of Sardinia.

As soon as Mr. de Beaulieu had found himself obliged to retire upon the Adda, he felt the necessity of quickly recalling those troops which he had on the Tefin, and at Milan. After having left 1,800 men in the citadel, the Austrians evacuated that town on the 10th of May, and the French to the number of 4,000 men, commanded by General Massena, entered it on the 11th. On the day following Buonaparte made a triumphal entry into the town, in the midst of the acclamations of the populace, and escorted by a numerous cavalcade of troops, and carriages filled with the principal inhabitants of Milan. He passed several days in that place

place indulging himself in feasts, balls, and all sorts of pleasures. He received there greater honours than the Austrian Princes, Governors of the Milanese, had ever exacted. He lodged in the palace of the Archduke, who had left it a few days before. After having enjoyed his triumph, and shared with the Commissaries of the Executive Directory the incense offered up by the inhabitants of Milan, they employed themselves in attending to the interest of the Republic. They imposed a contribution of 20,000,000 of livres (800,000*l.*) on Lombardy, as the price of that liberty which they came to give them; and granted a suspension of arms to the Duke of Modena for the sum of 10,000,000 of livres (400,000*l.*) to be paid either in specie or in military stores, without forgetting to stipulate the gift of twenty valuable paintings.

On the 20th of May Buonaparte addressed a proclamation to his army, in which, after having extolled its late exploits, he announced those which he still expected from it. He called for its vengeance against the Neapolitans, the destroyers of Toulon, and on the inhabitants of Rome, the assassins of Bassville. [*Note 4.*] He made it fear to find a Capua in Lombardy; and in imitation of Annibal,

to whom Italian flattery did not cease to compare him, he promised to his soldiers the conquest of Rome, and the spoils of Italy.

Anxious to see this last promise realized, scarcely had his troops entered Lombardy, than they gave themselves up to pillage, violence, and every species of disorder. Their rapacity, their contempt of religious ceremonies, and above all their licentious conduct towards the women, exasperated the inhabitants to the highest pitch. They could not support such accumulated outrages, and they revenged themselves like Italians. On the 22d of May a general insurrection broke out against the French. The towns and villages armed themselves at the sound of the tocsin. The national cockade was trampled under foot; the trees of liberty were cut down, and all the Republicans found in small parties were massacred. It was at Milan, Lodi, Varese, and Pavia, that the greatest fury was shewn, and that the fiery and vindictive character of the Italians displayed itself in all its violence. The inhabitants of Pavia, assisted by 5 or 6,000 peasants, surrounded the French garrison, disarmed, and took it prisoner. The people of Milan were not so fortunate in a similar attempt. The French, more
numerous

numerous than at Pavia, dispersed the insurgents, after having killed a vast number of them. Buona-
 parte had already begun his march against the Au-
 strians, when he heard of this unexpected insur-
 rection. He returned immediately, and ordered
 troops to march against those places where the in-
 surgents chiefly assembled. He caused the village
 of Binasco to be burnt, put a hundred of its in-
 habitants to the sword, and marched himself with a
 powerful corps against the town of Pavia. [*Note 5.*]
 He found the gates of it shut; and having in vain
 summoned the inhabitants to open them, he caused
 them to be beaten down with cannon. The French
 then spread themselves through the streets, killed
 every one they met, delivered the garrison which
 was prisoner, and pillaged the town. These rigor-
 ous punishments soon quelled the insurrection. The
 Commissaries and Generals of the French arrested
 in all the towns the most considerable persons,
 caused a great number of them to be shot, disarmed
 the inhabitants of Lombardy, and treated it more
 and more as a conquered country.

After the battle of Lodi, General Beaulieu, too
 weak to dispute any longer the possession of the
 Milanese, and to support the insurrection of its

inhabitants, thought of nothing more but of covering Mantua, and of keeping up his communication with Germany. For this purpose he took a good position on the Mincio, his right extending to the lake of Garda, and his left to Mantua.

Buonaparte made different movements with his troops to induce Mr. de Beaulieu to believe, that he wished to go round the lake of Garda by Salo and Riva, in order to make himself master of the road to Tyrol. But whilst he was making these feints, he attacked the Austrian posts on the Mincio, on the 30th of May, and effected the passage of that river near Borghetto. In the mean time, one column of his army directed its march towards Peschiera and Castelnovo, with the intention of cutting off Mr. de Beaulieu from the road to Verona and Trente. As the latter movement might have deprived this General of every future means of retreat, he was no longer at liberty to defer it. He was compelled to give up all communication with Mantua, and to leave that place to rely on itself. Happily he had had time to supply it with provisions, and to render it capable of making a good defence. He garrisoned the town with 12,000 men, and marched towards the Adige with the remainder

remainder of his army. He passed that river, routed a corps of the enemy which was pursuing him, traversed the states of Venice, and retired into the narrow passes of the Tyrol. There he took post with about 14,000 men, which was all that remained of his army.

The conduct of Mr. de Beaulieu, after the French had passed the Po, deserves praise. Constantly attacked and pursued by a victorious army, double in numbers to his own, he sustained several battles with credit, if not with success, and effected his retreat with order and with but little loss. He rendered Mantua in a short time, capable of making a long defence, and by those means he preserved a possibility to the Austrians of returning with advantage into Italy, of which Mantua, in a military point of view, is the capital. In spite of all the manœuvres made on his right and left by the French with a view to surround, and cut him off from the road to Germany, Mr. de Beaulieu gained the defiles of the Tyrol with his little army, and made excellent dispositions for defence.

The retreat of the Austrians into the Trentin, having left Buonaparte master of his movements in Italy, he took advantage of it to spread his troops

in it, and to raise contributions. Knowing that much time would elapse before the Imperialists could assemble a new army, he wished in this interval to take advantage of his victories, and to find the means of making fresh conquests in those countries which he had already subdued. He was desirous above all to detach the King of Naples from the coalition, and even the Pope, whose states were, by the retreat of the Austrians, at the mercy of the French. His wishes were quickly satisfied, and even anticipated. The King of Naples proposed a suspension of arms, to which Buonaparte the more readily agreed, as the distance of that Prince's states protected them from the menaces of the French, at least by land, and because by drawing off his troops from the Austrian army, the latter would become still weaker. The King of Naples might injure the French, but had nothing to fear from them. The conditions of the armistice, therefore, which was concluded on the 4th of June were not grievous to that Prince. They were reduced to a stipulation, that his troops should separate from those of the Emperor, which happened soon after.

The

The Pope was, with respect to the French, in a much more unfavourable position, both as to the situation of his dominions, his means of resistance, and in every other respect. Buonaparte entered the dominions of his Holiness on the 19th of June, and took possession of the towns of Bologna and Ferrara, as well as of fort Urbino. He threatened to make farther advances into the territories of the church, and there was nothing that could prevent him from doing so. The Pope, who had not a doubt of the extreme rigour with which the French would exercise the rights of conquest upon his dominions, and knew how much they desired to annihilate both his spiritual and temporal power, hastened to avert the impending storm, by offering to consent to any conditions which might be imposed upon him. Whatever might have been the inclination of Buonaparte to invade the territories of the church, and whatever was the facility with which he might have done so: yet he felt that it would be dangerous to engage himself farther on, whilst he left behind him Mantua, the Castle of Milan, and Lombardy, the inhabitants of which might revolt again in his absence. He esteemed it therefore more prudent, as well as more convenient to enjoy
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without danger all the sacrifices, by which the Pope offered to purchase his neutrality. This was granted him, on condition that he should pay to France 21,000,000 of French livres (£900,000) and that he should deliver up to the commissaries of the Republic 100 paintings, as well as 200 precious manuscripts; that the French troops should remain in possession of the towns of Ferrara and Bologna, [*Note 6.*] and of fort Urbino; that the Citadel of Ancona [*Note 7.*] should be delivered up to them, and that the Pope should recall or set at liberty those of his subjects, who had been proscribed or imprisoned, as guilty of sedition, and revolutionary practices. [*Note 8.*]

The French found in the towns of Bologna, Ferrara, Modena, and Urbino 200 pieces of heavy artillery, and all the military stores of which they were in want, to enable them to besiege Mantua. Several artists were sent from Paris, who chose in the abovementioned towns, and in those of Milan, Pavia, Parma, and Placentia, all the most precious monuments of the arts, which were to be found, and sent them to Paris. Thus did the French plunder Italy, as the Romans had formerly plundered Greece.

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The inhabitants of the Imperial Fiefs, irritated by the vexations and insolence of the French soldiers, took up arms against them, killed some, and besieged those who formed the Garrison of Arquata. Buonaparte sent a body of troops against these insurgents, caused a great number of them to be shot; and several villages to be burnt. He loaded this small country with heavy impositions, and subjected it to all the rigours of military despotism.

The Directory wished to take advantage of the moment, when its army was without a rival in Italy, to destroy in every respect the power of its enemies. Indifferent as to the choice of means, and caring little whether they were just, provided they were advantageous, it gave a glaring proof how little dependance was to be placed on the treaties which it contracted. Regardless of that which had just been concluded with the grand Duke of Tuscany, and regretting sincerely that it could no longer treat that Prince as an enemy, the Directory ordered Buonaparte to take possession of the town of Leghorn. That General consequently marched his troops into the territory of the Grand Duke, and with a view to conceal their real destination spread a report that these troops were intended to pene-
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trate into the southern parts of the Ecclesiastical States. But they suddenly turned to the right, and entered Leghorn on the 27th. of June. [*Note 9.*] They drove the Governor, whom they did not find sufficiently obedient, out of the place, and substituted themselves instead of the forces of the Grand Duke. That Prince in vain made representations upon the violation of his territory and neutrality. The powerful arguments of the strongest, and that supreme law the interests of the French Republic were opposed to him. It did not however reap all the advantages from that expedition, which its chiefs had promised themselves. The English had been warned of what was preparing against them, and their ships had time to leave the port, carrying off the greatest part of the magazines and effects belonging to the Government, and to the merchants of that country. Greatly disappointed at seeing their intended prey escape, the French, to make themselves amends, imposed a heavy contribution on every thing in that town, which was suspected to be English property, and summoned the inhabitants under the most severe penalties to denounce whatever they knew to belong to the English. By this means they did not fail to draw pretty considerable profit

profit from the taking of Leghorn; and they gained besides their chief object, which was to shut the port of that town against the fleets, both military and mercantile of the English.

About the same time the French experienced afresh the just consequences of the rapine and vexations which they exercised upon the conquered countries. The inhabitants of a part of Romagna, driven to despair by all which they were condemned to give, and to suffer, armed themselves to the number of several thousands, fell upon and massacred the French detachments employed in laying waste their country. Buonaparte who did not chuse to let this insurrection go unpunished, sent an additional number of troops, who killed several hundreds of the unfortunate Peasants, and burnt the town of Lugo, as well as several villages [Note 10.] These sanguinary and barbarous executions, although in part justified by the rights of war, raised a hatred and a desire of vengeance in all those parts of Italy occupied by the French to the highest pitch. A great number of them fell victims in consequence, and the Italian stiletto seconded by the climate, and the intemperance of the French concurred as powerfully as the Austrian sword,

to the great consumption of men in the French army in Italy.

Whilst Buonaparte was thus exercising his empire in that country, possessing himself of its spoils, and rendering himself an object of fear and hatred, his troops were carrying on the sieges of Mantua, and of the castle of Milan. The latter place surrendered on the 29th of June, twelve days after the trenches were opened. The garrison commanded by General Lami, were made prisoners of war. I have not entered into any details of this siege, because it exhibited nothing remarkable, brought on no considerable action, and was attended with little blood shed on either side. [*Note 11.*]

Buonaparte being in want of the artillery necessary for carrying on a siege, and of the requisite stores, had been compelled to content himself after the retreat of Mr. de Beaulieu into the Tyrol, with investing the town of Mantua; and he even had not been able to form the blockade but at a great distance on account of the peculiar situation of the place.

Mantua has so much occupied the attention of Europe, has been the aim of so many efforts, has

has caused such an effusion of blood, and has so long held in suspense the fate of Italy, that those readers who are not well acquainted with the topographical and military situation of that town, may not be displeased to find here a description of it.

This town which boasts of having been founded by the Etrurians before the Trojan war, is situated upon a lake formed by the Mincio, twenty Italian miles in circumference, and two miles broad. It is large, well built, and contains a great number of churches, of which some are very richly decorated. At the time when it still belonged to the Dukes of Mantua [*Note 12.*] who resided there, it reckoned upwards of 50,000 inhabitants; it does not now possess half that number. It has always been fortified, and its situation has made it considered in all Italian wars as the most important fortress in that country. It has sustained several sieges, and whenever it has surrendered, it has been more in consequence of a blockade and want of provisions than of open force, or the regular operations of art. Its chief means of defence consists less in its fortifications, than in the difficulties opposed to the approach

and attacks of an enemy. The town being entirely surrounded by water and marshes, is only to be arrived at by three bridges or principal causeways, which are covered by works raised at each of their extremities. It communicates by these causeways with the suburbs of St. George, St. Anthony, and la Favorite, which being capable of defence, must be carried by an enemy before he can approach the town. If once the besiegers make themselves masters of these suburbs, they may easily form and maintain the blockade of Mantua, but they are scarcely more advanced towards the formation of a regular siege, as they can only open the trenches upon the narrow front of the causeways which lead into the town. The waters of the lake stagnating in summer, the place then becomes very unwholesome, and those of the inhabitants who are in easy circumstances generally leave it at that time. This unwholesomeness is not the least of its means of defence: for it is impossible to besiege it without risking the total destruction of an army by sickness. In almost every siege this place has sustained, pestilential fevers have made great ravages, both amongst the assailants and defenders of it.

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These considerations did not deter General Buonaparte, who had been taught by past successes to be confident of future ones. After having carried some out posts of the town, he opened the trenches before it on the 18th of July. But the difficulties attending the siege, the fevers which broke out in his army, and the successful sorties of the garrison, rendered the progress of the French extremely slow, and enabled the Count de Canto d'Irles, who commanded in the town, to defend it until relieved.

C H A P. III.

A new army assembled by the Austrians in Italy under the command of Field Marshal Wurmser---Operations and first successes of that General---The siege of Mantua raised by Buonaparte---Complete defeat of the corps of General Quosdanovich---Defeat of Mr. de Wurmser at Castiglione---Second defeat---Repassing of the Mincio and the Adige, and re-entrance of the defiles of Tyrol---New insurrection against the French---Plan formed by the French to unite all their armies in Germany---Battle of Roveredo---Action at Bassano---Arrival of Marshal Wurmser at Mantua---Peace made by the King of Naples with the French Republic---Refusal by the Pope of the conditions of peace prescribed by them---Revolt of the inhabitants of the Dutchies of Modena, Bologna, and Ferrara---Origin of the Cispadan Republic.

THE defection of the King of Sardinia, and the loss of the Milanese, which resulted from it, made known to the Court of Vienna when too late
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the insufficiency of the troops which it had sent into Italy. As it could not possibly acquiesce in leaving so valuable a part of its dominions as Lombardy in the hands of the French, it resolved to make the greatest efforts for the recovery of that country. All the troops stationed in Carinthia and Styria were sent by forced marches into the Tyrol. The inhabitants of the latter country having shewn a disposition to arm themselves for the defence of it, some thousands of them were equiped and formed into corps of chasseurs, a sort of service to which the Tyrolians are extremely well adapted. As all these different reinforcements would not however have made Mr. de Beaulieu's army sufficiently strong to enable him to renew offensive operations, the Cabinet of Vienna, attending to the most pressing concern, sacrificed its plan of a campaign beyond the Rhine, to its personal and immediate interest in Italy. Field Marshal Wurmser, who commanded the Imperial army of the Upper Rhine, received an order to set off with more than 30,000 effective men for Italy, and there to replace General Beaulieu. The months of June and July passed away before these different corps of troops could form a junction, or be sufficiently recovered from the fatigues of so long

long a march, and put in a state to act. Ten thousand men out of the 30,000 who had come from the army of the Rhine, were left in the Bishopric of Inspruck to observe a French corps, which menaced it; and on the 29th of July Marshal Wurmser began his march against the French, at the head of an army of 47,000 men. He divided it into three principal bodies. That of the right, consisting of 17 battalions and 14 squadrons, directed its march along the lake of Garda to Salo and Brescia: that of the left commanded by General Mezaros, consisting of 5 battalions and 7 squadrons, marched by Legnago towards the Po; whilst Marshal Wurmser with 29 battalions, and 14 squadrons, commanded by Generals Melas and Davidovich, advanced to the Mincio with the center, to attack in front the enemy's army between Mantua and Peschiera.

This disposition met at first with the greatest success. The column on the right under the orders of General Quosdanovich, being divided into several small columns, surprised and forced the important posts of Salo and Brescia, where it made prisoners 2,000 men, three Generals as well as a great number of officers. The next morning this corps advanced on the roads from Brescia to Mantua,
and

and Verona to take the French on their rear, and to favour the attack made by the center column.

This latter had not been less successful in what it had undertaken. On the 29th and 30th it forced all the enemy's posts along the Adige, took 1,500 men as well as 10 pieces of cannon, and drove back the French as far as the Mincio.

Buonaparte being victoriously attacked at all points, and threatened with being surrounded by the Austrian columns, in the night of the 31st, precipitately raised the siege of Mantua, which was so far advanced that the approaches were within 100 paces of the covered way. The garrison attentive to all the movements of the besiegers made a vigorous sortie whilst they were retiring; fell upon their rear guard, took 600 men, and made themselves masters of all their artillery, and all the ammunition of the siege, consisting of 134 cannons and mortars, and 140,000 shells or balls. It employed itself immediately in destroying the works, which had been raised either for the purpose of the siege, or for those of the blockade.—Placed between the two columns of Generals Wurmser and Quosdanovich, Buonaparte saw the whole danger of his situation, and was sensible that if he gave these two Generals time to

form a junction, and to combine their attacks, it would be almost impossible for him to make head against both of them at once. He then took the only course which could save his army, and preserve the Milanese. He judged that by concentrating his forces, and advancing rapidly against the corps of Mr. de Quosdanovich, he might defeat him before he could be succoured by Mr. de Wurmser.

In consequence of this plan Buonaparte marched on the 30th at night with the greatest part of his forces against Mr. de Quosdanovich, whose corps was divided, and stationed at several different points, by which he was endeavouring to rejoin Mr. de Wurmser. Buonaparte caused all these detachments to be attacked successively at Lonado, Montechiaro, Dezenzano, Brescia and Salo, on the 31st of July, the 1st, 2d, and 3d of August. Some of these actions were to the advantage of the Austrians, but the greater number to that of the French. The most obstinate and most bloody of all was that which took place on the 3d before Dezenzano. 4,000 Austrians being attacked by 10,000 French, defeated them, and made prisoner a General, and some hundreds of men. But the French corps having rallied and having been reinforced by fresh troops,

troops, re-attacked the Austrians. The latter made a long and courageous resistance; but being at last overpowered by numbers, by heat, and the fatigue occasioned by a continued march of four days and four nights, were almost all killed or made prisoners. The Austrian regiment of Klebeck lost on this occasion more than 1,000 men, who were deprived of all bodily strength either to defend themselves, or even to fly. After a series of actions for four days, the different corps of Mr. de Quosdanovich's columns were entirely defeated, dispersed, and obliged to make their escape as they could into the mountains of the Tyrol. Near one half was killed, or fell into the hands of the French; who purchased however these advantages by the loss of a great number of men, and of several Generals.

Delivered from one part of his enemies, and having no longer any thing to fear for his rear, immediately after the first successes obtained against Mr. de Quosdanovich, Buonaparte, leaving only a small body of troops completely to drive this General back into the Tyrol, hastened his return with about 28,000 men to go against Marshal Wurmser. The latter, after having passed the Mincio, was advancing with 18,000 men, to en-

deavour to effect a junction with Mr. de Quosdanovich. On the 3d of August Buonaparte met near Castiglione the advanced guard of Mr. de Wurmser, which had gained a slight advantage on that day, and had taken 2 or 300 men, and some pieces of cannon. He instantly attacked with his whole force this advanced guard, composed of 3,000 men, commanded by General Lyptay. This brave General opposed the firmest resistance, disputing the ground inch by inch, to give time to Mr. de Wurmser to come to his assistance. The latter however not arriving, and the French assailing General Lyptay on all sides, he found it impossible to hold out any longer, and came forward with his officers to surrender themselves to the French. But at this moment, the latter perceiving at a distance the Austrian cavalry coming up on a gallop, retreated precipitately to take a fresh position against the new troops who were coming to attack them, and fell back before General Lyptay, who was advancing towards them to lay down his arms. The main body of Mr. de Wurmser's army arrived in the interval; but before it could form in order of battle, Buonaparte attacked it with impetuosity. The Austrians did not give way; but fatigued by a long march
made

made during extreme heat, not being formed, and engaging in an unconnected manner, and without any determinate object, against an enemy which had the advantage of ground, and whose dispositions were before made, all that they could do was to maintain themselves in the disadvantageous position which they occupied. They had been even on the point of being driven from it, but having fortunately planted 12 pieces of cannon on an eminence which supported their left, their fire stopped the French, and prevented them from penetrating into the plain which separated the right and the left of the Austrians. Buonaparte wrote word that they lost on this day 20 pieces of cannon and 7,000 men, of whom 4,000 were made prisoners. I can affirm that their whole loss did not exceed 2,600, and that of the French was at least as great.

The two armies passed the night within musquet shot of each other. They were so overcome with fatigue, that they made no movement whatever. That which could have had the greatest physical strength to attack the other, would have been sure of destroying it. They passed the 4th without coming to blows. The French employed it in putting them-

themselves in order, and posting themselves advantageously. The Austrians on the other hand made no new disposition, and remained in the bad situation in which they had engaged the day before. They contented themselves with forming the plan of a general attack for the 7th. But Buonaparte did not wait for it, and hastened to take advantage of the superiority of his force, and the faults of his enemies. On the 5th in the morning he attacked with vigour the whole line of the Austrians, whose left he had turned, and whose rear was threatened by General Serrurier, who was coming from the Po with one division. The Austrians fought with their usual valour, but every advantage was so entirely on the side of the French, that victory could not escape them. If they had succeeded in piercing into the plain, all had been over with the Austrian army. All the officers who were about Mr. de Wurmser pressed him for a long time in vain to give orders for a retreat, which was become indispensable. This brave, but too old commander, could not bring himself to decide on it. The English Colonel Graham had at length the good fortune to determine him to it, and thus to save the Austrian army from total destruction. But the
French

French had already gained so many advantages, and the ground was so favourable for them, that the retreat could not be made without great disorder and loss. It cost them near 3,000 men in killed wounded and prisoners, 30 pieces of cannon, and a great number of ammunition waggons. The Austrians repassed the Mincio on the same day at Valeggio, and encamped near that town. On the next and the following days they continued their retreat, during which they had to sustain many actions, which cost them some hundreds of men more, as well as some pieces of cannon. They did not stop till they reached the entrance into the Tyrol, to which Mr. de Wurmser brought back not much more than half of his army. However, notwithstanding the disasters which this General experienced, he attained his principal object, which was to relieve Mantua. During the five or six days that he was in full communication with this city, he had thrown into it considerable supplies of provisions and ammunition, recruited the garrison, and again enabled this place to resist a long blockade.

Thus terminated this expedition, the preparations for, and first events of which, seemed to promise to the Austrians the recovery of the Milanese. The first
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dispositions made by Marshal Wurmser were excellent and perfectly executed. The reverses which followed may be ascribed principally to two causes: 1st. To the useless diversion which Mr. de Wurmser caused General Mezaros to make, whose corps never fired a shot. 2d. To his imprudence in advancing with too small a force beyond the Mincio, though he had every reason to believe that Mr. de Quosdanovich had been defeated. If the Marshal, satisfied with having in great part accomplished his object by the deliverance of Mantua, had, resting his left against this place, continued behind the Mincio, he might have defended the passage of this river, have received all the re-inforcements which he expected, collected the remains of Quosdanovich's corps, and in a short time have formed a powerful army, and superior in number to that of the French. Then he might have passed the Mincio in force, and have advanced beyond that river with advantage, and a probability of success.

Buonaparte, with no less expedition than judgment, took advantage of the faults and of the separation of the Generals Wurmser and Quosdanovich, gained two marches on the former, and fell unexpectedly

expectedly on the corps of the latter, which being too much extended, was easily defeated and dissipated. The French General executed on this occasion the same manœuvre, to which he had before owed, and has owed since, so much success. He was also particularly assisted by the preservation of the fort of Peschiera, which defends the point of the Lake of Garda, at the spot from whence the Mincio issues, a fort which the Austrians could not get possession of, and which a good deal embarrassed their movements. The accounts from Buonaparte made the loss of the Austrians amount, in this short but memorable expedition, to 70 pieces of cannon, a still greater number of ammunition waggons, 6,000 men killed or wounded, and 15,000 made prisoners. This statement was exaggerated, but not so much as many others that have been transmitted by this General. I have before me a particular account, furnished by each regiment to General Wurmser, and sent by him to the aulic council of war. The result is, that the Austrians lost in these eight days of victories and disasters, 17,000 men, of whom 391 were officers. The loss of the French however was not a great deal less; it certainly amounted to 10,000 men, of whom 4,000 were made prisoners.

Their army suffered also cruelly from the heat and the forced marches which it made, and was in little less disorder than that of their enemies.

Buonaparte was in the course of this expedition twice in danger of being taken. The officer who commanded the Austrian flotilla on the Lake of Garda, having on the 31st of July defeated that of the French, disembarked his troops in the Peninsula of Cermione, and placed them in ambuscade on the road from Brescia to Peschiera. His soldiers had orders not to fire, and to stop none but such as might seem to be of consequence. In the evening the Generals Buonaparte and Berthier with their staff returning from Brescia, passed along that road, preceded by three Hussars. The Croats who were in ambuscade, hearing some cavalry arrive at a quick rate, sprung on the high road and fired on the three Hussars. Two of them they killed, but the third having been missed, he turned his horse and galloped off crying out, *General, save yourself*: and the whole party turned about, fled with precipitation, and had the good fortune to escape all the shots that were fired at them. They returned to Brescia and took another road, which obliged them to make a tour of several leagues:

leagues. On another occasion Buonaparte was within two minutes of being taken by the Austrian Hussars, at Goito. I don't think it necessary to enter into any detail to prove the falseness of the marvellous account sent at this time by the French General to the Directory. He wrote word, that being at Lonado with 1,200 men, at the moment when 4,000 Austrians were surrounding this town, he sent them an order to lay down their arms, which they instantly obeyed. The improbability of this event makes it unnecessary to enter into any discussion about it. It was never heard of in the Austrian army.

The remainder of the month of August passed away without any event of importance. It was spent by the respective armies in recovering from their fatigues and their losses. Marshal Wurmser was entirely occupied in recruiting the great diminution sustained by his army, which by the end of August amounted to nearly 50,000 men. Buonaparte also received new reinforcements from the army of Kellerman. He re-constructed the works necessary for the blockade of Mantua,

and employed himself in providing the means to secure the accomplishment of new designs.

Emboldened by the continual triumphs of their armies, and determined by the necessity of maintaining them at the expence of Europe, the Chiefs of the French Republic conceived at once the project and the hope to unite on the banks of the Danube the three armies of Moreau, Jourdan, and Buonaparte, to invade the dominions of the House of Austria, to annihilate its supremacy over Germany, and to dispose of the destiny and riches of that vast country. To realize this project as rash as it was gigantic, it was necessary that Buonaparte should destroy the remainder of Wurmser's army, should force the passes of the Tyrol, and march into Bavaria to form a junction with Moreau. More confident, more able, and above all more fortunate than any of the Republican Generals, he hastened to concur in the execution of this plan.

[*Note 13.*]

On the 4th of September he attacked the whole line of the Austrians, and was fortunate enough to force it, after a resistance which was pretty vigorous at some points, but weak at others.

others. He wrote word that he had taken on this occasion, 25 pieces of cannon, 50 ammunition waggons, 7 pair of colours, and 6,500 men. He made himself master of the city of Trent, and of a great part of the Dutchy of that name.

At the same time that Buonaparte was intent on penetrating into Germany, Marshal Wurmser being made acquainted with his design, had formed that of disconcerting it by a diversion and a new attempt for the delivery of Mantua. He had calculated that by advancing with a part of his army along the Brenta, and turning the right flank of the French, the latter would not dare to advance into Tyrol from the fear of seeing themselves separated from the troops, who were besieging Mantua. Mr. de Wurmser had flattered himself that by this manœuvre he should perhaps accomplish the raising the blockade of that place, and that at least he should retain Buonaparte in Italy.

It happened that these two Generals commenced their operations on the same day, and the departure of Mr. de Wurmser facilitated greatly the gaining the battle of Roveredo by

Buo.

Buonaparte. The latter learnt with astonishment the march of the Field Marshal; and as that General had imagined, Buonaparte in spite of his last advantages, was obliged to suspend his march in Tyrol to follow Mr. de Wurmser. He came up with his rear guard on the 7th of September at Primolano on the Brenta, defeated it, and took (as he wrote word) 10 pieces of cannon, and 4,000 men. He continued his pursuit the next day, and arrived at Bassano the moment when Marshal Wurmser quitted it. The latter pursued his march with rapidity, evaded three divisions of the enemy who attempted to surround him; defeated one of them at Cerea on the 11th, took 800 prisoners, and arrived at length under the walls of Mantua with about 10,000 men. The French attacked him on the 13th; but he again defeated them, killed a great number of men, and took 1,500 prisoners, with 10 pieces of cannon.

The junction of Mr. de Wurmser with the garrison of Mantua augmented its means of resistance in case of a siege, but diminished in the same proportion those which it could oppose to a blockade, since the number of mouths to feed was considerably increased. Accordingly, Mr. de Wurmser thought
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less of attacking the enemy than of procuring the greatest possible quantity of provisions and forage. With this view he made during the month of October several excursions in the environs of Mantua. This occasioned several engagements with various success, of which the only effect was to straiten the Austrians more or less in their position without the works of the place; they were of no importance in any other light.

The unexpected operation executed by Mr. de Wurmser, and the disasters which the French at the same time experienced in Germany, obliged Buonaparte to renounce the design of penetrating thither. He then led back the greater part of his army round Mantua, after leaving two corps, one in the Trentino, and the other in Frioul, to observe, and keep in check the Austrians in these two countries.

The month of October furnished no great military events, but it presented political occurrences of great consequence to the state of Italy, and to the further progress of the war in that country. Of two armistices concluded in the month of June preceding between the French Republic on one side, and the Pope and the King of Naples on the other,
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the former was broken, and the second was changed into a treaty of peace. However it made no alteration in the relative situation of the Republic and the King of Naples, and was properly speaking only a continuation of the armistice. The King of Naples had been induced to conclude it by the solicitation of the Court of Spain, and by the fear that if the English left the Mediterranean, the city of Naples would be exposed to the insults of the French fleet. The treaty of peace secured him from this; and this was the only advantage which the King of the two Sicilies reaped from that treaty. To the French it was more profitable. They detached from the coalition the most powerful Prince in Italy next to the Emperor, and had no longer reason to apprehend that the King of Naples, who had for three months been organizing a numerous army, would send a large body of troops across the Pope's dominions to make a powerful diversion in favour of the Austrians, in the Duchies of Ferrara and Modena. [Note 14.]

The Pope had taken advantage of the armistice which he had concluded with the French to commence negotiations for peace. To effect this he made many advances to the French Government; but the latter was little disposed to make peace with
a Prince

a prince, from whom it had nothing to fear, and of whom it had resolved to make a prey. Unwilling however to incur the odium of peremptorily refusing the propositions for peace made by the Pope, the Directory chose rather to elude them, and caused proposals for peace to be presented to him, at once so burdensome and so humiliating, that notwithstanding the invasion of his dominions, the dangers he incurred, and the weakness of his means of defence, he could not resolve to accept them. One is at a loss which most to wonder at, the despotism, the ignorance, or the folly, which dictated the thirty-three articles proposed by the French to a prince, who had never declared war against them; articles on which he was left no option but that of absolute assent or refusal. Never did any conqueror reduce his enemies to such extremities. It appears however that his Holiness, was only determined to a refusal, by those articles which concerned his ecclesiastical jurisdiction; the acceptance of which would have destroyed the doctrine of his infallibility, and the basis of his Spiritual Empire.

The French about the same time began to realize their project, which had been long known, of forming republics in Italy.

They had delayed the execution of this plan, merely to gain sufficient time to reap the fruits of their victories. They had begun by levying exorbitant contributions in the conquered countries, and by completing the supply of necessaries requisite for the maintenance of their army. When they had exhausted all the countries occupied by their troops, and had drawn from them, partly by contributions, partly by the sale of armistices, every thing which they were capable of furnishing, they proceeded to mature those seeds of insurrection and democracy which they had sown in Italy. They excited the people to abjure the laws of their country, and to adopt the revolutionary forms of Government. They took care at first not to call to independance the inhabitants of Lombardy, over whom they still wished to preserve the most absolute authority. They began by causing a revolt amongst the subjects of the Duke of Modena, whom they did not find sufficiently dependant on themselves, notwithstanding the rigour of the armistice which they had granted him. The inhabitants of the town of Reggio were the first to set an example of insurrection; this was quickly imitated by several towns throughout the Dutchy of Modena. The troops of the Duke were driven out, his agents

were

were deprived of their offices, and his government was replaced by a democratic administration. Its chiefs hastened to solicit the support of the protectors of the liberties of the people, which was immediately granted them ; and notwithstanding the neutrality agreed upon with the Duke, that Prince was declared in a short time after to have lost the confidence of the French Republic.

The example set by the inhabitants of the Duchy of Modena, and the certainty of being protected by the French, encouraged the towns of Bologna and Ferrara to overturn their governments, and to put themselves in a state of revolution. No time was lost by the French in rendering the revolt general, and in drawing from it all the advantages which they had promised themselves. They convinced the insurgents of the necessity of taking up arms if they wished to preserve their liberty, and pointed out to them how much it was their interest to defend those who had ensured it to them. . Thus they armed several thousands of the inhabitants of the revolted countries, trained them to the military profession, and joined them to their troops. The aim of the French was partly to compensate by this reinforcement, for the excessive diminution which their

army had sustained in battle and through sickness; and to acquire an augmentation of forces to resist the new attack prepared by the Austrians. The French calculated that the fear of again falling into the power of their sovereign, would urge these auxiliaries to make the greatest efforts; who though not yet inured to war, had the great advantage of being proof against the climate. The example of the French National Guards, who were become good troops in a short time, led them to suppose, that the habits of a camp, and a few engagements would have the same effect upon those of Italy, and would render them capable of defending in future their own independence.

CHAP.

C H A P. IV.

The Austrians assemble a fourth army in the Frioul and Tyrol, under the orders of Lieutenant Generals Alvinzy and Davidovich---Position and strength of the French army---March of Mr. d'Alvinzy---Battle of Fonteniva---Success of Mr. Davidovich on the Upper Adige---Battle of Arcole, and retreat of Mr. d'Alvinzy---New successes of Mr. Davidovich---He is compelled to retire to Alla---Causes of the misfortunes of the Austrians---Faults committed by Generals Davidovich and Alvinzy---Able conduct of Buonaparte.

WHILST the French were thus spreading confusion throughout the northern parts of Italy, and were raising up new enemies against the Austrians, the latter were collecting the means of making a third attempt to rescue Mantua, and to re-conquer the Milanese. All the regiments which had suffered in the months of August and September were reinforced; and 25,000 fresh troops were sent into the
Frioul

Frioul and the Tyrol. These different corps found themselves capable of acting by the end of October, and began to be in motion on the 31st of the same month, under the orders of Lieutenant General Alvinzy. This General set out from Frioul with 30,000 men, traversed the Trevisano, and directed his course towards the town of Bassano, situated upon the river Brenta; at the same time that another corps of about 20,000 men, commanded by Lieutenant General Davidovich, left the environs of Botzen, marched along the Adige, and bore upon the town of Trent. The French army was then distributed in the following manner: 15,000 men occupied the banks of the Brenta, 10,000 defended the approach to the town of Trent; 25,000 formed or covered the blockade of Mantua, where Marshal Wurmser was shut up with more than 20,000 men, and 10,000 others, either French or Italians, were distributed as garrisons in the towns of Milan, Bologna, Ferrara, and Leghorn.

In recapitulating the numbers of the respective forces, it appears that the Austrians had nearly 70,000 men, and that the French had 60,000, of which only 50,000 could be brought into action.

[*Note 15.*]

On

On the 3d of November, General Alvinzy arrived on the banks of the Brenta, forced the passage of that river, and posted himself with 12,000 men at Bassano. He placed a like number at Fonteniva, under the orders of Lieutenant General Provera, and the rest of his army was employed either in covering his left, or in forming his communication with Mr. Davidovich.

In the night of the 5th, Buonaparte left Vicenza, where he had re-united the divisions of his army which occupied Ferrara, Legnago, Verona, and Montebello, and attacked the corps of General Provera on the morning of the 6th. Both sides fought with the greatest animosity, which rendered the combat for a long time doubtful, and at the same time excessive bloody. 4,000 Austrians and an equal number of French, were either killed or wounded. One of the French Generals, called la Nuffe, was wounded and made prisoner. The Republicans succeeded at length in driving back the Austrians beyond the Brenta, and in breaking down the bridge at Fonteniva.

Generals Alvinzy and Provera, had drawn nearer to one another, and were preparing to
renew

renew the engagement on the 7th, when they perceived that the French had abandoned the field of battle. Bounaparte had been induced to it, on hearing of the reverses which his troops had sustained in the Trentino. They had been defeated on the 2d and 3d by General Davidovich, who had taken 1,000 prisoners, and had made himself master of the town of Trent. That General attacked the French again on the 6th and 7th, routed them after a very smart action, killed and wounded 2,000, took 1,000 more prisoners, and pursued the rest as far as Rivoli and la Corona. [*Note 16.*]

General Alvinzy wishing to take advantage of the retreat of the French, and of their defeat in the Trentino, set out on the 7th from the banks of the Brenta, continued his march the 8th, and took possession of the town of Vicenza, which the French had abandoned. On the 9th and 10th he still gained ground, and dislodged the enemy from Montebello, who retired between that town and Verona. On the 11th, an action of no consequence took place with the advanced guards. On the 12th, the two armies found themselves in presence with each other, and

and came to action. The French met with some success at first, but they did not maintain it, and the action terminated in favour of the Austrians, who compelled their enemies to fall back into the town of Verona. The Republican General Launay was killed in this affair, and two others were wounded. On the 13th, General Alvinzy made some movements, in order to draw nearer to Mr. Davidovich, and to enable himself to combine his operations with those of that General. In the night of the 13th Buonaparte filed a large column of troops along the Adige, constructed a bridge of boats over that river at Ronco, and marched towards Villanova. His project was to surprize the rear of the Austrian army, and to carry off their baggage and their train of artillery; but he could not succeed in this attempt, having been stopped during his march by a corps of the enemy entrenched in the village of Arcole, which is surrounded with morasses and canals. This advantageous position was well defended by the Austrian troops who occupied it, and maintained by them the whole day, against the attacks of almost the whole French army. In vain did

their Generals put themselves at the head of their columns, animate them by their words, and draw them on by their example: in vain did General Buonaparte harangue his soldiers, remind them of their victory at Lodi, call for the same exertions, and promise them the same success: In vain did he lead them several times himself to the attack of the bridge of Arcole: overpowered by a dreadful fire of grape and musquet shot, they were compelled to give up all hopes of carrying the bridge and village of Arcole by storm. They were great sufferers in these imprudent attacks in which five of their Generals were killed or wounded. Whilst Buonaparte obstinately persisted in re-acting the affair of the bridge of Lodi, and was sacrificing without advantage to himself the blood of his Generals and soldiers; a division of his army which he had detached, had crossed the Adige much lower down. After having made an extensive circuit, in order to turn the village of Arcole, it attacked that place on a weak point, and made itself master of the village in the night, where it took 5 pieces of cannon, and 400 men. General Massena at the same time obtained a slight advantage over a small body of Austrians.

General

General Alvinzy having advanced with all his forces upon the points menaced, promoted the views of Buonaparte, who wished to draw him towards the lower Adige, in order to prevent his junction with General Davidovich. The approach of the Austrians obliged the French to evacuate the village of Arcole in the night of the 14th. In the morning of the 15th, an action was commenced which lasted the whole day, without having any decisive or even important result. It was however of some advantage to the French. On the following day the 16th, the Austrians attacked the whole line of the French army. They at first compelled the center and right wing of the enemy to give ground, but the French having rallied, and the Austrians being unexpectedly taken *in flank* by a corps of troops concealed in a wood, and in *the rear* by another column which had turned their left, they were put to the rout, driven from the village of Arcole, and compelled to retire in disorder to Bonifacio.

In the account given by Buonaparte to the Directory of these three engagements, he stated that he had made between 4 and 5,000 prisoners, killed and wounded 8,000 men, and taken 18 pieces of cannon. He concluded his letter with

assurances that he should be master of Mantua within fifteen days. No doubt this estimate of the loss of the Austrians was exaggerated; their Generals however acknowledged it to have been very considerable on these three days, and above all on the last. But at the same time they asserted, that that of the French was not inferior, which it is easy to believe when we read even in the very letter of General Buonaparte, that it was in reality *a combat a mort*: that 15 of his Generals were killed or wounded, and that there were none who had not their cloaths pierced with bullets. All accounts agree in representing these three actions as the most bloody in the whole campaign.

The Day after the battle of Arcole, the Austrians retired towards Vicenza. They were feebly pursued by the French, who did not follow their victory, either because it had too much weakened them, or on account of the reverses which they had sustained on their left. With a view partly to deprive them of the fruits of the victory of Arcole, General Davidovich attacked on the 17th the French Troops left on the upper Adige, under the orders of General Vaubois. He defeated them completely, drove them from the entrenched heights of Rivoli, and seized the important post of la Chiusa.

Chiufa. He pursued the Republicans as far as the heights of Campara, and took from them 11 pieces of cannon, and 2,000 men, amongst whom were the Generals La Valette, and Fiorella. Mr. Davidovich on the day following, (the 18th) again attacked the French with equal success, and although they had been re-inforced during the night, repulsed them as far as Peschiera, and advanced to Castelnovo.

These two advantages obtained one after the other by Mr. Davidovich, were so much the more important as they placed that General on the rear of Buonaparte's army, as well as on that of the troops who blockaded Mantua. Mr. Davidovich was now within a few leagues of that place, and to enable him to arrive there he had neither any river to pass, nor any considerable defile to force. The Austrians had not yet been so near raising the blockade of Mantua, and they had reason to hope that they should accomplish it.

Alarmed at the successes of General Davidovich, and foreseeing the whole extent of those consequences which might arise from them, Buonaparte had no hesitation in renouncing the advantages which might have been derived from the victory of Arcole.

Arcole. He marched immediately on his left with two divisions of his army, joined them to that of General Vaubois, and attacked on the 21st General Davidovich on the heights of Campara. The latter finding himself very inferior in number, did not attempt to make any great resistance, and retreated towards Rivoli, and from thence towards Dolce, Peri, and Alla. A corps of 4,000 men, commanded by General Augereau, had marched from Verona, with the intention of advancing directly against Borghetto and Alla, with a view of cutting off the retreat of Davidovich's corps; but it was stopped the whole of the 21st, and the night following, by a small corps of 800 men, commanded by Colonel Lufignan, who kept it in check till Mr. Davidovich had arrived at Alla with the whole artillery and baggage. Buonaparte nevertheless wrote word that he had taken in this affair 1,500 men, with two trains of pontoons, besides baggage. The author is enabled from the most authentic information to assert that he did not take near so great a number of men, and to affirm with equal confidence that, which Buonaparte took care not to publish, which is, that between the 4th and the 21st

21st of November the corps of Mr. Davidovich alone took 22 pieces of cannon, and more than 4,000 men, and that he did not lose in the same space of time more than 1,800 men, and 3 pieces of cannon.

In looking for the causes which produced the failure of this expedition, we perceive that we must again attribute the disasters of the Austrians to the division of their forces, and to the too great extent of their front of attack. It is probable that if after the battle of Bassano Mr. d'Alvinzy had drawn nearer to Mr. Davidovich, these two Generals united, and superior in numbers to the French, would have been enabled to repulse them beyond the Adige, and afterwards beyond the Mincio. This fault is after all not the only cause of the issue of this enterprise. The best informed officers of the Austrian army in Italy attribute it principally to two things. First, to the inaction in which General Davidovich remained from the 9th to the 17th of November; an inaction, which cannot be justified, and which permitted Buonaparte to direct almost his whole force against Mr. d'Alvinzy. Secondly, to the refusal of the latter General to form a junction by a forced march in the night with Mr. Davidovich
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who was already on the other side of the Adige near Rivoli; a junction, which would without doubt have overthrown the few obstacles which existed from thence to Mantua. The conduct of Generals Davidovich and Alvinzy on this occasion, which seems to have arisen rather from want of inclination than of capacity, was so much the more unskilful, if it was not culpable, as their first successes had removed the principal difficulties; and as being superior in force, they no longer wanted any thing but some degree of mutual understanding, and some activity to deliver Mantua, an object for which the Emperor had entrusted them with near 50,000, and employed all his military resources.

Buonaparte during the fifteen days which this expedition lasted; acted as he had invariably done from the commencement of the campaign. He exerted himself constantly to prevent the two corps of his enemy from forming a junction; advanced like lightning sometimes against the one, sometimes against the other, always attacking their weakest point, and pushing his successes as far, and with as much vivacity as possible. In this manner although he had upon the whole fewer men than the Austrian Generals, he found himself when opposed
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to either of them separately, equal and sometimes even superior in number. The frequency of his attacks, and the bravery of his troops secured the success of this manœuvre, and gave him the victory. We must likewise add that the Austrians were, as it appears, as ill informed of Buonaparte's movements, as he was well informed of their's; or that if they were not ignorant of them, they neglected to take advantage of those moments, in which for the purpose of advancing in mass at one single point, he left others unprotected.

C H A P. V.

Position of Peri re-taken and again lost by Mr. Davidovich---Sorties of the garrison of Mantua---Inaction and position of the respective armies---Mission of General Clarke---Exhausted state of Lombardy---New burdens imposed by the French---Discontent excited in consequence---Cispadan Convention---Preparations for war made by the Pope---New sorties of Marshal Wurmser---The French take possession of the Venetian citadel of Bergamo.

GENERAL Alvinzy having made some movements to draw nearer to the city of Verona, the French who had reason to apprehend being taken in flank by that General, did not dare to run the risque of maintaining themselves in the position of Peri. They quitted it on the 22d of November, and on the same day Mr. Davidovich took possession of it a second time with his advanced guard; he did not however keep it long, and was forced to abandon it three days afterwards, Mr. d'Alvinzy not having
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continued to advance, and the French having taken measures to secure themselves from that General.

Whilst Generals Davidovich and Alvinzy yielded to the talents and fortune of Buonaparte, Marshal Wurmser made several sorties from Mantua to make a diversion in their favour, as well as to procure subsistence and forage. He made an attack with almost his whole force on the 19th and 23d of Nov. on *St. Antoine*, and *la Favorite*, drove in the enemy's picquets and had the good fortune to introduce into Mantua a considerable quantity of provisions. These enabled him to prolong still further his defence.

The successes of Mr. Davidovich between the 4th and 17th of November, having in some degree made amends for the disasters which Mr. d'Alvinzy had experienced during the same interval; and their army being still in spite of its losses more numerous than that of the French, it was supposed that these Generals would quickly recommence offensive operations. But whether they proposed waiting for new reinforcements, whether they knew that the last sorties of Marshal Wurmser secured for a long time still to come the subsistence of Mantua, or whether they were restrained by superior orders, they under-

took nothing during the month of November. The bad season came on, and obliged them to pass likewise the month of December in complete inaction, and in the same position which they occupied at the end of the preceding month. Their armies formed a semi-circle from the Lake of Garda as far as Monceleze beyond the Piavego, occupying Arco, Alla, Bassano, Vicenza, and Padua. The head quarters of Mr. d'Alvinzy were at Bassano, and those of Mr. Davidovich at Alla.

The French army was as completely inactive, and remained so for as long a time as the Austrians and for the same reasons. The line which it occupied extended from the Lake of Garda to Legnago, passing through Rivoli, Verona and Montebello. The space comprised between the Austrian and French armies was occupied by their advanced guards.

General Alvinzy after having fixed the position, and the cantonments of his army, went at the end of November to Alla to concert measures there with Mr. Davidovich, and to make arrangements relative to the future subsistence and disposition of his army. At the same time Buonaparte set off for Milan, with a view of meeting in that place

General

General Clarke, whom the executive directory were sending to Vienna with proposals of a separate peace. The stay which the latter made at Milan, and the reciprocal inactivity in which the two armies remained during this interval occasioned it to be pretty generally believed that General Clarke had made known the object of his mission to Generals Buonaparte and Alvinzy, and had engaged them to suspend provisionally all hostilities till the issue of his negotiation. The tranquillity which the armies enjoyed was more owing in reality to the rigor of the season, the impossibility of acting in the mountains of Tyrol, and to the expectation of re-inforcements on both sides. With respect to General Clarke's mission, it proved in the sequel, as short as it was ineffectual, the Court of Vienna having rejected the proposals, and even refused to admit the presence of that Irish negotiator.

Buonaparte was detained at Milan till the middle of December, as well by a sore in his leg, as by affairs relative to the subsistence of his army. It was in want of many articles of cloathing and equipment. The administrators of provisions likewise knew not in what manner to supply
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the consumption of the army. The contributions were found to be dissipated, and Lombardy was exhausted by two successive requisitions. The particular extortions of the Generals and the commissioners, had completed the ruin of that fertile, and not long before flourishing country. The commissioners of the executive power Salicetti, and his nephew Buonaparte, had acquired immense riches, and had set the example of pillage. They had been but too well imitated by the chief of the staff Berthier, and by the other Generals, who had shared amongst them the spoils of Italy.

The plunder of that country was the only point on which Buonaparte was in agreement with the Generals under his orders. These last incited and headed by Berthier, [*Note 18.*] whose talents and advice had not a little contributed to the triumphs of Buonaparte, displayed during this interval of military stagnation the greatest discontent against that General. Their complaints were principally directed against the imperious character of that young man, and against the indifference with which he had lavished during the whole campaign, the blood of his Generals and his soldiers. The rumour of these dissensions having reached France, the directory

rectory dreading the consequences which might result from them, took measures for surpressing them. It obliged Buonaparte and Berthier to write two letters, in which they disavowed all motives of division, which were said to exist between them. The injunction of the directors, the supreme authority of Buonaparte, and the military events which followed, kept within bounds the spirit of jealousy and hatred, which animated the chiefs of the French army.

Its wants were so pressing, and the French Government was so little in a condition to supply them of itself, that however exhausted Lombardy might be, Buonaparte was obliged to demand from it new sacrifices. He convoked at Milan in the beginning of December, a general assembly of the nobility and clergy of the Dutchy, and imposed on the inhabitants a new contribution of 5,000,000 of French livres, and a levy of 25,000 men. These two demands which the presence of their conquerors prevented the Milanese from refusing pre-emptorily, excited an universal discontent, and there was every prospect that the execution of them would be attended with the greatest difficulty. Buonaparte did not find more good-will in the
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inhabitants of Ferrara, Bologna, and Lodi, on which he likewise laid proportionate contributions, and the inhabitants of which it was his intention to subject to military service. The city of Lodi distinguished itself a second time by a vigorous opposition to the conquerors of the Milanese. It was accordingly placed in a state of siege, that is to say, it was delivered up to the discretion of the Republican Generals.

At the same time that Buonaparte took these rigorous measures to maintain and augment his army, he employed himself also in extending and consolidating the revolt of the inhabitants of the Dutchies of Modena, Ferrara, and Bologna. He assembled in the town of Modena a kind of federal Convention, composed of nearly one hundred deputies, charged with the office of constituting the Cispadan Republic, and above all, of arming the greatest number of men they could for the purpose of re-inforcing the French army. All the inhabitants of the cities and counties of Modena, Reggio, Ferrara, and Bologna, from eighteen to fifty years of age, received orders to arm, under pain, in case of disobedience, of being considered as enemies of their country and the public

good. This confederation adopted the forms as well as the principles of the National Convention of France. It formed also *committees of public safety, and of general security*, and employed all the revolutionary means of its model.

The Pope in refusing to accede to the conditions which the French Government wished to impose on him, had not been blind to the dangers to which he exposed himself. He was not ignorant that the French had resolved if not to annihilate, at least greatly to circumscribe his spiritual and temporal power, and that they would make the utmost efforts to penetrate farther into his dominions, to plunder and to revolutionize them. Being conscious that he had done every thing to allay the storm which depended upon him, either in the character of a Prince, or of Head of the Church, he now thought only of employing all the means in his power to defend his existence in these two respects. Being no longer able to reckon, at least ostensibly, on the succour of the King of Naples, and having reason to doubt the sincerity of the intercession of the Court of Spain in his favour, he connected himself more closely with that of Vienna, and united his destiny with that

of the latter power. He augmented his army, and placed it on a war establishment, [*Note 19.*] and sought for extraordinary means of defence in the affection of his subjects towards him, and in their hatred to the French. He exhorted all the inhabitants of the territories of the church to arm; and to induce them to do so, neglected neither promises, nor privileges, nor rewards.

He was well seconded by the zeal and patriotism of the higher ranks, and the opulent people. They readily employed their money and their influence in raising several corps of volunteers. The Princes of Colonna and Borghese each raised a regiment at his own expence. The states of the church assumed all at once a military aspect, and their head after having shewn himself worthy of his spiritual elevation by his wisdom and his attachment to principles, did himself no less credit as a Sovereign by his courage and his resolution. On the 20th of December he ordered a body of troops to march to Faenza, [*Note 20.*] and took measures that it should amount in a short time to 20,000 men. He gave the command of it to the Austrian General Colli, (formerly the commander of the King of Sardinia's troops) who he had requested of the
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Emperor might be allowed to be placed at the head of his army.

The inaction of the Generals Alvinzy and Davidovich, not allowing Marshal Wurmser to hope for a speedy deliverance, he was again obliged to rely on himself for providing means for the subsistence of the garrison, and inhabitants of Mantua. He made several forties during the month of December. Those of the 11th. and the 14th. were the most successful. His troops got possession of some boats loaded with provision and ammunition destined for the French army. This resource, joined to some thousands of horses which were in the place, delayed for some time the necessity of a surrender.

Buonaparte quitted Milan on the 16th. and proceeded to Verona. His army had been considerably reinforced, partly by old troops from France, and partly by some thousands raised in the insurgent countries. He had besides received from Piedmont a train of battering artillery; and it was supposed, that weary of waiting till famine might subdue Mantua, he had determined again to besiege it in form: but the

certainty of his having shortly to sustain another attack on the part of the Austrians, prevented him from thinking of this enterprize, and he felt that the real mode of reducing Mantua, was to be again victorious. He neglected no means to become so; he visited the principal posts of his army, and made dispositions to be prepared for every event. He gave at the same time a fresh proof of the little respect he paid to neutral powers, by ordering a body of troops suddenly to enter the venetian Citadel of Bergamo, which commands the city of that name. To colour this violation of neutrality, he wrote to the Directory that he had been determined to this measure by the unfriendly disposition of the inhabitants of this province towards the French; and to prevent the enemy's parties from disturbing the communication between the Adige and the Adda. Many of his soldiers, he said, had been assassinated by the people of the country, who favoured as much as possible the escape of the Austrian prisoners.

On the 19th of December General Laudohn,
(nephew of the famous Field-Marshal of that
name)

name) who commanded the right wing of Davidovich's army, reconnoitred beyond the Lake of Garda, and pushed forward as far as the town of Brescia. He met only some of the enemy's vedettes, whom he took. At the same time General Alvinzy detached a body of troops from the left wing of his army, which passed the Adige at Boara, and directed its march towards the duchies of Ferrara and Bologna, where the French were reinforcing themselves.

The object of the Austrians in making these movements on their right and left, was to draw the attention of the enemy to them, and to induce them to weaken their center. The march of General Laudohn towards Brescia and Bergamo was calculated to persuade the French that the Austrians intended to carry the war to the Country between the Adige and the Oglio, as Prince Eugene had done in 1705. The object of sending a body of troops into the countries of Rovigo and Bologna, was to cover the territories of the Pope, to facilitate the junction of his troops with the Austrians, and to oblige the French to place a large part of their force at this point.

point. These preparatory dispositions for the attack meditated by the Austrian Generals, had in part the effect which they promised themselves from them. Buonaparte reinforced his posts, as well in the Brescian as on the lower Adige. He was not however deceived as to the real intentions of the Austrians. It was easy for him to judge that they had no other object in view but the deliverance of Mantua: he therefore took his measures, so as to be enabled, when necessary, to re-unite against them the greater part of his forces.

C H A P. IV.

The Austrians form a fifth army---Distress of Mantua---Sortie of Marshal Wurmser; and escape of the English Colonel Graham---March and success of General Provera---Battle of St. Michael before Verona---March and success of Mr. d'Alvinzy---Complete defeat of the Austrians at Rivoli and Corona---Buonaparte returns with reinforcements to the blockade of Mantua---Mr. de Provera arrives before this place--His rear guard is taken prisoners--His failure before the suburb of St. George---He is taken with his whole corps---Observations on the causes of these events---Loss of the Austrians and the French.

THE Austrians had employed the end of November and the month of December in forming a fifth army. All the regiments had been completed; and General Frolich had joined Mr. Davidovich with about 6,000 men. By the end of December the Austrian army was as strong as it had been before

before the expedition in the month of November; and no exertions or expence had been spared to enable it to renew the campaign with advantage. The Generals were informed of the distress the city of Mantua experienced. They knew that the garrison was altogether in want of many necessary articles of subsistence, and was diminished by sickness and by service. In order to give himself time to wait the effect of the expedition which was preparing, Marshal Wurmser had made on the 29th of December a very vigorous sortie. He had killed and taken prisoners a great many men: but this had been more brilliant than useful, the environs of Mantua being so exhausted of provisions, that the garrison could bring but a small quantity into the place. Its critical situation did not allow General Alvinzy to remain any longer in a state of inaction; and he kept himself in readiness to renew the campaign as soon as the season would admit of it. The necessity of hastening appeared more pressing on the arrival of the English Colonel Graham at headquarters. This officer, who exercised with the army of Italy the same functions which Colonel Crauford did with that of Germany, had followed Marshal Wurmser in all his expeditions, and had
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shut himself up with him in Mantua. The great importance of the Austrian Generals being exactly informed of the state of the garrison determined Colonel Graham to take on himself the charge of carrying this information to them. He acquitted himself with address and good fortune in this hazardous commission. He left the city in disguise on the night of the 29th of December, and after having escaped the vigilance of the French patrols, arrived on the 4th of January at the head-quarters of the Austrians. Mr. d'Alvinzy received from him precise information of all that related to the city of Mantua and its garrison. He learned that whatever might be the œconomy in the consumption of the subsistence, it would be entirely exhausted by the end of January. These accounts did not admit of his losing a moment; and it was resolved to execute instantly the projected operations.

The Austrian army at that time amounted to near 50,000 men. About 10,000 were before Padua under the orders of Lieutenant General Provera; nearly 10,000 were at Bassano, about half way between Mr. de Provera and Mr. d'Alvinzy, who was in the Tyrol with more than 25,000 men. It was resolved that General Provera should begin

the attack on the Lower Adige, while the center corps should advance in force against Verona, and that the grand army should put itself in motion in the Tyrol. The French army, notwithstanding all the reinforcements which it had received, did not exceed 40,000 men. Every probability was in favour of the Austrians.

On the 7th of January the corps of Mr. de Provera left the neighbourhood of Padua, directing itself against Porto Legnago. On the 8th he met the French, attacked and defeated them, though they made a vigorous resistance. He took from them the posts of Casella, Meclara and San Salvaro; and forced them to retire to Bevilaqua. The enemy, having been reinforced, endeavoured to recover the ground which they had lost, but failed, and were again driven back to Bevilaqua; nor could they sustain themselves there, but fell back on Porto Legnago, where General Augereau was, who defended the Lower Adige with 10,000 men. Of the two French Generals Stever and Comus, the first was killed, and the second wounded and made prisoner on this occasion, in which the Vienna Volunteers, who had lately joined the army, particularly distinguished themselves. On the day following

following, the 9th, the Austrians pursued their advantages, again attacked the French, and with the same success as the day before. They forced them from the villages of St. Zenon, Menerba, and Bosto, and drove them as far as Bonavigo, and Porto Legnago, after having taken 300 prisoners and 3 pieces of cannon. These successes brought Mr. de Provera to the banks of the Adige, the passage of which he must necessarily force to be enabled to get to Mantua.

Buonaparte was at Bologna, when he was informed (on the evening of the 10th of January) of the march and success of Mr. de Provera. Not doubting but that all the rest of the Austrian army was at the same time in motion, he renounced for the moment the affairs which had called him to Bologna. [*Note 21.*] After having caused 2,000 men who were with him in that city to march immediately towards the Adige, he proceeded himself, first to the blockade of Mantua, and then to Verona. He reached this city in the morning of the 12th, at the moment when the division of General Massena, who commanded there, was engaged with a part of the Austrian column that had come from Bassano. This corps, whose destination was to alarm the enemy

on his center, and to keep in check there a part of his forces, had overthrown the advanced guard of Massena, and had driven it under Verona. That General then marched out of the town with all the troops that he had with him, and met the Austrians at the village of St. Michael. A very brisk action ensued, which was not decisively favourable to either party. The Austrians attained their double object, which was to occupy General Massena at this point, and then to favour the march of a part of the corps from Bassano, which was going to re-inforce Mr. de Alvinzy, in the valley of the Adige. The French claimed the honour of victory in this action, and said, that they had taken 600 men, and 3 pieces of cannon. They did not add that they had lost an equal number of men and 4 pieces of cannon. After this affair, the Austrians marched back towards the mountains, and the French resumed their position before Verona.

Whilst the Austrians were thus engaging the right and center of the French to draw their attention and their force to those points, Mr. de Alvinzy commanded the principal attack on the upper Adige. He marched on the 11th. to

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Montebaldo; and on the 12th made an attack on the head of the French line. The Austrians drove them from some entrenchments, but could not make themselves masters of the redoubts of Corona, which could not be attacked in front. They turned them on the 13th, and succeeded in driving the enemy out of them, taking near 1,000 prisoners. General Joubert, who commanded the French in these parts, fell back from Corona on Rivoli, which was by nature, as well as by the works which the French had raised, the strongest point of their position on the upper Adige.

Buonaparte was as yet ignorant what were the real projects of the Austrians, they had attacked at the same time the right, the center, and the left of his line; and had shewn on these three points forces nearly equal. Their movements had been till then well combined and executed. Buonaparte, uncertain against which point the Austrians would direct their greatest force, had not yet ventured to weaken any part of his line, and had remained in the center, at Verona, that he might be ready to march with reinforcements either to the right, or to the left, as circumstances

stances might require. On the 13th at night he learned at the same time that General Provera had forced the passage of the Adige, and that General Joubert had been driven from Corona. These two checks experienced at once by both wings were calculated to increase Buonaparte's embarrassments, and to double his uncertainty with respect to the direction of the disposable troops which he had with him; but the report of the spies, and the considerable force which the Austrians had filed off towards Corona, left him no doubt of their designs, and convinced him that it was on the Upper Adige that they intended to make their principal efforts.

In consequence he instantly ordered the division of General Massena to set out from Verona for Rivoli; sent directions to a corps which was at Desenzano to proceed to the same point; and after having given instructions for the measures to be taken on his center and his right, went post himself with his whole staff to Rivoli, where he arrived in the middle of the night. He immediately considered how he should recover the important post of St. Marco, which is the key of the valley of the Adige; a post of which the Austrians had a few hours before obtained possession.

General

General Alvinzy, who had concerted every thing to make a general attack on the day following, passed this same night in making preparatory dispositions for it. He had not supposed that Buonaparte could have had time to reach Rivoli with reinforcements; and believing that he should have to do only with the division of General Joubert, he had conceived the project of turning it, and the hope of cutting it off. The French occupied the semicircle of mountains which surround the village and the valley of Rivoli, at the foot of which runs the Adige. Mr. d'Alvinzy's plan was to turn this position, by placing a column behind it, which should cut off the road from Rivoli to Peschiera and Castelnuovo, and should at the same time prevent General Joubert from receiving reinforcements, and from effecting his retreat. This General was to be attacked at the same time vigorously in front; and Mr. d'Alvinzy flattered himself that he should thus inclose him between superior forces, and break down in one day the principal barrier between him and Mantua. According to this plan he had detached a corps of 4,000 infantry, which was to take a position on the 14th in the rear of General Joubert.

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As soon as the French attacked, at four in the morning, the advanced posts of the Austrians, and re-took that of St. Marco, Mr. de Alvinzy perceived that he had been prevented, and that contrary to his expectations the French had been re-inforced. All his dispositions however having been made, and in part executed, he was obliged to make up his mind to engage in the position in which he had placed his army, although it ceased to be so advantageous, since the enemy had received such reinforcements. The battle began warmly at about five o'clock in the morning. The Austrians vigorously attacked the left of the French, made it give way, and drove it from height to height. After having forced it entirely out of the line they proceeded against the center, which they likewise made fall back, which movement the right also followed. Buonaparte seeing himself on the point of being completely defeated, ordered a brigade of reserve to march to the center, the defence of which he intrusted to General Berthier, and went himself to the left, which was losing ground every minute. At this moment, so critical for the French, General Massena appeared with the division which was coming from Verona. Buonaparte instantly ordered

ordered it to his left, which being re-inforced and rallying, renewed the attack against the Austrians, and after an obstinate engagement, re-took a part of the posts which it had lost. Whilst matters were in this situation on the right of the Austrians, their center and left gained fresh advantages over the enemy, and after having carried several entrenchments, reached Rivoli, the principal position where the enemy had re-united almost all their forces and their Artillery. At the moment when they gained possession of the strongest posts of this position, the column which had been detached to turn it, appeared at a distance on the heights behind the French. This moment seemed likely to be decisive in favour of the Austrians, and would undoubtedly have been so, if, whilst that column took the enemy in the rear, the rest of the Austrian army had re-united and had made a vigorous attack in front; but the main army remained divided into three columns, which endeavoured separately to make themselves masters of all the heights, in order to surround the French. This enabled the latter to place themselves in force between these columns, and to take them in flank.

Till that time the battle was entirely in favour of the Austrians, and every thing seemed to promise them a complete triumph. However distressing Buonaparte's situation might be, he did not despair of victory. He judged that it was possible to turn the dispositions made by the Austrians against themselves, and that what seemed likely to effect his ruin, might on the contrary produce that of his enemy. He saw that if he could succeed in retaking Rivoli, the column which had turned him being thus insulated, would itself be cut off and lost. In consequence, sending a brigade to keep this column in check, he rallied, re-animated, and led his troops again to attack the corps which had taken Rivoli, and recovered that precious post. As the possession of it must decide the day, the Austrians returned to the charge, and made such vast efforts that they again took this position. Buonaparte, knowing that it could not be left in their hands without his being exposed to complete ruin, united his whole forces and made new dispositions. He sent General Berthier with all the cavalry to charge the enemy in the plain, and marched himself against the heights so long disputed. These two attacks, made with concert and fury, had the greatest

greatest success. General Joubert re-took Rivoli; and at the same moment General Massena, who had gained the right of the Austrians, taking them briskly in flank, threw them into disorder, and decided their defeat. They retreated in great confusion towards la Corona.

Buonaparte, victorious in front, was then enabled to dispatch a considerable force against the 4,000 men who had turned Rivoli. He caused them to be attacked by several columns, which almost encircled them, and left them no resource but to surrender themselves, or to cut their way through with sword in hand. This corps preferred the latter, and made the greatest efforts to pierce through the troops which surrounded them: but having neither cannon nor cavalry, they could not resist an enemy who had both these advantages as well as those of position and number. The greater part of these 4,000 men were either killed or made prisoners. [*Note 22.*]

Such was the issue of the battle of Rivoli, which ruined the measures taken by the Austrians for the purpose of penetrating into the Duchy of Mantua, and of delivering its capital. We cannot absolutely affirm that the plan of their Generals was ill-

combined, but in the execution of it they committed several faults, of which it was impossible to be guilty with impunity, when opposed to a General so able and so active as Buonaparte. It was no doubt to the rapidity with which he advanced, and with which he made Massena's division march from Verona to Rivoli, that he owed this victory. If he had deferred that movement for only one day, General Joubert would undoubtedly have been driven from his position, and perhaps cut off. Buonaparte decided the business by outstripping Mr. d'Alvinzy; and it was no doubt as much owing to the good intelligence of spies, as to his own ability.

However important might be the victory of Rivoli, it delivered Buonaparte from only a part of his enemies. Previous to his departure from Verona to Rivoli he had been informed of Mr. de Provera's success on the lower Adige; and whilst he was defeating Mr. d'Alvinzy, he had good reason to apprehend that the former General would overcome every obstacle, and succeed in breaking through the blockade of Mantua. This would have accomplished the principal object of the Austrians, and would have counterbalanced the effect of the battle of Rivoli. Buonaparte, desirous to
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neglect nothing which might hinder Mr. de Provera from accomplishing his object, without taking any repose, or allowing any to his troops, set out in the night of the 14th for the blockade of Mantua, accompanied by part of the troops who had fought at Rivoli. He left at that place General Joubert, with orders to attack the Austrians the next morning at la Corona. To insure the success of this enterprize, General Joubert sent, during the night, a column which marched round Montebaldo, and arrived at day break on the heights which commanded la Corona. It was posted there before the whole of the Austrian army was arrived; it then attacked them with advantage during its march, and took them in flank, whilst General Joubert advanced directly against them.

The Austrians, overpowered by fatigue, weakened by their losses, and discouraged by their disasters, opposed no very vigorous resistance. They were defeated, and lost a great number of men made prisoners. The rest continued their retreat, and proceeded to secure themselves in the defiles of Tyrol.

Buonaparte arrived on the 15th at night at Roverbella with the reinforcements which he brought
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from the Upper Adige. He there learned that Mr. de Provera had arrived before the lines of the blockade of Mantua. We have seen before, that that General had reached on the 9th the banks of the Adige, between Porto Legnago and Ronco. Not being strong enough to think of making himself master of those two posts, which would besides have diverted him from his object, he resolved to force as soon as possible the passage of the Adige at some point or other, and to march straight to Mantua, without attending to the enemies whom he might leave behind. He employed the 11th, 12th, and 13th in making his arrangements, and in attempting to deceive General Augereau, who was opposed to him. For this purpose he made part of his troops march towards Ronco and Legnago, and sent some pontoons to Nicisola to induce a belief that he intended to pass the Adige at that place. But whilst he was making these feints, he prepared to pass the river opposite Anguiary, the most favourable point for this operation. On the evening of the 13th he raised a battery of some pieces of cannon on the banks of the river, and under cover of their fire succeeded in spite of the French in constructing his bridge. His advanced guard composed of volunteers

lunteers drove them from Anguiary; and the Austrians passed the Adige in defiance of all the efforts which the enemy made to hinder them. This being accomplished, Mr. de Provera recalled the troops which he had sent towards Bonavigo and Legnago; and having left two battalions on the banks of the Adige, began his march towards Mantua, thinking only of being before-hand with the enemy. He passed through Cerea, Sanguinetto, and Nogara, where he arrived on the 14th in the evening, and where his troops passed the night. The next day he marched as rapidly as possible, passed through Castellara, and arrived at noon before St. George, a suburb of Mantua, which was one of the principal posts of the blockade, and which the French had fortified in a very strong manner.

As soon as Mr. de Provera had left the Adige, Generals Guieux and Augereau lost no time in pursuing him with whatever troops they could assemble. The rapidity of Mr. de Provera's march did not allow them to overtake him, but they came up with his rear guard, which having to do with a very superior force, and being wholly unsupported, was defeated and made prisoners. The same thing happened to the troops which Mr. de Provera had left on
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the Adige. The consequence was that that General had not more than 5,000 men when he arrived before St. George. He found that suburb so strongly entrenched, that however urgent the necessity was for forcing the lines of the blockade, Mr. de Provera did not dare to hazard an immediate assault on the suburb, with troops fatigued and small in number. He deferred his attack till the next morning, and found means in the course of the day to concert measures with General Wurmer. They agreed that on the next day the 16th they should attack, each on their own side, la Favorite and Montado, which they hoped to be able to carry more easily than St. George. But whilst they were preparing for this enterprize, Generals Buonaparte and Massena hastened their march, and that of the 6,000 men, whom they brought with them. They arrived before Mantua on the night of the 15th, and proceeded to reinforce the posts of St. Antony, la Favorite, and St. George. By this junction the French found themselves at day-break about 17,000 men strong, with the expectation of being still more numerous in a short time, General Augereau being on his march with his whole division. This superiority of force greatly embarrassed

Mr.

Mr. de Provera. That General seeing himself hemmed in by so great a number of enemies, receiving no news of General Alvinzy, and having every reason to suppose he had been defeated, had no part left him but to endeavour to break through the blockade of Mantua, and to shut himself up with Mr. de Wurmser in that place. The latter as he promised marched out of the citadel before day-break with almost all the troops under his command. He attacked and carried the post of St. Antony, then proceeded to la Favorite, and exerted all his efforts to force the entrenchments, and the corps of the enemy opposed to him. But this body, reinforced by the troops just arrived, shut up within its lines, and protected by the fire of its works, put a stop to the progress of Marshal Wurmser, and in spite of the vigour of his attack prevented him from advancing further. At the same instant Mr. de Provera likewise attacked la Favorite on his side: but he met with insurmountable obstacles, as did Mr. de Wurmser, and was incessantly repulsed by the fire from the enemy's entrenchments. Whilst he was thus making useless efforts to storm the lines of the blockade, several French corps were ranging themselves behind, and were hemming him in. General

Miollis who commanded at St. George, then sallied out of his entrenchments, and advanced in front against Mr. de Provera. The latter attacked on several points, and threatened on all, had it no longer in his power to resist such a force. Nevertheless after having bravely defended himself for a long time, and killed a vast number of the enemy, his troops being overcome by numbers and fatigue, he offered to capitulate, which was agreed to. The whole of his corps was made prisoners of war; but the officers were at liberty to return to the Austrian army on their parole. The Marshal Wurmser seeing his hopes once more disappointed put an end to an useless contest, and retired within the walls of Mantua.

Thus ended this expedition, which like all those undertaken by the Austrians in this campaign, commenced with the most brilliant success, and concluded with the greatest disasters. The failure was the result of the same causes, which had brought on the misfortunes of the months of August and November. The Austrians persisted in dividing their forces, and in making partial attacks. Buonaparte also persevered, and certainly with more reason in uniting

uniting his troops and to engage in a mass on one single point. He was not however indebted for his success to his tactics alone. He acknowledged himself in his dispatches, and the dispositions which he made clearly evinced, that he had been thoroughly instructed as to the projects of Mr. d'Alvinzy. It would be imprudent indeed to publish conjectures on the manner in which he received this most precious intelligence. What may be depended upon is that he did not procure it through the means of a common spy, but from some one whose situation afforded opportunities of being well acquainted with the plans formed by the Austrians. If Buonaparte had not been so exactly informed, it is reasonable to believe, that instead of being so completely victorious, he would have been severely beaten at some point or other, and that the Austrians would at least have been enabled to break up the blockade of Mantua. That General admitted that he never incurred so great a danger, and *that his position hung as it were by a thread*. In effect if he had remained a day longer at Verona, the corps of General Joubert would undoubtedly have been routed, and perhaps cut off. If after the victory of Rivoli he

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had stayed four-and-twenty hours more on the Upper Adige, it is probable that Mr. de Provera would have penetrated the lines of the blockade of Mantua, and formed a junction with Mr. de Wurmsfer. In either cases Mantua would have been delivered, and the French placed between two powerful divisions of the army, would have been compelled to abandon the Adige, and to repass the Mincio. Far from being guilty of the least delay, Buonaparte as if he had possessed the power of divination, hastened from Verona to the Upper Adige, and from thence to the blockade of Mantua, on the very day, and at the very hour it was necessary for him to be there, in order to frustrate the operations of the Austrians.

He arrived at Rivoli some hours before General Alvinzy commenced the grand attack which he had projected. Buonaparte then opposing to him a very large force, and at the same time making use of it with the utmost dexterity, disconcerted Mr. Alvinzy and made him experience a defeat in the very place where he had a right to expect a victory. From thence without either losing an instant or granting any repose to his troops, he led them under the walls of Mantua, and arrived
likewise

likewise some hours before Generals Wurmser and Provera carried their combined attack into execution. He opposed to these two Generals, soldiers who thirty-six hours before were fighting at Rivoli, and who brought victory with them from the banks of the Adige to those of the Mincio. This excessive exertion, the constant cause of Buonaparte's triumphs, might on this occasion have drawn him on to utter ruin, had he not been informed with precision of the numbers, position, and designs of his enemies. Without this immense advantage he would not have dared to move his troops with almost magical celerity, and to expose those points which he had left without sufficient means of defence to be forced in his absence. However brave, able and fortunate, he would never have ventured to play so hazardous a game. He was besides much assisted by the quality of the troops with which he had to contend, the Austrian Army being chiefly composed of recruits. He was not less so by the errors of the Generals opposed to him. They committed several, both on the upper and lower Adige; but the greatest undoubtedly was the ordering Mr. de Provera to commence his campaign before he could be joined by the troops assembled at Faenza by the
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the Pope, or before they could have time to march towards the Po, with a view of causing a diversion there. If either had happened, Buonaparte would probably have left a greater number of troops on the lower Adige, which would have set Mr. d'Alvinzy more at his ease, or if he had not done so, Mr. de Provera, and the Papal troops would undoubtedly have broken up the blockade of Mantua, and formed a powerful army by their junction with Mr. de Wurmser. The hurry of Mr. de Provera's march cannot be excused by the pressing necessity of relieving Mantua: a delay of a few days would not have put that place in the hands of the French, since it held out sixteen days after his defeat. The result of this expedition, which resembled in its short duration and fatal consequences, those of the months of August and November preceding, had a decisive effect in favour of the French. It secured to them the possession of their conquests in Italy, by throwing Mantua into their hands. These advantages are incontestible, but what is by no means so, is the account sent by General Buonaparte and Berthier, of the number of Austrians killed, wounded, and prisoners.

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They estimated that of the killed or wounded at 6,000, which is not very far from the truth, but they calculated that of the prisoners in one letter to be 23,000, in a second 25,000, and in a third 20,000. [*Note 23.*] In like manner they reckoned the number of cannon taken at one time to be 44, and at another 60. This variation in an article so easily ascertained as men and cannon, alone makes it doubtful what degree of credit should be given to these reports. Other considerations contribute to prove their exaggeration. Even allowing that the list of officers taken prisoners as sent by Buonaparte was exact, (which it is not) whoever knows the formation of the Austrian battalions and squadrons may judge how erroneously the French Generals have stated the account. In fact, calculating from the rank the most favourable to their reports, the number of officers is not sufficient for 12,000 men, even deducting all those who might be absent as attached to the equipage, and to commissariat. The accuracy of this method of calculating the number of prisoners, has been confirmed by several former occasions. It might be objected that some of the officers had been killed, but an equal

equal proportion of foldiers having without doubt fallen, the officers and foldiers taken prifoners muft continue in the fame proportion both in the battalions and fquadrons. Following therefore neither the French accounts, nor thofe publifhed at Vienna, after the moft exact information I have been able to obtain on this fubject, I fhall eftimate the lofs of the Auftrians under both the Generals Alvinzy and Provera, at 17,000 men, in killed, wounded and prifoners. The French faid nothing of that which they fufained during thefe fix days ; it undoubtedly fell far fhort of that of their enemies, though it amounted to upwards of 7,000 men, in killed, wounded, and prifoners.

CHAP.

C H A P. VII.

Retreat of the Austrians in Tyrol and Friuli---Battles of Carpedenolo and Avio---Defensive position taken by the Austrians.---Surrender of Mantua---March of the French to the Papal territories---Proclamation of Buonaparte---Battle of Senio---Conquest of Romagna, of the Dutchy of Urbino, and of the march of Ancona---Taking of Loretto---Letters between the Pope and Buonaparte---Treaty of Peace between his Holiness and the French.

AFTER the fatal days of the 14th, 15th, and 16th of January, the Austrians wholly incapable of undertaking any thing, or of even preserving the places they held, thought only of saving the wrecks of their army. Mr. d'Alvinzy secured himself in the defiles of Tyrol, and all the troops which were between the Adige and the Brenta, fell back on this last river, and marched towards the Tervisano: they were not immediately followed by the French who also required some time to recover from the losses and fatigues they had sustained.

In two days however they began to pursue the Austrians, whose rear guard they overtook on the 26th of January. They attacked it at Carpedenolo, and after a very smart engagement they killed by their own account 200 men, and took 900. At the same time General Joubert marching up the two banks of the Adige followed the Austrians into Tyrol. He attacked their advanced posts at Avio, and made some prisoners amounting, as he reported, to 400. He continued to advance for some days, and successively took possession of the towns of Torbole, Roveredo, and Trent, as fast as they were evacuated by the Austrians. If we may believe that General, they left in this last town 2,000 sick or wounded, and lost in their retreat 1,800 men taken prisoners. The Generals Massena and Augereau marched, the first towards Feltre, and the other towards Treviso, and continued as well as Joubert to advance till they had arrived before the new defensive position which the Austrians took behind the rivers Adige, Lavis, and Piave. Their line extended from Botzen or Bolzano, (the point where the defiles of Tyrol become impenetrable, or at least cannot be turned) to the mouth of the Piave, which falls into the

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Adriatic sea, above and near to Venice. They divided their army into three principal bodies, one of which defended Tyrol, and another Friuli, where they placed the greatest number of their Forces. The third body stationed between the two first, covered the space enclosed between the sources of the Lavis and the Piave. It was in this position defended by three rivers, and a chain of almost inaccessible mountains, that the Austrians, obliged to abandon Mantua and Italy to the French, and having no other view than that of covering the hereditary dominions, concentrated their remaining forces, and waited for new ones. Their army was still under the command of Lieutenant General Alvinzy, whom His Royal Highness the Archduke Charles replaced soon after.

The disasters and retreat of the Austrians deprived them of all hope of preserving Mantua. This place, for which the House of Austria had made such great exertions, and had suffered such considerable losses, was at length obliged to capitulate: its garrison much diminished by the sword, but still more by disease, had been long deprived of common necessaries, and reduced to eat horse flesh. Overwhelmed with fatigue, misery, and

want, it had borne them all in the hope of preserving to the Emperor a place on which depended his power in Italy. It was reduced to the last extremity, when the Generals Alvinzy and Provera made a last effort for its relief. The event of this expedition reduced Marshal Wurmser to the hard necessity of surrendering a fortress which he had defended during four months with a perseverance and activity, worthy of the highest applause. The honourable conduct of this veteran officer secured to him the respect even of his enemies, and the capitulation which they granted him bore testimony to the high estimation with which he had inspired them. It was signed on the 2d of February; the principal articles were: that the garrison consisting of 18,000 men, should become prisoners of war, but be conducted into the territories of the Emperor to be there exchanged in preference to all others [*Note 24.*] That Marshal Wurmser, all the Generals, the officers of the staff, 200 cavalry, and 500 individuals at the choice of Mr. de Wurmser, should not be prisoners of war, and should return into the Austrian dominions with 6 pieces of cannon and their artillery men; that all the Generals and officers should

should keep their swords and baggage, and the privates of the infantry retain their knapsacks, and those of the cavalry their cloak bags. Besides these conditions Mr. de Wurmser obtained advantageous terms for the inhabitants of Mantua, and secured to them the exercise of their religion, and the enjoyment of their property and privileges. The just regard thus paid to the rank, the age, and the conduct of Marshal Wurmser, reflected so much the more honour on Buonaparte, as he had not hitherto given any opportunity of praising his moderation.

The French General having no longer any opponents in Italy, resumed the execution of those plans of plunder and dismemberment, which had been concerted either by himself or by the leaders of the French Republic. After the defeat of the Generals Alvinzy and Provera, he had hastened to reinforce the troops which he had stationed in the Dutchies of Bologna and Ferrara, and had dispatched General Victor thither with orders to penetrate into Romagna. Shortly after he went himself to take the command of this detachment, in order to give more dispatch and greater success to the expedition. He was preceded by two proclamations, in

in the first of which, after having enumerated the injuries which the French pretended to have received from the Pope, he declared that the armistice concluded between his Holiness and the French Republic in the month of June preceding, was at an end. The second of these proclamations exhibits so well the style and character of Buonaparte, and drew on him such deserved odium both in Italy and France, that I think it right to transcribe the whole of it.

“ The French army is going to enter the territories of the Pope.—It will be faithful to the maxims which it professes ; it will protect religion and the people. The French soldier carries in one hand the bayonet, sure pledge of victory, and offers with the other to the different towns and villages, peace, protection, and safety : Woe be to those who shall disdain it ! and who seduced by men of the deepest hypocrisy and villainy, shall wantonly draw down upon their dwellings the horrors of war, and the vengeance of an army which has in the space of six months made prisoners 100,000 of the best troops of the Emperor, taken 400 pieces
“ of

“ of cannon, 110 standards, and destroyed five
 “ armies.

“ ARTICLE I. Every village or town in which
 “ the Tocfin shall be founded at the approach of
 “ the French army, shall be instantly burnt and the
 “ magistrates shot.

“ ARTICLE II. The parish in which a French-
 “ man shall be assassinated shall be declared in a
 “ state of war; a flying column shall be dispatched
 “ thither, hostages shall be taken, and an extraor-
 “ dinary contribution levied.

“ ARTICLE III. All the Priests, Monks, and
 “ ministers of religion of whatever description,
 “ shall be protected and secured in their respective
 “ stations, if they conduct themselves according
 “ to the principles of the gospel. Should they be
 “ the first to transgress them, they will be subject
 “ to military execution, and treated with greater
 “ severity than other citizens.” [*Note 25.*]

On the 1st of February Buonaparte made him-
 self master of Imola; and marched the next day
 to attack Faenza, in front of which the Papal
 troops were entrenched behind the river Senio.
 These troops which had never before been in
 action ventured nevertheless to wait for the con-
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querors of the Austrians, and were desirous of shewing that report had not done justice to them. As soon as the French appeared on the left bank of the Senio, they were cannonaded from the batteries which the troops of the Pope had erected on the opposite bank. Buonaparte brought against them a legion of Italians which he had raised in Lombardy: this body of troops, which like its opponents had never been before engaged, but which was supported by the French, attacked in concert with them this little army, which was quickly broken and put to flight. It lost 14 pieces of cannon, 1,000 prisoners, and 400 killed or wounded. The French lost only 40 men; such at least was the account of Buonaparte, who also asserted that several priests had been killed in the field of battle.

After this easy victory, the French arrived under the walls of Faenza, the inhabitants of which assembled at the sound of the tocsin, and flew to arms. Buonaparte forced the gates of the city with cannon; he had not the barbarity to put in execution the threats contained in his proclamation, and did not give up the town to pillage. He contented himself with assembling all
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the Priests and Monks, whom he harangued, and brought back, as he said, to the *Principles of the Gospel*. He thought himself so sure of the effect which his speech had produced upon them, that he dispatched two superiors of Religious Orders, one to Ravenna, and the other to Cesenna, (the country of the present Pope) to prepare the inhabitants for his reception. It was a circumstance not a little extraordinary that one of the most strenuous supporters of the faction most adverse to the Catholic Religion, should make choice of two Monks for his ambassadors.

After the capture of Faenza, the French advanced into Romagna, and possessed themselves of the towns of Forli and Cesenna, near which runs the famous Rubicon. They pursued their march the following days without meeting with any opposition from the papal troops, which being divided into several separate small bodies, were not able to make any effectual resistance. Most of these corps retreated at the approach of the French, and those whom the latter came up with, were either taken or dispersed. After having traversed Romagna, Buonaparte entered into the dutchy of Urbino; he met with no farther op-

position, advanced into the march of Ancona, and made himself master of the town of that name, where he took 1,200 of the Popal troops, and a great quantity of cannon and arms of all sorts, that place being one of the principal arsenals in the Pope's territories. On the 11th. Buonaparte sent a detachment to take possession of Loretto, in the hope of finding there the boasted treasure of the Holy Virgin; but care had been taken a few days before, to remove the greatest part of it. The French found nothing there but the Statue in wood of the Madonna, some relics, and some valuable articles, worth nearly 100,000 livres (£4,000 sterling) which General Berthier estimated nevertheless at a million, (£40,000 sterling.)

Buonaparte at this period issued a proclamation, which there was little reason to expect from him, and which concurred with the capitulation granted to Marshal Wurmser, to shew that he was not inaccessible to the sentiments of moderation, justice, and humanity. Satisfied, he said, with the conduct of the French priests, who had taken refuge in Italy, he forbid, under the severest penalties, all the inhabitants of the country

try , as well as all the individuals of his army, to molest them, under any pretence whatever ; ordered that they should be lodged, maintained, and fed, at the expence of the convents, in the dominions of the church ; and ended his proclamation with saying, that he should see with pleasure, whatever the bishops and other charitable ecclesiastics should do to ameliorate the destiny of the banished priests.

After the taking of Ancona and Loretto, the French continued to advance into the territories of the church, directing their march to Macerata and Foligno. Their progress, which nothing could stop, there being no probability that the Pope's troops would dispute the passage of the Appennine, filled Rome with the greatest alarms. In the person of Buonaparte, they saw Brennus and Attila. They represented him to themselves arriving in the capital of the christian world and of the arts, making himself master of its riches, destroying its monuments, and overturning the pontifical throne. All the rich and considerable persons of Rome prepared to quit that city ; and his Holiness himself made dispositions for placing his person in a state of safety. All the riches of

Rome and Loretto were packed up, and sent to Terracina. At the same time that the Pope took measures to escape the tempest, he neglected nothing to avert it. Foreseeing all the consequences, which might result from the arrival of the French at Rome, he thought it right to prevent it by making all the sacrifices which they exacted from him.

Buonaparte on his side was not less disposed to terminate his expedition by a treaty. His object was less to advance to Rome, than to excite apprehensions in the Pope of his doing so, and to determine him to agree to the conditions, which the French Republic chose to prescribe. Buonaparte felt that he could not without imprudence penetrate farther into the Papal territories. Whatever victories he had gained over the Austrians, and however weakened they were, it was possible they might attempt to take advantage of his absence, and the distance of a part of his army. In addition to this, he would have been obliged for the purpose of securing the obedience of a vast country and a city so populous as Rome, to maintain a considerable body of troops in that place, and would in that case have weakened his army, and have afforded the Austrians the opportunity of attacking it

it with advantage. If he had left in the dominions of the church only a small body of men, he would have had reason to apprehend that their weakness being known, the Pope's troops might assemble, and being supported by a people who were numerous and ill-disposed to the French, might cut off the return of the latter, engaged as they would be in a difficult country, and where every thing was against them. Being unable at any rate to employ more than one month in this expedition, Buonaparte instead of undertaking an uncertain and dangerous conquest, was right in preferring a treaty which gave him without risk all the advantages that he could expect from the war. He had besides received from Paris instructions conformable to these views, the Courts of Madrid and Naples, having made advances to the executive directory in favour of the Pope.

These considerations induced Buonaparte to take advantage of the first pacific overtures made by Holiness. Having received from cardinal Mathei, a letter as affecting as it was dexterous, he returned an answer on the 13th of February, and announced to him that he granted his Holiness five days for the purpose of sending him a negociator, provided

vided with full powers to treat for peace. Two days afterwards Buonaparte received the following letter.

“ Dear Sir, health and apostolical Benediction,

“ Being desirous to terminate in an amicable
 “ manner our existing differences with the French
 “ Republic, by the retreat of the troops which you
 “ command, we send and depute to you as our
 “ Plenipotentiaries, two ecclesiastics, Cardinal
 “ Mathei, who is perfectly known to you, and
 “ Mon Signor Galeppi, and two secular persons,
 “ the Duke Don Louis Braschi our nephew, and
 “ the Marquis Camillo Maffimi, who are invested
 “ by us with full power to concert with you, to
 “ promise and to subscribe such conditions as we
 “ hope will be just and reasonable, binding our-
 “ selves by our faith and word, to approve and
 “ ratify them in special form, that they may be
 “ valid and inviolable at all times. Being assured
 “ of the sentiments of good-will, which you have
 “ manifested, we have abstained from any removal
 “ from Rome, and by that you will be persuaded
 “ how great is our confidence in you. We finish
 “ by

“ by assuring you of our greatest esteem, and by
 “ giving you the paternal apostolical benediction.”

PIUS 6.

Given at St. Peter of Rome the 12th of February.

This letter, and the arrival of the negociator was quickly followed by the conclusion of peace; and Buonaparte returned to the Pope the following answer:

“ *Most Holy Father,*

“ I ought to thank your Holiness for the
 “ obliging things contained in the letter, which
 “ you have given yourself the trouble to write
 “ to me. The peace between the French Repub-
 “ lic and your Holiness has been just signed. I
 “ congratulate myself on having been able to
 “ contribute to your particular repose. I conjure
 “ your Holiness to distrust those persons who at
 “ Rome are sold to the Courts which are enemies
 “ to France, or who allow themselves to be ex-
 “ clusively guided by those malicious passions
 “ which always bring on the ruin of states. All
 “ Europe knows the pacific and conciliating vir-
 “ tues of your Holiness. The French Republic
 “ will,

“ will, I hope, be always one of the truest friends
 “ of Rome. I send my Aid-de camp, Chief of
 “ Brigade, to express to your Holiness the esteem
 “ and perfect veneration which I have for your
 “ person, and I beseech you to believe the desire
 “ which I have to give on every occasion proofs
 “ of that respect and veneration, with which I
 “ have the honour to be your very obedient servant,

BUONAPARTE, General in chief.”

From the Head Quarters at Tolentino,

February 19.

The Articles of peace were nearly the same with
 those of the armistice concluded in the month of June
 preceding, of which this treaty might be said to be
 only a ratification. The principal conditions were,
 that the Pope should give up irrevocably to France
 Avignon, the Comtat Venaissin, the Duchies of
 Bologna and Ferrara, and the legation of Romagna;
 that he should pay in two months 15,000,000 of
 French livres over and above the 21,000,000 sti-
 pulated in the armistice concluded in the month
 of June, of which 5,000,000 only had been
 paid; that the French should remain in possession
 of the citadel of Ancona till peace should be esta-
 blished

blished on the Continent, and of the provinces of Macerata, Umbria, Perugia, and Camerino, till the 36,000,000 due from the Pope should be entirely paid. They likewise confirmed the articles which stipulated the gift of the statues, pictures, and precious manuscripts. The French made besides, as Buonaparte wrote word, a good harvest, of these in Romagna, the Dutchy of Urbino, and the march of Ancona.

Such was the price at which the Pope who had never declared war against the French, and who had only made it for the purpose of self defence, was obliged to purchase the preservation of the throne of St. Peter. It cost nearly the third part of the dominions of the church, and more than one year of his revenues, to satisfy the ambitious views and the rapacity of the French Government.

After having acquired by this treaty new pecuniary means for the subsistence of his army, from the chests of which a treasurer named Flachet had just stolen 6,000,000 (£250,000 sterling) Buonaparte employed himself in laying also under contribution the Grand Duke of Tuscany, and the Republic of Venice. In this manner did the French accomplish their purpose of making this

campaign at the expence of the neutral powers, and thus did the latter, for the sake of a neutrality which was constantly violated, make greater sacrifices than it would have cost them to defend the entrance of Italy against the French, or to drive them from thence after they had invaded it.

There remains only to present the reader with some general observations on the whole of the campaign taken together, and on its result.

C H A P. VIII.

IT would be useless for me to enlarge on the astonishing succession of events, which I have been describing. The facts speak for themselves, and are too striking to require being detailed. Piedmond invaded, and the King of Sardinia forced to an ignominious peace; Lombardy conquered; both banks of the Po republicanized; the King of
Naples

Naples detached from the Coalition; the Pope deprived of nearly one third of his dominions; all the north of Italy a prey to the miseries of war, and to political convulsions; that country but lately so rich and flourishing, robbed of its wealth and splendor: Such is the picture presented to us by this memorable campaign, which will be to posterity a subject of admiration and regret, and which the annals of war with a place on a level with, if not above, that of 1706, [*Note 26.*]

No person has so much contributed to the issue of the campaign of 1796, and by it to the peace which will follow this war, than the commander of the French army, Buonaparte. [*Note 27.*] None of the Generals of the Republic have performed services so important and so difficult. He is the only one amongst them who has not owed all his success to the superiority of his forces, or to political causes. Active, enterprising, able, and above all fortunate, he has committed few military faults, has not suffered his adversaries to commit any with impunity, and has not in person experienced one defeat. The war of Italy, which till 1796, had been, if I may use the expression, only an episode of the general war, he made its principal and leading

object; and there where the Emperor seemed to have the least to apprehend, he made him experience the most sensible losses, and caused the most serious alarms.

If Buonaparte has been so great as a General, he has been far from shewing himself so as a conqueror or as a man. The cruel manner in which he treated the towns of Milan, Pavia, Lugo, and Arquata; the burning of Binasco and several other villages; the massacre of a great number of their inhabitants; the outrages and pillages which he sanctioned by impunity as well as by his own example, have tarnished the splendour of his victories, and have left him no other claims to the admiration of posterity. The despotism which he exercised over the countries conquered by his arms, the excessive contributions which he imposed on the inhabitants, and the extreme rigour with which he enforced the measures ordered by the French Government, have fortunately weakened the great effect of opinion, which his victories might have produced in Italy. Notwithstanding the formation of the Cispadan and Transpadan Republics, and although they furnished many thousands of auxiliaries to the army of Buonaparte, one cannot doubt the aversion which the majority

majority of the inhabitants of this country has for the French, and for their political principles. The violent insurrections which broke out whenever the latter had experienced any check, afford an unequivocal proof of the sentiments of hatred and vengeance with which they had inspired them as well as of all the evils which they had occasioned. [Note 28.] If Buonaparte has by his political conduct placed himself below the height to which his military triumphs had raised him, neither has he kept up to it by his personal qualities. The bombast, the boasting, and the marvellous which mark all his letters to the Directory, the constant exaggeration of the losses of the enemy, the ridiculously diminished estimate of his own, the perpetual representation of the destruction of the Austrian armies when they had only been beaten, the capture of Mantua so often announced as very near many months before it took place, the circumstance of 4,000 men laying down their arms at Lonado at his command, have given to his narrative the appearance of a military romance; and still leave just doubts, not of the reality of his victories, but of the extent of their consequences.

In fact, if one takes the trouble to cast up the number of Austrians whom Buonaparte has successively declared to be killed, wounded and made prisoners from the opening of the campaign to the capture of Mantua inclusively, we shall find that the killed or wounded amount to near 50,000, and the prisoners to more than 100,000 men. In order to enable the reader to judge of the degree of credit which should be given to this enumeration, I will present an account of the number of Austrian troops sent into Italy, from the month of March 1796, to the month of January 1797, which I have every reason to believe to be a pretty correct statement.

The army of Mr. de Beaulieu at the opening of the campaign	- -	30,000
Troops which came from the upper Rhine with M. de Wurmser	- -	30,000
Re-inforcements sent to Mr. d'Alvinzy during the months of September, October, and November	-	25,000
Troops detached from the corps of M. de Frolich and the armed Tyrolese		11,000
		Fresh

Fresh re-inforcements sent to Mr. d'Al-	
vinzy in December and January	9,000
Total.	105,000

From this statement, rather exaggerated than under-rated, we find that according to the accounts sent by General Buonaparte, he must have taken killed or wounded 45,000 men more than the Austrians employed in Italy during this campaign; not to mention that at least 10,000 died in the hospitals, and that after the capture of M. de Provera, and the defeat of M. d'Alvinzy at Rivoli, there still remained to the latter about 30,000 men, either in the Tyrol or on the Brenta.

Perhaps it may be acceptable to compare the statement which I have just given with that of the forces sent also by the French into Italy, and with that of the loss which they sustained.

The army of Buonaparte (or of the lower	
Alps) before the opening of the	
campaign	30,000
Troops drawn from the two armies which	
had made war in Spain, and which	
	were

were sent into Italy, in March,	
April, and May	- - - 35,000
Army of Kellermann, (or of the upper Alps,) which after the peace with the king of Sardinia, was successively incorporated with that of Buonaparte,	- - - 25,000
Reinforcements which arrived from the interior, 'till January 15, 1797	18,000
Troops raised in Italy	- - 12,000
	Total 120,000

Buonaparte found himself at the end of January at the head of about 60,000 men. He had therefore lost at that period, an equal number in killed, prisoners, rendered unfit for service, or dead in the hospitals: that is to say, only 15,000 less than the Austrians. If one is surprised that the difference between the loss of the one army almost always victorious, and that of the vanquished army, was not greater, a reason for it will be found in the indifference with which Buonaparte always lavished the blood of his soldiers; an indifference to which he owed almost all his success,

in

in the sacrifices of men which he made at Lodi, at Fonteniva and Arcole, and more than all, in the diseases occasioned by the climate, the blockade of Mantua, and the intemperance of the French soldiery. [*Note 29*]

It has been seen in the course of this work, from what causes and owing to what faults the Generals Beaulieu, Wurmser, and Alvinzy, were successively driven out of the Milanese, from the dutchy of Mantua, and finally from all Italy. After having sustained for four years so many losses and expences, the cabinet of Vienna nevertheless formed, during this campaign, six powerful armies in Italy, made greater efforts, and displayed greater resources towards the end of the war, than it had done in the beginning of it. Though it might probably have done better, had it begun as it ended, it deserves applause however for the wisdom with which it reserved its means in a war, the long duration of which it was easy to foresee, and for the energy with which it employed them in this last campaign. This would, without doubt have been a successful one, if the means which were provided with vigour, had been directed with ability. But the

Austrian Generals, persisting in Italy in their old ideas of tactics, whilst the Archduke was advantageously following new ones in Germany, constantly practised in the former country their system of *Ubiquity*, notwithstanding the success with which Buonaparte opposed to them a contrary line of conduct. Their mode of carrying on the war was methodical and slow, whilst his was enterprising and violent: They were making combinations, whilst he was preparing battles: They were shewing themselves on all points, whilst he made a point of appearing strong but on one: They were extending themselves, and endeavouring to circumvent him by their manœuvres, whilst he contracted himself, and advancing rapidly in mass against the point which it was of importance to him to force, broke in a moment the line and the combinations which they had formed against him. It was to this system, invariably followed by Buonaparte, that he owed the victories of Millefimo, Montechiaro, Castiglione, Roveredo, and Rivoli: it was by the rapid transposition and violent employment of his troops, that he gained such brilliant successes, in the Months of August, November,

vember, and January; and that at each of these periods, in less than six days, he disconcerted plans, and dispersed armies, which had been two months in forming.

Some secondary causes also contributed very much to the issue of this campaign. The council of war at Vienna chose, as it had done in the preceding ones, not only to take the charge of forming the general plan of the campaign, but also to direct the execution and local application of it. The Austrian Generals, bound by positive instructions, not daring to undertake any thing contrary to them, and being less responsible for events, than for their obedience to the orders which they had received, were often obliged to sacrifice to them opportunities of probable success, even fought for them less anxiously, and considered less how to deserve applause, than how to escape censure. The first dispositions of the Austrians being made with a great deal of care, exactness, and often with ability, and the General executing them with scrupulous fidelity, they were almost always crowned with success, [Note 30]. But when the talents of the enemy, or the chance of war produced any unforeseen

event, which reduced the Austrian Generals to the impossibility of executing the plan which had been dictated to them ; then obliged to rely on their own discretion, not being in the habit of taking it for their guide, and fearing to commit themselves, they neither dared, nor were capable of acting independently, and did not hazard any of those decisive strokes, which in certain circumstances can alone give victory.

Buonaparte was much more advantageously circumstanced. The necessity in which the Executive Directory found itself of paying, maintaining, and subsisting the armies of the Republic at the expence of the countries which they occupied, did not admit of its limiting the power of its Generals ; and as those had every thing to do, it was requisite that they should have the power to do every thing. To these considerations was added the confidence which Buonaparte's first victories inspired. They taught the Directory that it might rely on the talents and good fortune of this young man. They left it altogether to him to direct at his will the force which was entrusted to him. Exempt from all responsibility, and neither mistrusting himself or
his

his fortune, he could take advantage of all favourable circumstances, and could even seek for victory in hazard. All the confidence which the Directory had in Buonaparte, he extended to the Generals who were under him, and left them the liberty of regulating their conduct according to circumstances and their own judgment. He had seldom occasion to repent of the latitude which he gave them; and when they made a bad use of it, he employed them no more; he changed his Generals, but not his system. He owed to it in great part his successes; as those of the Archduke in Germany resulted principally from the full powers which he had received, and from the independence in which he was placed, of the direction as well as censure of the aulic council of war.

Buonaparte appears also to have very ably employed another powerful means of success, that of treachery and secret intelligence. Imitating in that respect Prince Eugene, he spared no pains or expence to procure faithful spies, and to gain over people, who were in a situation to admit of their being well informed. Taking with one hand money from the countries which he had conquered, he lavished it with the other to purchase or to discover
the

the secrets of his enemies. [*Note 31*] The Austrian Generals having little money to dispose of for the same object, and not being able to procure it in the same manner that Buonaparte did, had it not in their power to be equally prodigal. In this they laboured under a very great disadvantage ; and it is not one of the least real causes of their reverses. Those which they experienced in the latter months of this campaign, resulted also in great part, from the quality of the troops which they commanded. The armies which were formed in the months of November and January, had a considerable proportion of recruits. The flower of the army of Italy had been destroyed or taken in the fatal expedition of the month of August ; and what then escaped, was afterwards shut up in Mantua with Mr. de Wurmser. The sixth army formed since the month of January, and of which the Archduke Charles has taken the command, is also in great part composed of young soldiers. That of the French on the contrary, with the exception of some thousands of men raised in Italy, is composed of the best troops of the Republic. In proportion as the latter disengaged itself by peace from part of its enemies, it diminished the number of its armies, and sent to those

those which it retained, the choice part of those which it suppressed. Those the troops which had been employed against Spain, la Vendée, and the King of Sardinia, went to repair the losses of the armies in Germany and Italy. The latter consists at present of none but formed and veteran soldiers; whilst the Emperor has been only enabled to supply with recruits, the void which has taken place in his armies. The French republic has at this time the same advantage over the Emperor, with respect to the quality of troops, which that Prince had over it at the commencement of the war. [*Note 32.*]

March, 1797.

F I N I S.

NOTES

FOR THE

CAMPAIGN OF ITALY.

Note 1. Page 218.

THE Bocchetta is a chain of mountains, over which, forming many windings, passes the great road from Lombardy to Genoa. On the top of the highest of these mountains, the road contracts itself so much that scarcely three persons can pass abreast. It is properly speaking this pass which is known under the name of Bocchetta. It is the key to the territories of the Genoese Republic.

Note 2. Page 219.

The city of Genoa is ten miles in circumference. The regular troops of the Republic do not exceed 3,000 men, but it can, if necessary, assemble 30,000 militia. It had as many as 18,000 on foot in the last war in which it was engaged. This town was bombarded in 1746 by an English fleet, and taken by the Imperialists who had

B b b

forced

forced the passage of Bocchetta. It will no doubt be recollected in what manner it delivered itself from the latter.

Note 3. Page 243.

Buonaparte having assembled this council of grenadiers, made them an energetic harrangue, in which he did not dissemble the dangers that attended this *coup de main*. The answer of the grenadiers was, " Give us some brandy, and we will see what is to be done. It was given them in abundance, and produced a greater effect than the speech of Buonaparte. An officer of the Austrian staff related to the author this fact, which was imparted to him by a French officer, who was present at the battle of Lodi, and was made prisoner some time afterwards.

Note 4. Page 247.

This Basseville, secretary to the French Embassy, was massacred three or four years since by the populace of Rome, whom he had irritated by his conduct, and his revolutionary discourses.

Note 5. Page 249.

It was five miles from this town that Francis I. King of France was made prisoner by the Imperialists, in 1525. He was conducted from thence, and imprisoned at Pizzigtone.

Note

Note 6. Page 254.

Bologna is, next to Rome, the richest, and most important city of the dominions of the church. It has nearly 100,000 inhabitants.

Note 7. Page 254.

The town of Ancona is small, but very rich. It has a citadel and a pretty good port.

Note 8. Page 254.

The reader is without doubt struck with the hardship of this last condition, which had likewise been imposed on the King of Sardinia. The directory had the effrontery to deprive two Sovereigns of their most precious right, and most sacred duty, that of maintaining the public tranquility, and of punishing those who disturb it. It dared to protect criminals from the power of justice, and to constitute itself arbiter between Princes and their subjects; and this, whilst it punished with death every Frenchman who did not acknowledge its authority; whilst it accused the coalesced powers with wishing to interfere in the Government of France, and professed to make war against them, only to prevent their realizing that project, and to punish them for having conceived it. By reducing two Sovereigns to this degree of humiliation, one knows not whether the Directory did not in truth surpass in despotism those who

at the beginning of the century, wished to force Louis the XIV. to dethrone his own grandson.

All the world certainly knew that the Chiefs of the French Republic had never ceased from its first establishment, to support and recompence all strangers who partake of their principles, and endeavour to put them in practice. But it was not expected that they would make this protection one basis of their diplomatic system, and that they would force Sovereigns themselves to sanction the rebellion of their subjects.

Note 9. Page 256.

When sending an account to the Directory of this expedition, Buonaparte added, that on his going to Florence, the Grand Duke of Tuscany *had requested him as well as the Commissioner Salicetti, to do him the honor to come and dine with him, which they had thought proper to accept.*

Note 10. Page 257.

It was under the walls of Lugo that the Romans were defeated by the Gauls with the loss of 25,000 men: Belisarius built a fortress there.

Note 11. Page 258.

The Castle of Milan was besieged in 1707 by Prince Eugene, and made an excellent defence. The Marquis de la Floride commanded there.

Note

Note 12. Page 259.

The last Duke of Mantua was put under the ban of the Empire in 1703, as a punishment for having taken part with the French. The Imperial troops commanded by Prince Eugene, made themselves masters of the whole Dutchy of Mantua in 1707. Since that period, the House of Austria has remained in possession of it. It is annexed to the Milanese.

Note 13. Page 276.

The French formed the same plan in 1703, and the Duke de Vendome, who commanded their army in Italy, received orders to penetrate through the Trentino into Germany, in order to form a junction with the Elector of Bavaria. But although Mr. de Vendome was very superior in number to the Imperialists, he was unable to force the defiles of the Tyrol, and advanced no farther than the city of Trent.

Note 14. Page 280.

The King of Naples had made very considerable military preparations, and had raised his army to near 80,000 men. It consists in time of peace of only 40,000, of which a great part are Swifs.

Note

Note 15. Page 286.

The accuracy of this statement may be relied upon, both with respect to the numbers of the French and Austrians, and with respect to their position. It was sent to the author such as he has given it, by an Austrian General officer who commanded a corps in that expedition. If on this occasion particular stress is laid by the author on his authority, it is because the Austrians were then for the first time superior in number to the French, and because some readers might perhaps be induced to doubt this from the issue of the expedition.

Note 16. Page 288.

These two posts are very strong, and have been considered as highly important in all the wars of Italy. They have always been occupied by the armies which had to defend the entry of the Veronese and the Duchy of Mantua.

✍ By error of the press Note 17 has been omitted in the work: it comes in after the words, "of the Austrians was exaggerated," page 292, line 3.

Note 17. Page 292.

It was impossible to entertain a doubt of this in reading the dispatches of General Berthier, chief of the staff, which bore the same date as those of Buonaparte. The
first

first estimated the loss of the Austrians at 5,000 men made prisoners, and 3,000 killed and wounded; whilst the second made the latter amount to 8,000. The accounts of these two Generals had already been contradictory with regard to the defeat of Mr. de Wurmser in the month of August. Buonaparte wrote that he had taken from 12 to 15,000 men, and 70 pieces of cannon. Berthier in a letter equally official, written a few days afterwards, fixed the number of prisoners at 9,000, and that of the cannon taken at 45. The last-mentioned General, being chief of the staff, must necessarily have been as well informed on these points as Buonaparte himself, and cannot be suspected of wishing to lessen the enemies loss. I could give other examples of the difference in the reports of these two Generals. These contradictions shew the just measure of Buonaparte's veracity.

Note 18. Page 302.

This General is the son of the late first clerk of the war office, and of the repository of plans at Versailles. He owes his military fortune to Marshal de Broglie, to whom he was Aid-de-camp in 1789, when the Marshal commanded the army assembled round Paris.

Note

Note 19. Page 306.

The troops of the Pope, whatever ridicule be attached to their name, would not be contemptible if they had good officers. They are well kept, and have good pay. They were engaged with the French in an affair very honourable for them, though unfortunate, since they had never seen fire, and had to do with the most experienced troops in Europe.

Note 20. Page 93.

It was near this town situated on the Flaminian way, that historians pretend the famous triumvirate was formed. It was likewise in this town called by some Fayenza, that the earthen ware known by the name of *Fayence* was invented. Raphael, Julio Romano, and Titian, did not disdain to employ their pencils in painting some of these earthen vessels.

Note 21. Page 315.

He had marched into that town to intimidate the Pope, and to induce him to sue for peace. He had also in view to engage, or rather to force the Grand Duke of Tuscany to pay 2,000,000 to the Republic, to indemnify it for the trouble and expence it had incurred by *defending the port of Leghorn against the English*. Buonaparte renewed his demand after the defeat of the Austrians

trians, and the Grand Duke thought it not prudent to refuse it.

Note 22. Page 323.

The reader will perhaps not be displeased to read an extract from the private account which the author has received from the officer who commanded this column.

“ I had the command of the first column, consisting
 “ of 4,000 men; without a single horse or cannon,
 “ each soldier and officer on foot, provided with iron
 “ cramps, preceded by pioneers to break the ice. I
 “ marched thus during two days and two nights without
 “ halting, over rocks covered with snow, and without
 “ finding a single bush to make fire with. The third
 “ day, after a march equally severe, but through a
 “ country less dismal, I succeeded according to the
 “ general plan, in turning the position of the enemy,
 “ who were entrenched at Rivoli, on the banks of the
 “ Adige. Whilst I made this movement with my
 “ corps, three columns attacked the entrenchments of
 “ Rivoli in front, and carried them. The enemy re-
 “ took them, and we again succeeded in driving them
 “ out; but by one of those inexplicable fatalities, peculiar
 “ to the Austrian army in Italy, the three columns
 “ which had attacked in front, having once more
 “ lost the entrenchments, my column found itself cut
 “ off, and abandoned by the rest of the army. I had

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“ now

“ now nothing left but to cut my way through the ene-
 “ my, for I could not bring myself to capitulate.
 “ Without cannon or cavalry I had to make my way
 “ through a victorious army, which attacked me with
 “ all the advantage arising from numbers, from the
 “ ground, and from the nature of their arms. Ac-
 “ cordingly the greatest part of my troops was either
 “ killed or taken. Almost all the staff officers of my
 “ corps were wounded and made prisoners.

“ Seeing no longer any means of rejoining our army,
 “ which had retired into the mountains, I turned with
 “ 10 officers towards the lake of Garda, upon the bor-
 “ ders of which I remained shut up in a country house
 “ for two days and two nights, in order to escape the
 “ French patrols in search of us. On the third night
 “ I threw myself into a boat with my officers, and in
 “ spite of the vigilance of the French Feluccas we suc-
 “ ceeded in passing through them by dint of rowing, and
 “ happily arrived at Torbole, where there was an Aus-
 “ trian garrison.”

Note 23. Page 335.

Amongst these prisoners were the three Generals Pro-
 vera, Klobos, and Hohenzollern, 5 Colonels, 5 Majors,
 62 Captains, 78 Lieutenants, 48 Sub-lieutenants, and
 24 Ensigns. Several officers comprehended in this list
 were improperly included, and amongst others Colonel
 Lusignan,

Lusignan, who was one of the five Colonels said to be made prisoners, although he was not taken.

Note 24, Page 340.

It had consisted at the time of the junction with Marshal Wurmser of 24,000 men ; 6,000 had perished either by the sword or contagious fevers ; and a like number was in the hospitals.

Note 25 Page 343.

These means were not besides the only ones employed by Buonaparte to facilitate his march through the Papal territory, and for preventing the resistance which he might have experienced from a numerous and armed people. Before he made use of threats, he had endeavoured to tranquillize and lull the Papal Government into security. He had written Cardinal Mathèi a letter on the 20th of January, which contained the following expressions. “ *We are on the point of unravelling the*
 “ *plot of this ridiculous comedy.* You are witness of
 “ the value which I attach to peace, and of the ardent
 “ desire to spare you the horrors of war. Whatever may
 “ happen I entreat you to assure his Holiness that he
 “ may remain at Rome without inquietude. As first
 “ minister of religion, he shall meet with protec-
 “ tion both for himself and the church. You may
 “ likewise assure the people of Rome, that they shall

“ find in the French army, friends who will only re-
 “ joice at victory, as it may ameliorate the fate of the
 “ people, and deliver Italy from the dominion of stran-
 “ gers. My particular care shall be not to suffer any
 “ alteration to be made in the religion of their fathers.”

Buonaparte joined to this letter, those of Cardinal Busca to Cardinal Albani the Pope's envoy at Vienna, which he had intercepted. They contained the detail of the measures taken by the Pope for his defence, and a view of the steps to be taken with the Court of Vienna. A few days after having written this letter to Cardinal Ma-thei, Buonaparte had sent orders to citizen Cacault, agent of the Republic at Rome, to leave that town immediately, and to repair to him at Bologna.

Note 26. Page 355.

The French were at that time masters of almost all Lombardy, and of the City and Dutchy of Mantua. One of their armies occupied these territories whilst another besieged Turin. After the battle of Cagliano gained by the Duc de Vendome, over General Re-ventlaw, Prince Eugene was obliged to retreat as far as Roveredo and Gavardo: but he speedily resumed the offensive, and advanced early in May as far as Verona. Two months after, deceiving the Duke of Orleans who had succeeded Mr. de Vendome, he passed the Adige, the Tartaro, the Secchia, and the Tanaro, notwithstanding all the efforts of the Duke of Orleans, upon whom he
 had

had stolen several marches. He entered Piedmont, and raised the siege of Turin after having gained a great victory over the French army: returning back again he re-entered the Milanese, successively drove the French from all the posts occupied by them, and obliged them to evacuate Lombardy.

Note 27. Page. 355

Pascal Buonaparte, a godson of General Paoli, was born at Ajaccio in Corsica in the same year (1769) that that island became subject to France. His father who died young had the rank of Major in the service of that power. At the age of ten years Buonaparte was placed at the royal school at Brienne, from whence he was removed to the military school at Paris. While there, he discovered application and an inclination for the sciences. In 1785, being then no more than fifteen, he was appointed Lieutenant en second of the regiment *de la Fere* of artillery, which he joined at Valence. His person is middle sized, and his complexion is dark and swarthy; his countenance bespeaks nothing remarkable, except his black eyes which are lively, and habitually fixed on the ground. He brought with him from Corsica, and preserved both in the royal houses where he was brought up, and the regiment into which he entered, Republican and elevated ideas, a spirit of independance, a great deal of pride, an extravagant opinion of his own nation,

nation, and a great contempt for the rest of the world. This character as little adapted to military discipline as to society, pleased neither his commanders nor his companions: the latter did not fail to bestow on him those little corrections which when given by equals, generally prove useful lessons; they had however no good effect on the haughty and savage disposition of this young man. Dissembling, silent, vain and misanthropic, he read much, seldom went abroad, and almost always alone; he studied history and politics, disdainng the details of his profession, which he hardly attended to. Though naturally silent, when the subject under discussion was to his taste, whenever he deemed the auditory worthy of him, and more especially when Corsica was the topic of discourse, then he became animated, and spoke with great energy and warmth, though not with elegance. On these occasions he discovered a good memory, a great degree of penetration and wit, a knowledge very uncommon for his age, and above all an extreme tenacity of opinion. Such was Buonaparte before the Revolution: till that period he had shewn neither the inclinations, the virtues, the vices or the manners of his age. His opinions, the violence of his character, and his ambition, would naturally induce him to take part in this revolution; he was supposed to have had a considerable share in the disturbances which agitated Corsica in 1789. The year following he rejoined his regiment, which

which was at Auxonne, taking with him a brother of the age of twelve. One of his companions enquiring why he took so young a man as his brother with him, he replied, *I wish him to enjoy a great spectacle, that of a nation which will speedily be either regenerated or destroyed.*

Buonaparte attached himself more and more to the Republican party, and obtained a rapid advancement. He was for a short time employed in the war of la Vendée, and also at the siege of Toulon. Being at Paris on the 13th of Vendemiaire, he shewed himself on that occasion one of the warmest partisans of the Convention, and very actively seconded Barras. This last being made Director, offered Buonaparte the command of the army in Italy, on condition that he should marry the widow of the Vicomte de Beauharnois who had been guillotined. The young Italian accepted the terms, and departed for the Italian army, which he found in the greatest want of arms, clothes, and ammunition. He found the means to procure at Genoa, a part of what was wanting; and the victories which he obtained from the beginning of the campaign, very soon placed his army above all want.

This biographical note was given me by an officer who served several years in the same regiment as Buonaparte, and who was perfectly capable of appreciating him.

Note

Note 28. Page 357.

It would have been very surprising if the French could have made themselves beloved in Italy, by making it submit to the most despotic yoke, by despoiling it of its most precious effects, and drawing from it more than a 100,000,000 of livres by contribution. I have thought it right to present in this place the particulars. Lombardy was obliged to contribute 25,000,000 of livres; Mantua 800,000; the Imperial Fiefs 200,000; the Duchy of Modena 10,000,000; Massa and Carrara 600,000; Parma and Placentia 20,000,000; the Pope 36,000,000; Bologna and Ferrara 3,700,000; Leghorn as the depot of English magazines 8,000,000. If we add to these contributions, of which two thirds have been paid, the seizure of all the money which was found in the public coffers; 51 chests of silver plate taken at Milan, Lodi, and Bologna. If we add the immense value of the requisitions in kind made by the French, the pillage, the extortions, and the robberies committed by the French army, we may have an idea of the fate of Italy, and of the sentiments which its inhabitants must feel for their conquerors. Buonaparte had no hesitation to say in the proclamation which he made to his soldiers in entering into Carylthia, that all the expences of the army of Italy during eleven months had been paid by the conquered countries, and that he had besides sent 30,000,000 of livres into France.

Note

Note 29. Page 361.

I certainly do not undertake to say, that this estimate of the forces which the French and Austrians had in Italy, and of the losses which they sustained there, is arithmetically exact. Every judicious reader will perceive, that to determine this point with precision, one must have at the same time the statements made in the respective war departments of Vienna and Paris. I have only pretended to give a near and probable estimate: I have every reason to believe it to be so, from the numerous researches which I have made on this subject, from the assertions of persons to whom I have applied, and from the information which they have given me on the force, and the period of arrival of the different corps which have been respectively sent into Italy during this campaign.

Note 30. Page 363.

We may recollect, that in the three expeditions undertaken for the relief of Mantua, in the month of August, November, and January, the Austrians were victorious during the three or four first days; they were almost always so in the course of this war, whenever they began the execution of an offensive plan; and this from the causes I have just shewn.

Note 31. Page 366.

The day after the first battle of Castiglione (the 4th of August) he gave 900 pounds to and Italian spy, who
D d d gave

gave him in the course of the day an exact account of the position of the Austrians, and of the number of their troops. In consequence of this information the French General made in the night of the 4th the dispositions which might be most advantageous, and which procured him the victory which he gained the next day.

Note 32. Page 367.

These are not the only causes which have given the French such a great superiority over the Austrians in this campaign. There are others which arose from the nature of the country in which the war was carried on, and from the difference between the soldiers respectively employed. The theatre of war has been very disadvantageous to the Austrians. The mountains of Piedmont and Tyrol, are almost all extremely difficult of access. The valleys which separate them are covered with mulberry trees and vines, planted in hedge rows, or in arbours forming narrow covered ways, which must be forced one after the other by the foldier. The roads are defiles lined with walls, and are nevertheless the only places where the cavalry can act. The ground in Lombardy is not more favourable for war. It is not mountainous, but it is equally divided by vine and mulberry hedges, and the culture of rice requires a vast number of ditches full of water, which are no less embarrassing. A General must not hope to direct the movements of his troops on the ground : he can only manœuvre on maps
and

and according to the whole of his position taken together. In the Italian Tyrol a battalion can never march or attack in front. As soon as it advances to the enemy it must be scattered about as *tirailleurs*; then each man must act for himself, and consider himself alone as a small army. He must advance with rapidity when he is supported; retire in the same manner when he is not; he must fire a propos; then put himself under cover; he must call his companions when he has found a good pass. What disadvantage does not the Austrian soldier labour under in such a country! he is obliged to fight with a musket weighing eighteen pounds, to carry sixty cartridges, a very heavy knapsack, and a cloak around his breast which almost stifles him. In this condition he is to contend with the French soldier, whose musket weighs no more than a fowling piece, who has nothing but a wretched coat upon his back, which undoubtedly does not embarrass him, and whose natural agility as well as his species of courage renders very fit for this kind of war.

All new methods have succeeded in war from the Macedonian Phalanx to the tactics of Frederick. The French owe a great part of their successes to the new mode of fighting which they had adopted. They precipitate themselves like a swarm of wasps on all the points which they desire to force. Fifty drums beat the charge without ceasing; at this noise which animates the assailants,

failants, and intimidates those who are to wait their attack, the bravest advance shouting and mutually encouraging each other. Young Generals put themselves at their head and share their dangers. The timid mass follows at some distance, and fills up the ground. Artillery has but little assisted the successes of the French in Italy; they almost always charged with the bayonet. The Austrian army is brave, very brave; well managed it would be the first in Europe. But nothing is done to excite and uphold the bravery and good-will of the soldier. He is left to all the horrors of his profession; the idea of killing or being killed is constantly presented to his mind naked and unqualified. It is never disguised by the enthusiasm of honour, by the sound of military music, and the rolling of the drum. At the moment of action they send into the rear the music, and the colours, those precious ensigns, which have both in antient and modern times been so often the pledge of victory, and of the devotion of the soldiers. It is thus that an army whose elements are almost perfect, has been so often beaten by one very inferior with respect to material composition. Positions and entrenchments have besides been constantly relied on, although it ought to have been observed that they were always carried. In this war inanimate nature as been of no use, living nature has done every thing.

End of the Notes for the Campaign of Italy.

E R R A T A.

Page.	Line.
3	2 <i>and elfewhere</i> for Ehrebreitstein, read Ehrenbreitstein.
7	16 <i>for</i> Morelle read Mozelle
85	23 <i>for</i> ſent read ſend
87	4 <i>for</i> new read knew
93	15 <i>and any where elfe,</i> for Petrarch read Petrarſch
106	2 <i>for</i> there read then
107	11 <i>for</i> on read of
108	11 <i>for</i> paralled read parallel
110	5 <i>for</i> were read was
118	13 <i>for</i> from read of
123	1 <i>for</i> of read to
132	3 <i>for</i> Bournonville read Beurnonville
137	2 <i>for</i> in read it
146	6 <i>for</i> moſt read more
158	21 <i>for</i> driving read deriving
168	<i>for</i> Note 36, read Note 31
175	1 <i>for</i> added read adopted ; line 10, <i>for</i> diverted read directed
181	10 <i>for</i> new read knew
182	8 <i>leave out the word</i> to
185	<i>for</i> Note 43 read Note 38
201	3 <i>for</i> where read were
213	The contents of CHAP I. of the Campaign in Italy have been omitted in the book ; look for them in the Index
220	13 <i>for</i> order read ordered
221	24 <i>for</i> ſucceed read ſucceeded
224	25 <i>for</i> then read than
234	7 <i>for</i> appentines read appennines
247	25 <i>for</i> Annibal read Hannibal
287	16 <i>for</i> exceſſive read exceſſively
288	25 <i>for</i> with read of
292	3 <i>after the words</i> was exaggerated, the Note 17 comes in
303	6 <i>for</i> directors read directory
318	17 <i>for</i> Deſenſaro read Dezenzano
330	10 <i>for</i> was read were
331	1 <i>for</i> to engage read in engaging
335	20 <i>for</i> to commiſſariate read to the commiſſariate
341	11 <i>for</i> of read for
349	20 <i>for</i> by Holineſs read by his Holineſs
355	9 <i>for</i> with a read will
362	12 <i>for</i> he made a point of appearing read he aimed at being, &c.
263	22 <i>for</i> General read Generals
367	2 <i>for</i> thoſe read thus
376	<i>for</i> Note 20, page 93 read Note 20, page 306 .

E R A T A

Page 1. The first line of the first column should read "The first line of the first column" instead of "The first line of the first column".

Page 2. The second line of the second column should read "The second line of the second column" instead of "The second line of the second column".

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The History of the Campaign of 1796, in Germany and Italy

London 1797

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